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CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES: 
INSTITUTIONAL, JUDICIAL, AND SOCIETAL 
INDIFFERENCE TO THE LIVES OF 
INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS 
Nicole B. Godfrey* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged by 
taking stock of its prisons.  That is all the truer in this pandemic, 
where inmates everywhere have been rendered vulnerable and 
often powerless to protect themselves from harm.  May we hope 
that our country’s facilities serve as models rather than 
cautionary tales.1 
 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, issued the above-quoted clarion call to protect the lives 
of incarcerated people on May 14, 2020.2  At that point, the 
COVID-19 pandemic had brought American society to a 
standstill for a little more than two months, and it had begun to 
wreak havoc on American prisons nationwide.3  Despite Justice 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  Special 
thanks to Rebecca Aviel, John Bliss, Bernard Chao, Alan Chen, Ian Farrell, César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Sam Kamin, Tamara Kuennen, Margaret Kwoka, Kevin 
Lynch, Viva Moffatt, Govind Persad, and Laura Rovner for their insight on a very early 
version of this Article.  I also want to thank Benjamin Barton, Mira Edmonds, Fanna Gamal, 
Randy Hertz, Zina Makar, and Maneka Sinha for their feedback on an earlier draft of this 
piece presented at the 2020 Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop.  Finally, I want to 
thank Sara Hildebrand, Tamara Kuennen, Jesse Loper, Sarah Matsumoto, and Tania N. 
Valdez for their thoughtful feedback and encouragement as this piece moved into its final 
form.  Additional thanks to the editors of the Arkansas Law Review for their careful 
proofreading and edits.  All errors are my own. 
1. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., statement 
respecting the denial of application to vacate stay).  
2. See id. 
3. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Rejects Texas Inmates on Covid-19 Prevention (1), 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 14, 2020, 6:00 PM), [https://perma.cc/7CZF-FSCJ] (noting that more 
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Sotomayor’s hopes that the nation’s prisons might avoid 
becoming cautionary tales, the realities of and legal doctrines 
governing the American system of mass incarceration all-but-
insured that American prisons would become a site of mass 
casualty to the COVID-19 pandemic.  This Article explains why. 
Let’s start by looking at how the pandemic impacted one 
prison—Arkansas’s Cummins Unit—among the nation’s 
approximately 2,000.4  Established in 1902, the Cummins Unit is 
an Arkansas prison that sits on nearly 18,000 acres of farmland 
that used to be a cotton plantation.5  Built to incarcerate 1,876 
men, the prison confines 1,950 today.6  The men incarcerated at 
Cummins work in all manner of prison jobs; some work the fields 
in a manner all-too reminiscent of the slaves who worked the 
plantations during the antebellum era.7  More than 100 men living 
in the Cummins Unit go to work each day as part of what is known 
as the “Hoe Squad.”8  Unpaid, these men “pile into an open 
trailer” each morning, sitting side-by-side, “shoulder to shoulder, 
hip to hip” as “a tractor pulls them deep into the prison’s fields” 
where they “pull weeds, dig ditches, and pick cotton, cucumbers, 
 
than 20,000 incarcerated people had been infected and more than 300 had died at that point 
in the pandemic). 
4. HOMER VENTERS, LIFE AND DEATH IN RIKERS ISLAND 9 (2019) (noting that “[t]here 
are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000 prisons in the United States”). 
5. Molly Minta, Incarcerated, Infected, and Ignored: Inside an Arkansas Prison 
Outbreak, THE NATION (June 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/L7L9-2D5B].  Like many states 
in the South, Arkansas used the post-Reconstruction era to repurpose its antebellum-era slave 
plantations into prisons that would set the stage for the continued subjugation of Black 
people.  See, e.g., CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 136 (2009) 
(“In the aftermath of Reconstruction and the Civil War amendments, Southern states 
dismantled the old structure and recomposed its elements into a kind of hybrid, the ‘prison 
farm,’ at sites like Angola, Cummins, and Parchman.”). 
6. Minta, supra note 5.  
7. See Rachel Aviv, Punishment by Pandemic, THE NEW YORKER (June 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/37EY-X3KT] (describing the unpaid labor of the “Hoe Squad” and the 
patrol provided by the “field riders”).  While today the “field riders” patrol is made up of 
“officers on horseback,” id., Arkansas ran its prisons using a “trusty” system until well into 
the 1960s.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
313 (1993).  The “trusty” system allowed Arkansas to inexpensively run its prisons by 
granting power to certain “favorite[]” incarcerated people who would be charged with 
overseeing the rest of the incarcerated population.  Id. (“In Cummins prison, in Arkansas, 
for example, there were ‘only 35 free world employees’ for ‘slightly less than 1,000 men.’  
This was a cheap way to run a prison, but hardly enlightened penology.”) (footnote omitted). 
8. Aviv, supra note 7.  
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and watermelons.”9  When one man asked an officer why the men 
working the fields had to use “gardening tools rather than modern 
farming technology,” the prison official told him, “[w]e don’t 
want your brain.  We want your back.”10  After returning from the 
fields or other warehouse jobs, the incarcerated men live in open 
barracks, with beds that are about three feet apart.11  Prison 
officials send them to the chow hall “three to four barracks’ worth 
of men” at a time.12  In short, the men living in the Cummins Unit 
are forced to live and work in extremely close quarters—an 
environment ripe to incubate any highly infectious disease like 
COVID-19.13 
By early-to-mid March 2020, prison officials knew that, 
before long, the coronavirus would enter the Cummins Unit, 
infecting a large swath of the incarcerated population, yet still 
insisted that the Hoe Squad report to work in the crowded trailer 
without any safety precautions.14  As the men living in Cummins 
Unit learned of the COVID-19 pandemic and its risks in late 
March, some refused to report to work.15  In response, the prison 
disciplined them,16 even though by the time of the work strike, 
“Asa Hutchinson, the governor of Arkansas, had asked that 
businesses cease ‘nonessential functions.’”17  Meanwhile, in 
seeming recognition of the coming impact of the pandemic on the 




11. Minta, supra note 5 (describing how one incarcerated person, who is 5’9”, was able 
to touch the beds next to him when laying on his back and extending his arms outward). 
12. Id.  
13. Martin Kaste, Prisons and Jails Worry About Becoming Coronavirus ‘Incubators,’ 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RHJ5-W3DF]. 
14. Minta, supra note 5.  By late March, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) issued interim guidance meant to assist prison officials seeking to protect 
the health and safety of incarcerated persons, prison staff, and the general public.  See CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON MANAGEMENT OF 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN CORRECTIONAL AND DETENTION FACILITIES 
(Mar. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/86QN-UTAQ].  That interim guidance included a 
direction about the importance of personal hygiene, social distancing, and masks in the 
prevention and management of COVID-19 cases.  Id. at 3, 10. 
15. Aviv, supra note 7 (describing how the group of men assigned to the “Hoe Squad” 
lay down on their beds when officers called their names for work). 
16. Id. (recounting that the “men were disciplined for ‘unexcused absence’—a 
violation that carries a punishment of up to fifteen days in isolation”). 
17. Id. 
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wardens to “prepare a portion/area of [their] punitive isolation 
areas to house inmates effected by the CoronaVirus,”18 and the 
incarcerated people required to work in Cummins’s garment 
factory began to “manufacture masks that would be distributed 
throughout the state’s prison system.”19  
This contradictory behavior on the part of prison officials 
continued even after the first Cummins staff member tested 
positive for the virus on April 1, 2020.20  Despite the positive test, 
prison officials did not administer mass tests to Cummins’s 
incarcerated population, nor did they track “which or how many 
of its employees had tested positive.”21  Even when incarcerated 
people began exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19, the prison 
failed to take steps to limit an outbreak.22  Instead, prison officials 
ignored the complaints of symptomatic people, all but 
guaranteeing the rapid spread of the virus among the incarcerated 
population.23  For example, on April 10, 2020, a man incarcerated 
at Cummins “went to the infirmary with a severe headache and 
other symptoms he feared were signs of Covid-19.”24  After 
informing prison officials that he had a “real bad case of diarrhea” 
and had lost his senses of smell and taste, prison officials gave 
him two Tylenol and sent him back to his crowded barracks.25 
Four days later, as the number of symptomatic prisoners 
increased, Arkansas prison officials finally began mass testing at 
Cummins.26  But even in the face of mass testing, prison officials 
ignored public health guidance on necessary safety precautions to 
limit the spread.  For example, in one barracks, four nurses 
administered forty-six tests without regularly changing their 
gloves.27  Unsurprisingly, then, by April 25, 2020, 826 
 
18. Id. 
19. Minta, supra note 5. 
20. Id. 
21. Id.  
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
24. Minta, supra note 5. 
25. Id.  
26. Id.  
27. Aviv, supra note 7. 
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incarcerated men and 33 staff members tested positive for the 
virus.28  
But prison officials did not inform all prisoners of their 
positive result right away or take steps to quarantine infected 
people.  One person reported that after mass testing in his 
barracks, “a sergeant later shouted into the barracks, ‘Y’all are 
negative.’”29  This person, who noticed he could not smell 
anything when another man “defecated a few feet away from 
him,” remained skeptical and asked a family member to call the 
prison to find out the true results of his test.30  “He was positive.”31 
Despite the mass outbreak at Cummins, incarcerated people, 
former staff members, and current staff members reported a 
shocking level of indifference to the health of those infected.32  
Former staff members confirmed a practice of shredding sick call 
requests rather than responding to them,33 and current staff 
members reported seeing prison grievances in bathroom trash 
cans.34  One former nurse of the Arkansas prison system 
confirmed:  “[t]he mentality of the infirmary is:  these individuals 
are worthless.”35  One incarcerated person, twenty-nine-year-old 
Derick Coley, saw a nurse at Cummins on April 15; the nurse 
“noted that he was too weak to walk and his blood-oxygen level 
was ninety, which would typically indicate that a patient should 
be hospitalized.”36  Rather than send Mr. Coley to the hospital, 
the nurse sent him “to the Hole, where he remained for seventeen 
days.  His vitals were never recorded again.”37  The men confined 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id.  
30. Id.  
31. Id. 
32. Aviv, supra note 7. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.  A grievance is a formal complaint lodged by an incarcerated person related to 
conditions within a carceral facility.  An incarcerated person is required by the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court.  
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).  Exhaustion generally requires the filing of a 
grievance using the prison system’s requirements and following the prison system’s 
procedures through to completion.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (cautioning 
that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion” as defined by 
administrative law). 
35. Aviv, supra note 7. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. 
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next to Mr. Coley in the segregation unit begged staff to take him 
to the infirmary because he couldn’t breathe, but staff members 
just kept walking by his cell, ignoring him.38  When officers 
finally came to his cell—“not to check on him but to clear it so 
that someone else could move in”—Mr. Coley collapsed.39  
Prison officials handcuffed him, placed him in a wheelchair, and 
took him to the infirmary, where he “was ‘worked on and then 
passed away,’” according to the coroner’s report.40  At the time 
of his death, the prison had no doctor on duty, so the infirmary 
staff called the doctor on call, William Patrick Scott, whose 
“medical license ha[d] been suspended three times.”41 
Unfortunately, Mr. Coley’s story is neither unique to him, to 
the Cummins Unit, or to the Arkansas prison system.  By May 3, 
2020, just one month after the first Cummins staff member tested 
positive for COVID-19, four incarcerated people had died of 
COVID-19 complications and nearly half of the incarcerated 
population tested positive for the disease.42  By June 9, 2020, just 
a month later, eleven people had died in the Cummins Unit 
alone,43 and by September 2020, thirty-nine people had died 
throughout the Arkansas prison system.44  By July 1, 2021, 11,425 
people incarcerated in Arkansas prisons had contracted COVID-
19, and fifty-two people had died.45  Across the country, 398,627 
people incarcerated in American prisons have contracted 
COVID-19, and 2,715 people have died.46  
Prisons across the country have faced outbreaks like the 
outbreak at Cummins.  At the Marion Correctional Institution in 
 
38. Id.  
39. Id. 
40. Aviv, supra note 7. 
41. Id.  
42. 4 Cummins Unit Inmates Die Due to COVID-19, 4029 NEWS (May 3, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/TUF8-74JB] (noting the deaths of four incarcerated people at Cummins); 
see also Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 811 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (finding that 856 
people (of the 1,950) in Cummins contracted COVID by April 27, 2020).  
43. Anna Stitt, COVID-19 Inside Arkansas Prisons: The Death of Derick Coley, 
KUAR (June 9, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GBX5-E93Z]. 
44. John Moritz, Virus Deaths at 39 in State’s Prisons; 11 Inmates Were Eligible for 
Parole, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HVM6-J5RT]. 
45. A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT, [https://perma.cc/6AK9-RF37], (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM). 
46. Id. 
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Ohio, more than 80% of the incarcerated population tested 
positive for COVID-19.47  In Wisconsin, nearly 8% of the 
incarcerated population—more than 6,700 people—in the state 
Department of Corrections contracted COVID-19 by November 
2020.48  By June 2021, that number had risen to 10,989 people 
(one in two) in Wisconsin’s prisons, a rate four times greater than 
the rate in Wisconsin overall.49  In all, the COVID-19 case rate 
for incarcerated people reached 5.5 times higher than the national 
case rate in the United States by June 2020.50  Incarcerated people 
have faced a mortality rate that is 45% higher than the overall 
rate.51 
In addition to the illness and death that accompanies an 
outbreak, conditions in prisons that are experiencing an outbreak 
are often abysmal.  For example, at Sterling Correctional Facility 
in Colorado, outbreaks have been accompanied by extensive 
lockdowns, during which incarcerated people are locked down in 
their cells without access to showers or the bathroom.52  At times, 
these lockdowns last seventy-two hours without access to a 
shower and with limited meals.53  Colorado is not alone in 
utilizing lockdowns as a tool to manage the pandemic in its 
prisons.54  Moreover, in those facilities facing rampant infection 
rates, incarcerated people who fall ill are not receiving the care 
 
47. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. UNIV. L. 
REV. 59, 63 (2020) (noting that health experts warned “that the contagion ha[d] begun to 
spread to the communities surrounding the prison where guards and other staff live”).  
48. Rich Kremer, More Than 8 Percent of State’s Prison Population Currently Infected 
with COVID-19, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/VWD4-UDZ9]. 
49. THE MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 45.  For comparison, the infection rate for 
the incarcerated population in Arkansas is 5.7 times the rate in Arkansas overall, while the 
rate in Ohio’s prisons is 2.1 times the overall rate for the state.  Id. 
50. Brendan Saloneret et al., COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State 
Prisons, JAMA NETWORK (July 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/FK6M-23ZV]. 
51. Moe Clark, Vaccination Rates in Colorado Prisons Remain Low as COVID-19 
Cases Spike Across the State, COLO. NEWSLINE (Aug. 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/Q6PT-
29Z2]. 
52. Moe Clark, ‘It Was Just Chaos’: Former Sterling Prison Guard Says COVID 
Protocols Were Not Enforced, COLO. NEWSLINE (Nov. 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6YCF-
BW6C]. 
53. Id.  
54. See Nicole B. Godfrey & Laura L. Rovner, COVID-19 in American Prisons: 
Solitary Confinement is Not the Solution, 2 ARIZ. ST. L.J. ONLINE 127, 135-36 (2020) (noting 
that prison systems are turning to solitary confinement to address the harms posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
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necessary to adequately treat COVID-19 and its attendant 
comorbidities.55  In short, American prisons have become 
cautionary tales in both their lack of preparation and their 
response to the pandemic, at a cost of thousands of lives and the 
untold suffering of hundreds of thousands of incarcerated people. 
This Article posits that American prisons were doomed to be 
cautionary tales from the start of the pandemic due to three 
interwoven strands of indifference faced by incarcerated people 
in this country.  First, the sheer enormity of the American carceral 
state56 has led to an institutional indifference to the lives of 
incarcerated individuals.  American prisons are crowded, 
unhygienic, and violent.57  Prison officials focus their energy on 
security and control rather than rehabilitation and health.58  While 
the past half century has seen a rapid expansion in incarceration,59 
prison systems have done little to account for “the many ways in 
which incarcerated people face new risks of injury, sickness, and 
death behind bars.  The deaths, injuries, sickness, and trauma 
caused by incarceration” are wholly ignored.60  The COVID-19 
pandemic has brought this institutional indifference to the fore 
 
55. Carlos Franco-Paredes et al., Imprisoned on the COVID-19 Death Row, BMJ 
BLOGS (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RA8D-C9GJ] (noting that once incarcerated people 
become ill, “they are unable to receive adequate and timely medical care”). 
56. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 9 (“There are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000 
prisons in the United States.”). 
57. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 47, at 73 (noting that “prisons are infamous for 
overcrowding”); Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1579, 1580 (2019) (noting the overcrowding inherent to the American prison system); 
Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction 
Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E8QD-5ESL] (explaining that 
toilet tanks double as sinks “for hand washing, tooth brushing and other hygiene”). 
58. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 6 (warning that “[h]ealth care is not a top priority in 
prison” because “health systems in jail and prison are usually designed and controlled by 
people who aren’t health experts”); see also id. at 2 (noting that prisons and jails “are 
paramilitary settings, where the group that has the health data is usually under the control of 
the security service”). 
59. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580 (recounting the “familiar” story of the U.S. 
incarceration rate: “The United States incarcerates more people than anyone else in the 
world, both in absolute terms and per capita.  The United States has less than 5% of the 
world’s population but 20% of the world’s prison inmates.  There are 2.1 million people 
behind bars in this country, which is almost one in every 100 adults.  Many prisons are 
overcrowded, at times unconstitutionally so.  Given these facts, it is not surprising that the 
phrase ‘mass incarceration’ is routinely used to describe the American approach to crime and 
punishment.”). 
60. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 3. 
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and highlighted the myriad ways prisons as institutions ignore the 
plight of the incarcerated.  
Second, the muddled Eighth Amendment doctrine applied to 
claims challenging prison conditions61 is the result of 
overwhelming judicial indifference to the lives of the 
incarcerated.  This judicial indifference arises in part from the 
overwhelming deference the judiciary affords to prison officials62 
and in part from a misdirected focus on punishment—and a 
concomitant focus on intent—in cases challenging prison 
conditions.63  By examining the series of cases in which the 
Supreme Court developed the modern Eighth Amendment 
doctrine that is applied in prison conditions cases, I demonstrate 
that the doctrine developed from an undue judicial concern in 
 
61. Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151, 153 (2020). 
62. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-43. 
63. Id. at 137-40.  Incarcerated people seeking to enjoin ongoing harms posed by prison 
conditions must meet an exacting, two-part test colloquially known as the deliberate 
indifference standard.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).  First, the prisoner must 
demonstrate that the condition being challenged is “sufficiently serious” in order to satisfy 
the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry.  Id. at 834.  A sufficiently serious 
condition is a condition that results in the deprivation of basic human needs, see Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), like “food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
reasonable safety.”  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 
(1989) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)).  Incarcerated people need not 
wait for harm to befall them before seeking judicial relief from unsafe prison conditions—
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment protects against the risk of 
future harms.  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).  Second, in order to satisfy the 
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, an incarcerated person must prove that 
the person or entity being sued exhibited deliberate indifference to the serious condition 
being challenged.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  In other words, an incarcerated plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant being sued knew of the risk posed by the challenged condition but 
disregarded that knowledge by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.  Id. at 
847. 
In prior work, I have argued that application of this standard is nearly impossible in cases 
seeking injunctive relief.  Godfrey, supra note 61, at 153.  In particular, I argued that the type 
of proof necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference of an entity is unclear, and I 
proposed the courts look to certain categories of proof to demonstrate the entity’s knowledge 
of the risks posed by a challenged condition.  Id. at 186-95.  Here, I seek to build upon this 
prior work by examining how the federal courts arrived at the deliberate indifference 
standard for prison conditions claims.  In so examining, I demonstrate that the standard grew 
out of an undue focus on the word “punishments” in the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
unusual punishments clause.  By focusing too much on the word “punishment,” the Court 
ignored the reality that incarceration is the punishment at issue in conditions case.  The only 
true question before the Court in a conditions case is whether the conditions at issue in a 
particular prison are such that incarceration has become an unconstitutional punishment.  
See infra Part II. 
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protecting prison officials at the expense of incarcerated lives.  
The net result of this undue protection of prison officials is that 
courts are willing to leave horrific prison conditions undisturbed 
so as to avoid prison officials’ liability.64 
Finally, the reason that the institutional and judicial 
indifferences described above have been allowed to proliferate is 
a general societal indifference to the lives of the incarcerated.  In 
part, this indifference is just a continuation of the societal 
indifference to the poor and minorities, traditionally disfavored 
groups who are disproportionately entangled in the American 
criminal system.65  But societal indifference to the incarcerated 
also stems from a general attitude that prison should be harsh 
because incarcerated people deserve the cruelty they experience 
in American prison systems.66  Compounding these attitudes, 
American prison systems are notoriously resistant to 
transparency,67 leaving the American public with little idea of 
what really goes on behind prison walls.68  
 
64. See infra Part II. 
65. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1582 (noting that “high levels of imprisonment 
disproportionately affect the poor and minorities” and positing that “criminal justice policies 
. . . are created and enforced because they have this effect—imprisonment as a form of social 
control of disfavored groups.”); see also James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: 
Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 
1063 (1997) (hypothesizing that the “warehouse prison” reflects a “paradigm shift” that 
“changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his personhood.  By 
subjecting inmates to coerced and regimented idleness, the warehouse prison signifies that 
offenders are unworthy of activities imparting social value and self-esteem.”). 
66. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1585 (noting that “[p]rison is harsh, but we have taken 
most of the other punishment options (shaming, banishment, corporal) off the table, leaving 
the remaining choices as either being inapplicable in many cases (economic sanctions, 
restorative measures), too expensive (intensive rehabilitation), or not sufficiently harsh to 
satisfy retributive or deterrence goals (community supervision, home confinement, 
community service) . . . many believe that the harshness of incarceration is a feature rather 
than a flaw—the worse the prison conditions, the greater the incentive for people to avoid 
the underlying behavior.”).  
67. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that “[t]he resistance to transparency [is the] 
product of [both] the paramilitary nature of the setting [and the] role of litigation in 
improving jail conditions.”). 
68. See generally Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the 
Violence of Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), [https://perma.cc/23AB-FATR] 
(discussing lack of transparency in American prisons); Nicole B. Godfrey, “Inciting a Riot”: 
Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, and Prisoners’ Petition and Associational Rights, 43 
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (2020) (discussing the importance of hearing the 
voices and stories of those living inside prison walls in discussions of criminal system 
reform); Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax: 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  First, the Article 
describes the institutional indifference inherent to modern 
American prison systems and how the modern, bureaucratic 
prison state strips incarcerated people of their identities in an 
effort to maintain its indifference.  Part II provides a historical 
overview of the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment and a 
survey of the cases creating the current Eighth Amendment 
doctrine as applied to prison conditions.  Through this survey, 
Part II demonstrates that the current Eighth Amendment doctrine 
is the result of an undue focus on the subjective intent of prison 
officials rather than the harm experienced by prisoners.  This part 
concludes that this undue focus arises from long-standing judicial 
indifference to incarcerated lives.  Finally, Part III examines how 
both the institutional and judicial indifferences described in Parts 
I and II result from a general societal indifference to the lives of 
the incarcerated.  This Article concludes with a call for reform of 
the American carceral system to overcome the institutional, 
judicial, and societal indifference discussed to create a system that 
is truly just. 
I.  INSTITUTIONAL INDIFFERENCE: THE 
BUREAUCRATIC PRISON STATE 
One of the inherent difficulties in talking about the American 
prison system as an institution is that there is not one American 
carceral system.69  Rather, each state and the federal government 
operate separate systems of incarceration.70  However, there are 
some common features that permeate each of these systems, and 
it is those common features that create the institutional 
indifference that made American prisons ripe for disaster when 
the COVID-19 pandemic began.  
 
Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 460-64 (2018) (discussing 
the invisibility of prisons as compared to other aspects of the criminal system); Andrea C. 
Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions, 
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462-66 (2014) (discussing problems inherent to the lack of 
transparency in penal institutions). 
69. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 162-63.  
70. Id. at 163 (discussing the expansion of the federal and state prison systems in the 
late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century).  
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First, many prison systems are overcrowded and have been 
for decades.71  Even those that are not operating at full or greater 
than full capacity, are still crowded, even if not “overly” so.72  
According to the Prison Policy Initiative, “41 states are currently 
operating at 75% of their capacity, with at least nine of those state 
prison systems and the federal Bureau of Prisons are still 
operating at more than 100%.  Only one state—Maine—has a 
current prison population below 50% of their capacity.”73  
Importantly, some prison systems have changed the way they 
calculate their capacity in recent years.74  Rather than report their 
capacity as a measurement of the number of prison beds 
anticipated in the original design of a prison, these systems 
instead report capacity as a measurement of the number of beds 
that “can be squeezed into a facility.”75  But no matter the method 
of measurement, one thing is certain:  most American prisons 
have nowhere near enough space “to allow for adequate social 
distancing or medical isolation and quarantine.”76 
Second, prison systems operate as paramilitary 
bureaucracies where medical care, mental health care, education, 
and housing classifications decisions are made in a manner that 
fails to account for the incarcerated person as an individual.77  The 
prison bureaucratic state allows prison systems to ignore systemic 
problems by attributing tragic outcomes either to incarcerated 
people themselves or “a few bad apples” among the prison staff.78  
In the COVID-19 pandemic, the flaws in this approach are 
obvious when one examines the individual stories of the men and 
 
71. Emily Widra, Since You Asked: Just How Overcrowded Were Prisons before the 
Pandemic, and at This Time of Social Distancing, How Overcrowded Are They Now?, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/MQW5-2FDW] (noting that 
nine states’ and the federal government’s prison systems “were operating at 100% capacity 
or more” before the pandemic).  
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (2015).  
75. Id.  
76. Widra, supra note 71.  
77. See, e.g., VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20 (noting how the “paramilitary nature of 
health care in jails and prisons” leads prison officials to “do [their] best to link the death [of 
an incarcerated person] to a personal failing by the deceased patient or chalk it up to a few 
bad apples when staff abuse or neglect is clearly implicated”); see also infra Section I.B.  
78. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20. 
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women who have died in prison after being infected with the 
coronavirus.79 
Finally, prison systems operate to strip incarcerated people 
from any sense of individualized identity by creating routinized 
patterns of daily life.80  Endemic to this routinized system is a 
tribalism that further solidifies the only identities that matter as 
prison officials on the one hand and incarcerated people on the 
other.81  This tribalism leads to an institutionalized unwillingness 
to identify and reform systemic failures in order to protect the 
health and safety of individual people who are incarcerated.82 
The following three sections discuss each of these three 
common features of American prisons and how those features 
help create the institutionalized indifference inherent to systems 
of incarceration in this country.  Part I.A. discusses how America 
grew to become the world leader in incarceration, locking up 
more of its citizens than any other nation in the world.  Part I.B. 
then examines the bureaucratic prison state and how prison 
bureaucracy normalizes indifference to serious harms suffered by 
the incarcerated population.  Finally, Part I.C. analyzes how the 
purposeful stripping of identity that occurs in American prisons 
perpetuates the institutional indifference to individual lives. 
 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41 (discussing the death of Mr. Coley at 
Cummins Unit); Mahita Gajanan, Federal Inmate Dies of Coronavirus After Giving Birth 
While on Ventilator, TIME (Apr. 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E2UG-DR88] (describing the 
plight of Andrea Circle Bear who died at a federal medical center in Fort Worth, Texas after 
contracting the coronavirus); Jack Rodgers, Texas Geriatric Prison Ravaged by Virus 
Dodges Injunction, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R746-
TG3Y] (recounting how nineteen incarcerated people died in 116 days in the Pack Unit in 
Texas, including Alvin Norris, who died before prison officials “took any proactive measures 
to suppress Covid-19 infections”); Lance Benzel, Before Dying of COVID-19, Sterling 
Prison Inmate Deprived of Care, Former Resident Says, THE GAZETTE (May 23, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/7RRV-KTC8] (describing how eighty-six-year-old David Grosse had only 
other incarcerated people to care for him in his final days in the prison’s ward for military 
veterans and explaining that prison officials “declined to bring him to the clinic” because he 
did not have a fever, despite that he was soiling himself and not eating). 
80. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995) (describing modern prisons as places of 
“deadening routine punctuated by bursts of fear and violence” and places of “a relentlessly 
unchanging, grimly gray routine”). 
81. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (describing tribalism as a universal feature of 
jails where correctional officers and inmates look out for their own). 
82. See id. (describing prison tribalism as creating a system wherein allegiance to a 
particular group supersedes the greater good, particularly in times of conflict or friction). 
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A. Incarceration Nation 
The United States first began to turn to incarceration as its 
primary system of punishment in the decades following the 
American Revolutionary War.83  This new mode of punishment 
derived from a sense that society must separate its deviants in 
order to root out the causes of crime, and most states opened at 
least one penitentiary in the decades leading up to the Civil War.84  
After the Civil War, states sought to design prisons that could 
maximize the number of people confined while saving money on 
administration.85  The results of this focus on maximizing prison 
beds at the lowest possible monetary cost remains visible in 
American prison systems today. 
By the 1930s, most states and the federal government 
operated prisons known colloquially as the “Big Houses” because 
of the sheer number of men confined inside the prison gates.86  
But within a few decades, those Big Houses proved insufficient 
to house the country’s exploding prison population.87  Between 
1970 and 1980, the prison population doubled; between 1981 and 
1995, it doubled again.88  And the population growth continued, 
creating the “story [that] is now sadly familiar.  The United States 
incarcerates more people than anyone else in the world, both in 
absolute terms and per capita.”89  This population growth led to 
severe overcrowding, leading prison officials to begin placing 
two or three people into prison cells built for just one person.90  
While recent years have begun to see a slight decrease in the 
 
83. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 160-61. 
84. See id. 
85. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 
supra note 80, at 170 (explaining that states constructing new penitentiaries were driven “by 
how to confine the largest number of [people] at the lowest possible cost”).  
86. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 163 n.61 (citing Rotman, supra note 85, at 185) (“Big 
Houses were prisons that held, on average, 2,500 men, prisons such as San Quentin in 
California, Sing Sing in New York, Stateville in Illinois, and Jackson in Michigan.”). 
87. Morris, supra note 80, at 236 (noting the crisis of overcrowding that followed the 
population growth in American prisons). 
88. Id. 
89. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580. 
90. Morris, supra note 80, at 237. 
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prison population,91 many prison systems remain operating at or 
near capacity, as discussed above.92 
The harms associated with the crowded living conditions of 
modern prisons are well-known.93  Crowded conditions lead to 
increased violence, and prison studies confirm that prison 
overcrowding can lead to detrimental impacts for particularly 
vulnerable incarcerated populations (“e.g., those in bad health or 
having severe psychiatric disorders, older people”).94  Crowded 
prisons also have problems providing adequate medical care to 
people behind bars.95  Prison crowding limits the programming 
and educational opportunities available to incarcerated people,96 
and it reduces the availability of visitation for people confined 
behind prison walls.97  The decrease in programming and 
education often occurs despite engorged budgets allegedly 
responsive to the larger prison population.98 
 
91. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1581, 1620 (cataloguing reform efforts undertaken by 
the state and federal governments and the concomitant decrease in prison population and 
crime rate).  While overall incarceration has begun to decrease, “[i]ncarceration of women 
has increased dramatically in recent decades, growing at twice the pace of men’s 
incarceration.”  Andrea James, Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls, 128 YALE L.J. 
F. 772, 775 (2019).  Many of the harms associated with this increase in incarceration fall 
disproportionately on Black women and children.  Id. at 775-77. 
92. Widra, supra note 71. 
93. Id. 
94. See id.; see also Stéphanie Baggi, et al., Do Overcrowding and Turnover Cause 
Violence in Prisons?, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY (Jan. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NWX4-
4BSX]. 
95. Widra, supra note 71; see also Amy Miller, Overcrowding in Nebraska’s Prisons 
is Causing a Medical and Mental Health Care Crisis, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 16, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/T93Z-UGLV] (recounting “inexplicable failures of the most basic 
medical care,” including “a man with epilepsy who has landed in the hospital several times 
because he didn’t receive seizure medication” and a rape victim who reported her rape upon 
entering prison, was given a routine physical exam, but “staff somehow missed the fact she 
was pregnant until she unexpectedly went into labor”). 
96. Widra, supra note 71; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-743, 
BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, 
STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 19-20 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-743] (recounting the 
decrease in programming and educational opportunities, “resulting in waiting lists and 
inmate idleness,” caused by federal prison population growth). 
97. GAO-12-743, supra note 96, at 21 (explaining that Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
facilities have “visiting space to accommodate the number of inmates that the facility was 
designed to house and a visitor capacity to enable staff to manage the visitation process.  The 
infrastructure of the facility may not support the increase in visitors as a result of the growth 
of the prison population.”). 
98. See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
128 YALE L.J. F. 791, 793 (2019) (explaining that the “federal prison population increased 
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Thus, prison officials knew of the harms associated with the 
sheer number and close proximity of people living in carceral 
facilities well before the pandemic.  In fact, public health officials 
have known for decades that prisons made for easy “breeding 
grounds for all sorts of communicable diseases.”99  Despite this 
knowledge, prison systems proved ill-equipped to handle the 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incarcerated 
population.  In September 2020, incarcerated people were 
experiencing an infection rate four times higher than the general 
population and a death rate twice as high.100  The import of these 
statistics, particularly on marginalized communities, can be 
slightly misleading, however, because they fail to account for 
three important facts:  first, Black Americans are twice as likely 
to die from COVID-19.101  Second, Black Americans are 
“incarcerated . . . 5.1 times [more often than] white 
Americans.”102  Finally, “incarcerated individuals are much 
younger, [and] more likely to be male” than non-incarcerated 
individuals.103  
In sum, there can be no doubt that American prisons are 
“COVID-19 hotspots”104 and that the pandemic has been 
devastating to the incarcerated population, particularly Black 
incarcerated men.105  Stuck inside overcrowded facilities, these 
people had no control over whether and when they might be 
exposed to the virus.  Their safety remained in the hands of their 
captors, prison officials who work within the prison bureaucratic 
 
from 24,640 in 1980 to 185,617 in 2017” and that even though the budget “has grown, 
‘crowding out’ other Department of Justice (DOJ) priorities, the federal prison system has 
still largely failed to implement evidence-based rehabilitation programs”). 
99. Widra, supra note 71; see also James Hamblin, Mass Incarceration is Making 
Infectious Diseases Worse, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/7AL6-DKQ9] 
(noting the prevalence of infectious diseases among the incarcerated population—“4 percent 
have HIV, 15 percent have hepatitis C, and 3 percent have active tuberculosis”—and pointing 
to the carceral system as “a primary reason that these diseases can’t be eliminated globally”). 
100. Widra, supra note 71; see also Kevin T. Schnepel, Covid-19 in U.S. State and 
Federal Prisons, NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST., 3 (Dec. 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/F4UM-QDH2]. 
101. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 18. 
102. See Nicole Puglise, Black Americans Incarcerated Five Times More Than White 
People-Report, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/3BAP-A9S5]. 
103. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 7. 
104. Id. at 14. 
105. Id. at 18, 20. 
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state that developed in response to the exploding prison 
population in the latter half of the twentieth century.106  The 
impact that prison bureaucracy has on the lives of incarcerated 
people is the focus of the next section. 
 
B. The Prison Bureaucracy 
 
As the incarcerated population grew, so too did the need for 
people to run the prisons.107  This prison population explosion 
also transformed prison systems into modern bureaucracies, 
replete with overarching “rules and regulations that bind the 
organization[s] together.”108  Many viewed this move toward 
bureaucratization of the carceral state as a good thing, and it is 
hard to argue that prisons should operate without written rules and 
regulations.109  However, the structures of bureaucracy can also 
allow individual officials to skirt responsibility when things run 
amok, thereby allowing harms to individuals subject to the 
bureaucratic state to go unchecked.110 
Before turning to these dangers of bureaucracy, however, it 
is first important to have a basic understanding of features of 
bureaucracies in general and prison bureaucracies in particular.  
Malcom M. Feeley and Van Swearingen have succinctly 
 
106. See Malcom M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the 
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE 
L. REV. 433, 456 (2004) (discussing the growth of the number of prisons and guards in the 
final three decades of the twentieth century). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 456-57.  Civil rights litigation focused on protecting the rights of the 
incarcerated also contributed to the creation of the modern, bureaucratic, penal 
administrative state.  Id. at 455 (explaining that different prison reform efforts “were part of 
a process designed to drag pre- and under-bureaucratic (and at times, feudal) criminal justice 
institutions into the modern administrative world”).  See also Godfrey, supra note 61, at 164-
65 (discussing the beginning of the modern prisoners’ rights litigation movement). 
109. Feely & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 455 (quoting James B. Jacobs, The 
Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 458 
(Michael Tonry et al. eds., 1980)) (noting that prison systems in the 1960s and 1970s had 
“no written rules and regulations” but instead used “daily operating procedures . . . passed 
[on] from one generation to the next,” resulting in an “ability of the administration to act as 
it pleased,” ensuring “its almost total dominance of the mates”). 
110. See Dan Luban, et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 2348, 2352 (1992) (discussing the reoccurring epistemological excuse of “I didn’t 
know” that comes naturally “to those who commit wrongs in a bureaucratic setting”).  
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described Max Weber’s summary of the key elements of 
bureaucracy: 
Compared to other forms of organization . . . modern 
bureaucracy is defined by a rationalized set of rules and 
regulations that bind the organization together.  Every office 
is arranged in a clear hierarchy of superordination and 
subordination, with employees subject to a rigid and 
systematic set of policies designed to maintain control and 
discipline when necessary.  Offices within the bureaucracy 
are characterized by their fixed and definite division of 
organizational responsibility, and are staffed by highly 
trained officials who are appointed by merit, have set salaries 
and pensions, secure careers, and duties that are clearly 
separated from their private life.111 
Feeley and Swearingen also aptly summarize Victor 
Thompson’s application of Weber’s ideas to the American 
administrative state and identify several additional characteristics 
of the modern American bureaucracy.112  
In total, this discussion will focus on five characteristics of 
bureaucracies identified by Weber and Thompson and applicable 
to the modern American carceral state.  First, the American 
carceral state has a clearly defined organizational structure with 
clear divisions of power and responsibility.113  Every state prison 
system and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have a hierarchy of 
prison administration.114  At the top of the prison hierarchy is the 
director of the prison system, a position usually appointed by the 
 
111. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456 (citing MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT 
UND GESELLSCHAFT 650-78, 957, 973 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim 
Fischoff et al. trans., 1968)).  
112. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456-57 (citing VICTOR A. THOMPSON, 
MODERN ORGANIZATION 10-24 (1961)).  Four of those additional characteristics are 
relevant to this discussion:  (1) routinization of organizational activity, (2) classification of 
persons, (3) slowness to act or to change, and (4) “preoccupation with the monistic ideal—
the system of superior and subordinate relationships in which the superior is the only source 
of legitimate influence upon the subordinate.”  Id. at 457.  The other American characteristics 
of bureaucracy identified by Thompson are factoring the general goal into subgoals, 
formalistic impersonality, and categorization of data.  Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id.; see also Morris, supra note 80, at 226.  
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governor or, in the case of the federal system, by the President.115  
The organizational structure that each system director commands 
varies slightly depending on the size and responsibility of each 
particular system.116  For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
is organized into separate divisions focused on subject matter as 
well as separate geographical regions meant to provide oversight 
and support to the prisons within that region.117  Most state 
systems, in contrast, are organized into divisions based on 
specific subject matter.118 
Below this broad administrative structure sitting atop the 
prison system as a whole are the people responsible for running 
particular prisons, usually known as wardens.119  Wardens are 
responsible for the staff members who actually work in the 
prisons:  the administrative, custodial, and programming staff.120  
The vast majority of prison officials are custodial, or security, 
staff, but the division between those responsible for security and 
those responsible for programming or administration is largely 
farcical.121  Indeed, the most important divisions within the prison 
 
115. Morris, supra note 80, at 226; see also Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (discussing 
the federal prison system’s transition from no central organizing body to a civil service 
system). 
116. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457-58. 
117. See Organizational Structure, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, [https://perma.cc/565P-
8PMR] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021). 
118. See, e.g., Organization Chart, ALA. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/9LVT-
67VB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Attachment L: State Organization Charts, STATE OF 
ALASKA-DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/B7K4-JVWZ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); 
Rehabilitation & Reentry, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/6FM2-DATL] (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2021); Division of Correction Organizational Chart, ARK. DEP’T OF 
CORRS., [https://perma.cc/5NUR-DBBQ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Organizational 
Chart, COLO. DEP’T OF CORRS. (Feb. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6XEQ-6XJC].  
119. Morris, supra note 80, at 226. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 226-27; see also Eric Katz, Federal Prison Employees Fear Staff Shortages 
and Mass Reassignments as COVID-19 Cases Spike, GOV’T EXEC. (Dec. 1, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/TK23-M9Y2] (noting the federal prison system’s practice of 
augmentation, whereby non-custodial staff are “augment[ed]” to perform duties of security 
staff and justifying such practice by pointing to the fact that “all staff are trained as 
correctional officers”).  Prison officials have an overwhelming us vs. them mentality, 
wherein it remains of utmost importance that they remain separate from “the criminal 
element they supervise.”  See Anthony Gangi, Yes, Corrections Officers Are Law 
Enforcement Officers, CORRECTIONS1 (Sept. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/FD4J-WLKU] 
(explaining that in the correctional officers’ view, the lack of acceptance by the broader law 
enforcement community functions as a separation “from their brothers/sisters in blue [that] 
brings them closer to the offenders in their charge”). 
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itself are those created by the prison’s top-down, hierarchical 
structure that is modeled off of paramilitary organizations.122  
Accompanying this structure is an understanding that a 
subordinate staff person’s only legitimate source of direction 
must come from his, her, or their superior.123  This can create 
confusion in prison systems, however, when administrative 
supervisors—e.g., those responsible for running the medical or 
mental health programs—issue orders to security staff related to 
an individual’s treatment.124  This type of confusion can also 
contribute to the tendency to pass the blame when something goes 
wrong for a particular incarcerated individual in a prison facility, 
discussed in more detail below.125 
The second and third characteristics of bureaucratic systems 
that can be seen in the American carceral state are interrelated.  
Second, the American carceral state is theoretically bound by a 
set of rules and regulations.126  Third, these rules and regulation 
are, in theory, used to routinize organizational activity.127  The 
reason I use the terms “theoretically” and “in theory” to describe 
these two characteristics are important.  While it is true that 
almost every corrections system in the country has a codified 
system of rules meant to govern the operation of the system, many 
systems have found ways to “circumvent” the rules and their 
processes by implementing specific practices at their facilities 
that are unique to the specific security and programming concerns 
of a particular facility.128  What this means, practically speaking, 
is that while prison systems can often enact rules and regulations 
that, on their face, are meant to protect the health and safety of 
individuals who are incarcerated, those rules may not always be 
 
122. Marvin Preston, What is “Paramilitary”?, CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 26, 2010), 
[https://perma.cc/KA68-AA7Z] (describing the established ranking system in most prison 
systems as including line staff (corrections officers), supervisors (corporals and sergeants), 
and managers (lieutenants, captains, and majors)).  
123. See id. (explaining one corrections officer’s experience in the necessity of 
following orders); see also Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457 (stating prisons 
utilize a hierarchal structure to assign clear duties to subordinates within the organization). 
124. Preston, supra note 122 (noting that “Line Staff” can be confused about the 
necessity of following orders from non-security staff). 
125. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10. 
126. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 459. 
127. Id. at 464. 
128. Id. at 460.  
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fully followed at the institutional level.  This problem can be 
compounded by the fluid nature of who is occupying leadership 
positions at any given time.  Because the commissioners or 
directors of prison systems are appointed positions, whomever is 
filing those positions is necessarily influenced by the political 
whim of the current executive.129  This means that a reform-
minded leader may struggle to find buy-in from lower-level staff 
when implementing any changes to the system, or, conversely, a 
reform-minded lower-level staff may not be able to implement 
reforms without buy-in from the current prison administration.130 
Fourth, the American carceral state relies upon the 
classification of incarcerated individuals.131  The federal prison 
system became the first prison system to create a classification 
system for incarcerated people.132  Classification systems allow 
prisons to assign people “to specific institutions, units, and cells 
according to their propensity for violence, length of sentence, 
criminal history, and the like.”133  While in some instances 
classification may afford more protection to incarcerated 
individuals,134 it has also led to the creation of so-called “prison[s] 
of last resort,” where so-called intractable people can be sent 
when the prison system cannot find another place for them.135  
 
129. Morris, supra note 80, at 227 (describing the problem inherent to the “lack of 
continuity in leadership” at the director level). 
130. See, e.g., Michelle Theriault Boots, ‘It was Working’: The Rise (and Fall) of an 
Alaska Prison Reformer, THE CRIME REP. (Mar. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6V42-KJFS] 
(detailing the experience of a prison superintendent in Alaska who had backing to try an 
experimental re-entry unit from one prior commissioner only to have that backing dropped 
upon entry of the new commissioner). 
131. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 463. 
132. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (noting that the first director of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons implemented “a number of important improvements,” including developing a 
system that “made classification far more systematic in federal [than] in state facilities”). 
133. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 464.  
134. Id. 
135. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (describing the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ first 
last-resort prison, Alcatraz). 
In 1934, Alcatraz was awarded this distinction.  Its purpose was to isolate the 
criminal of the “vicious and irredeemable type,” those with no hope of 
rehabilitation.  Prisoners for Alcatraz were selected from other federal prisons 
and were transferred back to other prisons before their release.  Alcatraz 
inmates had virtually no privileges and little contact with the outside world.  
To prevent secret messages, officials never allowed prisoners to receive 
original copies of their mail, only transcribed ones.  In the early years, 
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While these so-called supermax prisons were meant to reduce 
violence in prison systems,136 recent studies have demonstrated 
that these facilities did not reduce misconduct or violence.137  This 
means that tens of thousands of individuals have languished in 
conditions of solitary confinement with little penological 
justification simply as a result of prison systems’ classification 
schemes.138  These classification schemes also prevented swaths 
of incarcerated people from securing release during the pandemic 
because prison systems classified them as high risk.139 
Fifth, the American carceral state is slow to reform.140  
Whether through litigation or legislation, reforms to carceral 
systems are usually incremental, contentious, and remain 
ongoing.141  That means that when faced with a new threat like 
 
conversation among inmates was prohibited except when indispensable.  To 
compensate for these restrictions, Alcatraz had a fairly extensive library with 
many classics, and its food was above the average.  Although the rest of the 
federal system was overcrowded, Alcatraz maintained its original purpose as 
a jail for the worst of the worst, a purpose that resulted in a surplus of beds.  
During the thirty years Alcatraz was in use, it housed a total of only 1,557 
prisoners, with the highest average of daily prisoners occurring in 1937 at 302.  
Because of deterioration of the physical plant, Alcatraz was closed in 1963 and 
was replaced by the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. 
Id. at 167-68.  In the early 1990s, the ADX in Florence, Colorado, replaced Marion as the 
BOP’s prison of last resort.  See Raymond Luc Levasseur, Trouble Coming Every Day: 
ADX—The First Year 1996, in THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND 
CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS 47, 50 (Joy James, ed., 2005) (describing the 
construction of ADX, slated to replace Marion); see also Robertson, supra note 65, at 1023 
n.92 (1997) (describing ADX as “a ‘high tech’ concrete dungeon [that] houses inmates in 
cells that prevent them from having eye contact with other inmates”).  
136. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate 
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1341-42 (2003). 
137. Benjamin Steiner & Callie M. Cain, The Relationship Between Inmate 
Misconduct, Institutional Violence, and Administrative Segregation: A Systematic Review of 
the Evidence, in RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE U.S.: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS 165, 179 (2016). 
138. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 130-33 (cataloguing the harms of solitary 
confinement); see also Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary 
Confinement is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 747-49 (2015) 
(discussing the overuse of solitary confinement in American prisons). 
139. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 
27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5RJE-LK9P]  (explaining that government release orders 
prioritized “low-level offenders,” among others, and excluded many who “could be released 
without risk to public safety”).  
140. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457. 
141. Id. at 465; see also Michelle Chen, The Growing Fight Against Solitary 
Confinement, THE PROGRESSIVE (Jan. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9ZPK-ABPJ] 
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the COVID-19 pandemic, prison systems are slow to find ways to 
respond in a way that will save lives.142 
Overall, these five characteristics of the bureaucracies of the 
American carceral state all too often cause individualized harms 
to the people subject to the whims of those bureaucracies—
incarcerated people—that are not readily attributable to any 
individual prison officials.143  In other words, the bureaucratic 
system itself allows for the “compartmentalization, mutual buck-
passing, and deniability” necessary to allow people operating 
within bureaucracies to stand idly by as real, concrete, serious 
harms befall other human beings.144  These harms can result from 
officials’ mechanical adherence to duty, process, or policy 
without regard for “what the fulfillment of his or her duty might 
entail.”145  In other words, the characteristics of bureaucracy 
inherent to American prison systems—the clearly defined 
organizational structure with specific divisions of power and 
responsibility and specific rules and regulations that govern that 
power and responsibility—result in situations where individual 
bureaucrats feel bound to follow rigid structures and policies 
rather than respond to individualized problems or harms that 
present themselves.146  Thus, the harms that befall people who are 
incarcerated are not always, or even usually, attributable to rogue 
prison officials but rather to the failures of the system itself.  
 
(cataloguing the long fight in several states to curb the use of solitary confinement in the 
prison system). 
142. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 27, 
2020), [https://perma.cc/5YYE-45WU] (criticizing prison systems worldwide for delaying 
releases, thereby “contributing to preventable suffering and death”). 
143. See Luban, et al., supra note 110, at 2355 (attributing lack of individual 
accountability for organizational harms to the “fragmentation of knowledge and 
responsibility” that occurs in bureaucratic organizations). 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 2354.  The paradigmatic example of the horror that can follow rigid 
adherence to bureaucratic duty is, of course, Nazism:  “perhaps the single most salient 
characteristic of the Nazi crimes was their bureaucratic nature.  They were committed, not 
by a lawless gang of criminals, but by a regularly functioning state bureaucracy executing 
official policies.”  Id.  
146. Cf. id. at 2359 (“The horrors of Nazism are without parallel, but the bureaucratic 
pattern of organizations that fragments the knowledge required for moral decisionmaking is 
common to large institutions throughout contemporary society.”). 
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Take, for example, the death of Mr. Coley in the Cummins 
Unit in Arkansas discussed above.147  A series of systemic 
failures, not wholly attributable to the actions of individual prison 
officials, worked together to cause his death:  the failure of the 
system to set up protocols to protect incarcerated people from the 
virus’s spread, the failure of the system to find ways to treat rather 
than isolate people who contracted the virus, and the failure of 
any number of line staff to check-on Mr. Coley in his isolation 
cell.148  These types of systemic failures are what I call 
institutional indifference:  the ways in which the prison 
bureaucracy allows individual prison officials to claim ignorance 
of the plight of individual incarcerated people by hiding behind 
bureaucratic norms.149 
This institutional indifference is compounded by the prison 
system’s prioritization of “control and security over humanity.”150  
The precedence of security over all else is evident in any number 
of common, modern prison practices, including the prevalence of 
supermax prisons,151 the intrusive and frequent nature of body 
cavity searches,152 the ban on unions of incarcerated workers,153 
and the wide-ranging book, speech, and communications bans 
that deprive incarcerated people of participation in political 
discourse and the marketplace of ideas.154  Because most prison 
 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.  
148. See supra notes 13-31, 36-41 and accompanying text. 
149. Professor Luban and his co-authors call the ability of individual bureaucratic 
officials to claim they did not know about the harms occurring around them the 
“epistemological excuse.”  Luban et al., supra note 110, at 2352.  They “argue (1) that 
bureaucracies function (often by design) to permit their functionaries to truthfully plead the 
excuse ‘I didn’t know!’; (2) that traditional accounts of moral responsibility typically 
recognize this epistemological excuse; and (3) that it is therefore very difficult to find a 
workable account of moral responsibility within bureaucratic institutions.”  Id. 
150. Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1673 (2019) 
(noting that moderate efforts to reform prisons will always fall short because they do not 
address the “structural and cultural transformation[s]” required to support change). 
151. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 65, at 1017 n.92. 
152. See, e.g., Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a 
Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU 857, 910 (1992) (doubting the veracity that visual body 
cavity searches are only for security and “not also to purposefully demoralize and humiliate 
the inmate”). 
153. See Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1132-35 (describing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. 
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)).  
154. See generally Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked Up, Shut Up: Why Speech 
in Prison Matters, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (describing the implications of limiting 
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policies are developed in secret,155 are justified by vague 
references to maintaining a prison’s “social order” when 
exposed,156 and are largely free from judicial review,157 “prison 
officials inevitably err on the side of too little freedom.”158 
In sum, the institution’s prioritization of security over 
humanity solidifies the authoritarian nature of the modern 
American carceral bureaucracy.159  When prison systems limit 
both the speech that may leave a facility and the speech that may 
enter a facility, they are both monopolizing the sources of public 
information about prisons160 and limiting the sources of 
information and knowledge for the people inside.161  The net 
effect of these types of restrictions is to create a system of forced 
idleness in that prison becomes not only a place that physically 
separates incarcerated people from the outside world but also 
removes them from broader societal conversations.162  This latter 
 
the speech of incarcerated people in light of the most common rationales that justify free 
speech—the marketplace of ideas, democracy legitimation, the checking power of free 
speech, and self-fulfillment).  The net effect of prison censorship policies “is that in the 
aggregate, people who are richer, whiter, and not incarcerated, will enjoy greater access to 
the marketplace of ideas than others.”  Id. at 20; see also James Tager, Literature Locked 
Up: How Prison Book Restriction Policies Constitute the Nation’s Largest Book Ban, PEN 
AM. 2, 3-4 (Sept. 2019), [https://perma.cc/D2WL-BW4U]. 
155. Tager, supra note 154, at 1 (noting the lack of “public visibility into how [prison 
censorship] policies are considered, adopted, and implemented”). 
156. Id. at 5. 
157. See infra Section II.B. (discussing judicial deference to prison officials).  The 
“central evil” of this lack of judicial review is the unchecked “administrative discretion 
granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal directly with prisoners.”  Gutterman, supra 
note 152, at 900. 
158. Tager, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. 119 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)). 
159. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 441, 458 (1999) (noting that prisons, by their very nature, are the 
“places where serious abuses of power and violations of rights are likely to occur”). 
160. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 22 (“Without prisoners’ speech, public 
information about prisons would come primarily from prison officials themselves.  Speech 
in prisons is especially fragile because limited checks on officials’ behavior increase[s] the 
risk of retaliation.”); see also infra Section III.B. 
161. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1673 (noting the importance of education 
to incarcerated people and the view of prison staff that education interferes with their “job”). 
To Sanchez, “college education is to the imprisoned what learning to read and write was to 
the enslaved—it is central to the abolition movement.”  Id. 
162. See Robertson, supra note 65, at 1063 (noting the “paradigm shift” in American 
punishment that “changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his 
personhood”).  
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removal signals to incarcerated people that they “are unworthy of 
activities imparting social value and self-esteem,”163 and leads to 
the last feature of institutional indifference I want to discuss:  the 
systematic deprivation of identity inherent to the American 
carceral state. 
C. Stripping Incarcerated People of Identity 
By separating people from society in self-contained mini-
societies (a.k.a., prisons), the United States has already created a 
whole new class of other (a.k.a., the incarcerated).  In so doing, 
American society has added an identity label onto the people it 
locks up, but the more insidious impact of this identity label is 
that it is meant to supersede all other identity labels a person may 
hold.164  It is also meant to be a stigmatic identity,165 an identity 
that makes the dehumanizing features of the prison seem justified 
to those responsible for maintaining the system of 
incarceration.166  In the early days of the American penitentiary 
system, this identity was intricately interrelated with the legal 
concept of “civil death—the legal and ritual processes that 
produced the figure of the prisoner as the living dead.”167  
[C]ivil death reduced the criminal citizen to the condition of 
an abject “other,” the negative image of the citizen-subject.  
The citizen was free; the prisoner was bound and contained.  
The citizen was a transcendent spirit or a reasoning mind; the 
prisoner was an offensive body vulnerable to violence and 
deprivation.  The citizen belonged to the human community; 
the prisoner was a monstrous exile, beyond the pale of 
humanity, without a claim to legal personhood.  Divested of 
rights and exiled from the body politic, he was unprotected, 
 
163. Id.  
164. James, supra note 91, at 774 (explaining how the “criminal legal system threatens 
even one’s identity as a mother”). 
165. Robertson, supra note 65, at 1033 (noting that the “coerced and regimented 
idleness” of the warehouse prison becomes a “‘stigma symbol,’ a sign that represents the 
debased identity of the inmate population”). 
166. See, e.g., PATRICK ELLIOT ALEXANDER, FROM SLAVE SHIP TO SUPERMAX: 
MASS INCARCERATION, PRISONER ABUSE, AND THE NEW NEO-SLAVE NOVEL 112 (2018) 
(describing Mumia Abu-Jamal’s description of the U.S. supermax prototype as 
“dehumanization by design”); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 29 (“Dehumanization, then, is 
no excess or exception; it is the very premise of the American prison.”). 
167. Smith, supra note 5, at 39.  
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infinitely vulnerable and pliable.  He could be whipped or 
gagged, confined to solitude, deprived of food, or subjected 
to whatever other torments prison officials deemed 
necessary either to his correction or to the orderly 
functioning of the institution . . . .  Civil death justified a 
virtually unlimited exploitation and discretionary violence 
against the living entombed.168 
And while the notion of civil death of the incarcerated has 
largely been abandoned as courts began to recognize that 
imprisoned people retained some rights,169 the general attitude 
underlying the concept continues to pervade the institutional 
culture and practices of many American prison systems.170 
Thus, while the theoretical rights of the incarcerated 
expanded in the final decades of the twentieth century, the 
perception of the incarcerated held by institutional actors remains 
largely the same—incarcerated individuals are a mere number 
amidst the thousands of numbers subjected to the social control 
of the state.171  But what gets lost in the institutional bureaucracy 
of the prison is the individual and his, her, or their stories and 
voice.172  
 
168. Id. at 39-40. 
169. See, e.g., Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 3 (“[A]s Justice Thurgood 
Marshall wrote:  ‘When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human 
quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a 
free and open interchange of opinions . . . .’”) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
170. See, e.g., Laura Rovner, “Everything is at Stake if Norway is Sentenced. In that 
Case, We Have Failed”: Solitary Confinement and the “Hard” Cases in the United States 
and Norway, 1 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 77, 85 (2017) (noting that the practice of solitary 
confinement “violates the sacredness of the human person”); Philip Fornaci et al., Criminal 
Justice in the Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 62 HOW. L.J. 125, 139 (2018) (commenting 
on how the prison system “necessarily and irrevocably leads to the deprivation of the 
humanity of prisoners, guards, and the community”). 
171. See Morris, supra note 80, at 227-28 (describing how he created the “diary of 
prisoner #12345” detailing “one day and one night in the life of a typical prisoner in a typical 
prison adjacent to a typical industrial city”). 
172. Cf. Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1654  (discussing the need for scholars to account 
for the personal stories, narratives, and perspectives of people impacted by prison in order to 
“shed light on the inhumanity that goes on inside of prison, the social problems that lead to 
prison, and the humanity of those impacted by prison”); see also Gutterman, supra note 152, 
at 906 (“Today, as at the beginning, the most serious social consequence of the prison system 
is the disintegration of the human personality of those committed to its confines.”); Colin 
Kaepernick, The Demand for Abolition, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HDX8-
6TB9] (“The young men there [on Rikers Island] explained the dehumanizing conditions in 
the prison that range from denial of literature to physical assault.  They have been 
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* * * 
The exploding prison population of the last half-century has 
led to the creation of a bureaucratic carceral state that sacrifices 
the identities of the individuals incarcerated for purported 
institutional security and order.173  By prioritizing institutional 
order over individual welfare, the modern prison bureaucracy 
operates in a state of institutional indifference to the lives of the 
people held captive behind prison walls.174  In times of emergency 
or uncertainty, like the COVID-19 pandemic, this indifference 
inevitably leads to individual harms that are above and beyond 
the anticipated harms attendant to incarceration.175  For people 
like Mr. Coley in Arkansas, who could not seem to fight through 
the bureaucratic maze of the Arkansas Department of Corrections 
to obtain adequate protection and medical care, such institutional 
indifference leads to the ultimate harm:  loss of life.  It is for those 
harms that one might think the judiciary should stand at the ready 
to halt and correct, but for reasons discussed in the next section, 
the legal doctrines protecting the incarcerated ignore those harms 
to protect the institutionalized indifference of prison officials.  
II.  JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE: JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE AND THE PROHIBITION ON CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS 
Despite the lack of care afforded Mr. Coley and others like 
him confined to the Cummins Unit in Arkansas, a lawsuit filed by 
the Arkansas American Civil Liberties Union, Disability Rights 
Arkansas, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
has been thus far minimally successful.176  In requesting 
 
criminalized and caged, in most cases, for being redlined into economic despair.  Forever 
emblazoned in my memory are the words of one of the young Black men:  ‘You love us 
when no one else does.’  The young brother was seeking love.  He was seeking care.  He was 
seeking a space that valued his life.”). 
173. See supra Part I.  
174. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. 
175. See, e.g., Minta, supra note 5. 
176. Aviv, supra note 7 (noting that the lawsuit argued “that the Arkansas prison 
system had displayed deliberate indifference to prisoners’ welfare”).  While the United States 
District Court for the District of Arkansas denied the plaintiff class’s request for emergency 
preliminary relief, the court later denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, so the case 
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preliminary injunctive relief, advocates pointed to the following 
facts, among others, to request that “the prison system 
immediately take more precautions, including releasing some 
people to home confinement”: 
Cummins has had the tenth-largest coronavirus outbreak in 
the nation—nine hundred and fifty-six people, including 
sixty-five staff members, have tested positive—but the 
Division of Correction has made only minimal steps to 
contain it.  The [incarcerated people] aren’t given access to 
alcohol-based hand sanitizer, even though the medical 
director of infectious diseases for the state’s Department of 
Health has advocated for its use.  “Maybe science will take 
precedence now in current situation,” he wrote, in an e-mail 
to the secretary of the department.  Men are still sleeping in 
open barracks, less than three feet apart.177 
In response to the advocates’ request, the Arkansas attorney 
general “argued that the risks to prisoners were not ‘so great that 
they violate standards of decency,’ nor were they ‘ones that 
today’s society does not tolerate.’”178  United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Arkansas Judge Kristine Baker agreed, 
denying the request for emergency relief and cautioning that 
“federal courts should ‘approach intrusion into the core activities 
of the state’s prison system with caution.’”179  Such a result is not 
surprising when viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence governing the constitutionality of 
prison conditions and federal courts’ general policy of deference 
to prison officials. 
The text of the Eighth Amendment is a mere sixteen words:  
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
 
remains ongoing.  See, e.g., Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL1236990, at 
*18 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part the state defendants’ 
motion to dismiss); Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL4502150, at *15 (E.D. 
Ark. Sept. 30, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part private medical provider’s motion 
to dismiss). 
177. Id. (“A spokesperson for the Department of Corrections told [the reporter] in an 
e-mail that if [prisoners] in every other bed follow new instructions to sleep with their feet 
in the spot typically occupied by their heads, their faces will be ‘separated by 6 feet from the 
next [prisoner’s] pillow.’”). 
178. Id.  
179. Id. 
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”180  The 
Eighth Amendment doctrine governing claims challenging prison 
conditions derives from the last six words of the Amendment:  the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.181  While federal courts 
declined to entertain constitutional claims challenging prison 
conditions for more than a century after the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights,182 the Supreme Court articulated and developed the 
modern doctrine in a series of cases beginning in 1976 and ending 
in 1994.183  Since then, lower courts have struggled to uniformly 
apply the doctrine, and scholars have almost unanimously 
criticized it as illogical, inconsistent, and unjust.184  As I explain 
 
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
181. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (explaining that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause both places restraints and imposes duties on prison officials).  
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, drawn nearly verbatim from Article Ten of the 
English Bill of Rights, “became part of the American Bill of Rights in 1791.”  COLIN DAYAN, 
THE STORY OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL 6 (2007).  While scholars debate the intention of the 
English parliamentarians in drafting Article Ten, most scholars accept that the American 
Framers intend for the clause to prohibit certain methods of punishment.  See Godfrey, supra 
note 61, at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both 
England and the United States). 
182. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 165 (describing the “hands-off” doctrine that governed 
federal courts’ review of prison conditions). 
183. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (leaving undisturbed district court’s finding that conditions in 
Arkansas’s prisons violated the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 
346-48 (1981) (focusing on objective effects of double-celling to determine that practice did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding, 
in the context of an excessive force case, that “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not 
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1991) (confirming 
that a two-part test, consisting of objective and subjective components, characterized every 
Eighth Amendment claim); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (upholding the rule 
that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment”) (internal quotations omitted); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) 
(confirming that Eighth Amendment protects against future harm); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840-
41, 847 (defining deliberate indifference as those instances where a prison official knows of 
a risk of harm attendant to a prison condition but fails to take reasonable steps to abate the 
risk).  
184. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (criticizing the application of the current doctrine 
in cases seeking injunctive relief); Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of 
Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 428-29 (2018) (criticizing the 
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s focus on the subjective intent of prison officials rather than 
the objective harms inflicted on the incarcerated); Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment 
Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405, 
426 (2016) (criticizing Eighth Amendment doctrine for failing to fully account for the 
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below, part of the challenge with the standard is that it developed 
out of a judicial refusal to acknowledge that, in prison conditions 
cases, the punishment at issue is incarceration itself. 
A. Ignoring Incarceration as Punishment 
The Supreme Court first considered how the Eighth 
Amendment might apply to prison conditions claims in the 1976 
case of Estelle v. Gamble.185  Estelle, viewed by many as an 
improvident grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,186 
established that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . . 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”187  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court identified four types of punishments 
“repugnant to the Eighth Amendment”:  (1) those “incompatible 
with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society;’”188 (2) those “which ‘involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;’”189 (3) those which 
are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime;”190 and 
 
contextual history of punishments utilized in early America); Brittany Glidden, Necessary 
Suffering?: Weighing the Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What is Cruel 
and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1820-21 (2012) (criticizing the unpredictability 
of application of current Eighth Amendment doctrine); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison 
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 890 (2009) (criticizing 
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s undue focus on what constitutes punishment rather than what 
is cruel).  John F. Stinneford, in a series of articles, has also criticized current Eighth 
Amendment doctrine for being untethered to the original meaning of the words comprising 
the clause.  See John F. Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39, 
48-55 (2019) [hereinafter Stinneford, Experimental Punishments]; John F. Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 502 (2017) [hereinafter Stinneford, 
Original Meaning of Cruel]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The 
Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753-54 (2008) 
[hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual]. 
185. 429 U.S. 97, 102-04.  
186. See, e.g., id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing puzzlement at the Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari); Schlanger, supra note 183, at 369 (noting that Estelle “was quite 
a low-profile case—no amicus briefs were filed, and the New York Times described the 
majority opinion as ‘generally stat[ing] the law as it has been developing in the lower Federal 
courts’”) (quoting Lesley Oelsner, Prison Medical Care Assayed by Justices, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 1, 1976), [https://perma.cc/3HSR-5BJ4]). 
187. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
188. Id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
189. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).  
190. Id. at 103 n.7 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).  
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(4) those which transgress the “substantive limits on what can be 
made criminal and punished.”191  The Court determined that 
Estelle did not involve the last two types of punishment and 
therefore focused its inquiry on the first two.192  Turning to the 
first two types of punishment, the Court determined that when the 
government is punishing someone by incarceration, it must 
provide medical care to that person because failing to do so will 
result in, at worst, “physical ‘torture or a lingering death’” or, at 
best, “pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any 
penological purpose.”193 
Importantly, the Court appeared to recognize that the 
“punishment” at issue in Estelle was incarceration itself, and the 
question posed to the Court was whether the pro se prisoner’s 
allegations of inadequate medical care were cruel and unusual 
such that the punishment became unconstitutional.194  However, 
this recognition becomes muddled by the Court’s decision to 
reassure prison officials that not “every claim by a prisoner that 
he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.”195  To make this reassurance, the 
Court analogized the inadvertent failure to provide adequate 
medical care to the circumstances at issue in Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber.196  In Resweber, Louisiana had sentenced 
Willie Francis, a Black man, to death, but a mechanical 
malfunction “thwarted” the State’s first attempt to electrocute 
him.197  Mr. Francis “petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that 
a second attempt to execute him would be unconstitutionally 
cruel,”198 and the Court denied Mr. Francis’s petition, reasoning 
that because the failure of the first attempt was an “unforeseeable 
accident,”199 trying again did not amount to cruel and unusual 
 
191. Id. (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). 
192. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 n.7. 
193. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (first quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); 
and then citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83).  
194. Id. at 103, 106. 
195. Id. at 105.  
196. Id. at 105-06 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464, 
470 (1947)).  
197. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27; see also Estelle, 428 U.S. at 105.  
198. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27. 
199. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.  
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punishment even though “it [might] produce added anguish.”200  
Similarly, according to the Court, an act of mere negligence with 
regard to medical care could not be cruel and unusual under the 
Constitution.201  
Presciently, Justice Stevens, in dissent, predicted that the 
Estelle majority’s focus on “the accidental character of the first 
unsuccessful attempt to electrocute the prisoner in” Resweber, 
and “its repeated references to ‘deliberate indifference’ and the 
‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care” would attach 
unwarranted significance to the “subjective motivation of the 
defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and 
unusual punishment has been inflicted.”202  While Justice Stevens 
hinted that the remedies available against a particular defendant 
might depend on his subjective intent, he insisted that the question 
of “whether the constitutional standard has been violated should 
turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation 
of the individual who inflicted it.”203  Referencing a prisoner-of-
war camp from the civil war, Justice Stevens pointed out: 
“[w]hether the conditions in Andersonville were the product of 
design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and 
inhuman.”204 
Two years after Estelle, in 1978, the Supreme Court again 
considered a case involving an Eighth Amendment challenge to 
prison conditions.205  Hutto v. Finney arose from a series of cases 
challenging the conditions of the Arkansas prison system—
including the Cummins Unit discussed above206—during the 
1960s.207  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
 
200. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.  
201. Id. at 106. 
202. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 116-17. 
205. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).  
206. See supra notes 5-46 and accompanying text.   
207. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 680 n.2 (noting that the case at issue in Hutto began as Holt v. 
Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I], a sequel to Talley v. Stephens, 
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) and Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 
1967), vacated 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968)).  Judge Jesse Smith Henley, the Chief Judge of 
Eastern District of Arkansas when the cases began in 1965, handled all these cases, even by 
special designation after his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in 1975.  Id.  
1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:43 PM 
398 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
had issued a series of remedial orders meant to correct the 
unconstitutional conditions it characterized as creating “a dark 
and evil world completely alien to the free world.”208  While the 
Supreme Court’s inquiry focused on the propriety of two aspects 
of the relief ordered by the district court,209 the district court’s 
orders rested on a finding that the conditions in Arkansas’s 
prisons violated the Eighth Amendment.210  In reaching its 
decision on the remedial issues before it, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that “[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is 
a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth 
Amendment standards.”211  Again, then, the Court implicitly 
acknowledged that the punishment examined by the district court 
was incarceration, and the district court found that the conditions 
of that incarceration rendered the punishment of imprisonment 
cruel and unusual.212 
Because Hutto presented an issue related only to remedy, the 
Supreme Court did not directly consider the question of when 
prison conditions render the punishment of incarceration 
unconstitutional until the 1981 case of Rhodes v. Chapman.213  
 
208. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 
1970) [hereinafter Holt II]).  
209. Id. at 680-81.  
210. Id. at 681-83. 
211. Id. at 685.  
212. Id.; see also Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 372-73.  Indeed, the district court’s conception 
of the Eighth Amendment supports this conclusion: 
It appears to the Court, however, that the concept of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” is not limited to instances in which a particular [person] is 
subjected to a punishment directed at him as an individual.  In the Court’s 
estimation confinement itself within a given institution may amount to a cruel 
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement 
is characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the 
conscience of reasonably civilized people even though a particular [person] 
may never personally be subject to any disciplinary action.  To put it another 
way, while confinement, even at hard labor and without compensation, is not 
considered to be necessarily a cruel and unusual punishment it may be so in 
certain circumstances and by reason of the conditions of the confinement.  
Holt II, 309 F. Supp. 372-73.  Thus, the question considered by the district court involved 
not whether the challenged conditions amounted to punishment but rather whether the 
conditions could be understood as cruel and unusual such that the punishment of 
incarceration became unconstitutional.  
213. 452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981) (noting the case presented the first time the Court 
would consider “the limitation that the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States 
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Relying on Hutto, the Court reiterated that incarceration “is a 
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment standards,”214 and it defined the dispute at issue as a 
question of whether “the conditions of confinement at a particular 
prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment.”215  Drawing on 
Eighth Amendment standards articulated in other contexts, the 
Court reiterated that federal courts must rely on “objective 
indicia” when determining whether a particular punishment is 
cruel and unusual.216  Underscoring the “flexible and dynamic”217 
nature of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Court maintained 
that no “static ‘test’” could be applied to “determine whether 
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.”218  Reiterating 
the four types of punishment identified in Estelle as violative of 
the Eighth Amendment,219 the Court held that “[c]onditions [that] 
. . . deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure[s] of life’s 
necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment.220 
Applying this new rule to the case before it, the Court 
examined whether the system of double-celling utilized by the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility created cruel and unusual 
conditions of confinement.221  To make this determination, the 
Court examined whether the “double celling made necessary by 
the unanticipated increase in prison population” led to 
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” (i.e., 
the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities).222  The Court 
concluded that the findings of fact articulated by the district court 
amounted to no such deprivations.223  The Court then went on, 
however, to recognize that the practice of double celling did 
 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . imposes upon the conditions in which a State may 
confine those convicted of crimes”) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). 
214. Id. at 345 (emphasis added) (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 346-47 (first citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976); and then 
citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
217. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171). 
218. Id. at 346 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
219. Id. at 346 n.12; see also supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
220. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
221. Id. at 339-40, 347-48. 
222. Id. at 348.  The Court also included safety among its list of life’s necessities.  Id. 
at 364 (noting the lack of increased violence). 
223. Id. at 348. 
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deprive incarcerated people of job and educational 
opportunities.224  The Court concluded that such deprivations, 
however, did “not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton 
pain.”225  Seemingly, then, the deprivations could not be deemed 
cruel and unusual.  Rather than draw this conclusion, though, the 
Court instead concluded that “deprivations of this kind simply are 
not punishments.”226  This conclusion muddled the issue 
presented to the Court, which focused on whether the conditions 
at issue were cruel and unusual,227 not whether the conditions 
amounted to a punishment above and beyond the punishment of 
incarceration itself.  This type of confusion—as to whether the 
issue presented in cases challenging prison conditions involves a 
question of what is cruel and unusual versus what is 
punishment—continued to shape Eighth Amendment doctrine 
over the course of the next decade and muddles the current 
doctrine’s application today.228 
 
224. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. 
225. Id.  
226. Id. (emphasis added). 
227. Id. at 345. 
228. See generally id.  Importantly, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Rhodes 
cautioned that the majority opinion may be read “as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny 
of prison conditions.”  Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353, (Brennan, J., concurring).  Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, reiterated the importance of judicial intervention 
to correct unlawful prison conditions in order to ensure “constitutional dictates—not to 
mention considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the prisons.”  Id. at 354.  
Acknowledging the pressing problems posed by “[o]vercrowding and cramped living 
conditions,” id. at 356, and the “[p]ublic apathy [toward] and [] political powerlessness of 
inmates,” id. at 358, Justice Brennan noted the important role judicial intervention plays in 
remedying, albeit slowly, unconstitutional conditions of confinement.  Id. at 359.  Justice 
Brennan also recognized the federal courts’ role “[i]n determining when prison conditions 
pass beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel and unusual.”  Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 
364 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  To fulfill that role, Justice Brennan 
suggested that the focus of the Court’s inquiry should be on the conditions’ “effect upon the 
imprisoned.”  Id. (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).  To 
Justice Brennan, “[w]hen the ‘cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens 
the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a 
probability of recidivism and future incarceration,’” the conditions at issue violate the 
Constitution.  Id. (quoting Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 323).  Finding that the evidence 
considered by the district court failed to demonstrate serious harm to the prisoners confined 
to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Justice Brennan ultimately concurred in the 
judgment of the Court.  Id. at 368.  Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence to caution 
against the adoption of “a policy of general deference” to prison administrators.  Id. at 369 
(Blackmun, J., concurring).  Finally, Justice Marshall, in dissent, cautioned that the majority 
decision may “eviscerate the federal courts’ traditional role of preventing a State from 
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The next Supreme Court decision to consider the Eighth 
Amendment’s application in the prison setting further 
compounded the confusion inherent in the majority’s decision in 
Rhodes.  In the 1986 Whitley v. Albers case, the Court considered 
what standard governs a prisoner’s claim that a prison official 
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment through the use of 
excessive force.229  While the Whitley Court acknowledged that 
prior Eighth Amendment precedent refused to require “[a]n 
express intent to inflict  unnecessary pain” to find a constitutional 
violation,230 the Court ultimately deviated from this maxim when 
it articulated the excessive force standard.231  Citing Ingraham v. 
Wright232 for the proposition that “[n]ot every governmental 
action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject 
to Eighth Amendment scrutiny,”233 the Court once again 
conflated the inquiry into what the punishment being challenged 
is with the inquiry into whether that punishment is cruel and 
 
imposing cruel and unusual punishment through its conditions of confinement.”  Rhodes, 
452 U.S. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Finding that the district court and court of appeals 
had faithfully discharged their roles in redressing deplorable conditions, Justice Marshall 
would have left the injunction entered by the district court requiring single-celling 
undisturbed.  Id. at 377. 
229. 475 U.S. 312, 314 (1986).  Justice O’Connor, who wrote the five to four majority 
opinion, framed the question presented to the Court a little differently:  “[t]his case requires 
us to decide what standard governs a prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected 
him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to 
quell a prison riot.”  Id. at 314.  The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, took issue with this framing, and accused the majority of 
conflating questions of fact that “are likely to be hotly contested” with the choice of a legal 
standard.  Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  “It is inappropriate, to say the least, to 
condition the choice of a legal standard, the purpose of which is to determine whether to send 
a constitutional claim to the jury, upon the court’s resolution of factual disputes that in many 
cases should themselves be resolved by the jury.”  Id.  Despite the dissent’s narrow view of 
the question decided by the Whitley majority, lower federal courts have since uniformly 
applied Whitley’s “malicious[] and sadistic[]” standard to cases involving the use of 
excessive force by prison officials.  See, e.g.,  Kapfhammer v. Boyd, 5 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692-
93 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Estrada v. Smart, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275-76 (D. Colo. 2021); 
Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2013). 
230. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 
231. Id. at 319, 327.  
232. 430 U.S. 651, 653-54, 683 (1977) (involving a challenge to the use of corporal 
punishment at a junior high school in which the Court concluded that such a challenge could 
not fall under the purview of the Eighth Amendment); see generally Raff Donelson, Who 
Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259 (2017). 
233. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 
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unusual.234  In Whitley, the Court articulated that the Eighth 
Amendment standard in cases challenging the use of force 
involves the question of “whether [the] force was applied in a 
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”235  The 
Court identified several factors relevant to the malicious and 
sadistic inquiry, including the need for the application of force, 
the relationship between the need for force and the amount of 
force used, the extent of the injury, the threat to the safety of staff 
and prisoners, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the 
response.236 
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent in Whitley 
would have maintained a focus on objective indicia to determine 
whether a particular punishment (i.e., incarceration) has been 
rendered cruel and unusual by internal prison conditions.237  To 
the dissenting justices, the correct Eighth Amendment standard to 
apply in a case of excessive force would have been “the 
‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard,”238 the application of which 
would require consideration of the “circumstances of the 
plaintiff’s injury, including whether it was inflicted during an 
attempt to quell a riot and whether there was a reasonable 
 
234. This may not be the exact same analytical problem identified in this Article’s 
discussion of Rhodes (and subsequent conditions cases).  See supra Section II.A.  In general, 
the problem with the Eighth Amendment doctrine is that it has developed an unnecessary 
focus on intent because it has been focused (erroneously) on whether the conditions being 
challenged are punishment rather than whether the incarceration (i.e., the punishment) is 
cruel and unusual because of certain conditions.  See id.  But it may be in cases of excessive 
force that the punishment inquiry is not wrong because the force is not necessarily attendant 
to the punishment (incarceration), whereas with conditions challenges, the conditions are 
attendant to the incarceration.  So, in excessive force cases, there may be a necessary inquiry 
into the intent of the force, and there is a need to draw on how the Court defines punishment 
in cases like Ingraham and Bell v. Wolfish.  See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651; Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  This could also require an inquiry into whether the doctrine 
should be different when the challenge involves “conduct” of a prison official rather than 
mere “conditions” within a prison.  See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 ( stating that “[t]o be cruel 
and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve 
more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety”).  This inquiry, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.  
235. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d 
Cir. 1973)).  
236. Id. at 321.  
237. Id. at 329, 334 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
238. Id. at 329. 
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apprehension of danger[.]”239  While the dissent did not fully 
articulate how the “‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard” would 
apply beyond the facts at issue in Whitley, it is clear that the focus 
of the inquiry for those justices would be the totality of the 
objective circumstances and not the subjective intent of prison 
official defendants.240 
The 1991 decision in Wilson v. Seiter brought to a head the 
question of whether an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison 
conditions required a subjective showing as to the intent of prison 
officials.241  The case involved a challenge lodged by Pearly L. 
Wilson, a man incarcerated by the State of Ohio at the Hocking 
Correctional Facility (HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.242  Mr. Wilson 
challenged HCF’s “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient 
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper 
ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining 
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and 
physically ill [prisoners].”243  The question presented involved 
whether Mr. Wilson had to demonstrate “a culpable state of mind 
on the part of prison officials, and, if so, what state of mind [wa]s 
required” in order to prove his Eighth Amendment claims.244 
In a five to four  decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court 
held that Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley “mandate inquiry into a 
prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official 
has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.”245  To support its 
conclusion, the majority highlighted that the Eighth Amendment 
“bans only cruel and unusual punishment.  If the pain inflicted is 
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the 
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the 
 
239. See id. at 329. 
240. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329.   
241. See 501 U.S. 294, 296, 300 (1991). 
242. Id. at 296. 
243. Id.  
244. Id.  
245. Id. at 298-99. 
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inflicting officer before it can qualify.”246, 247  To the majority, 
then, the conditions attendant to incarceration could only be 
challenged under the Eighth Amendment if they amounted to 
punishment above and beyond the punishment of incarceration 
itself.248  
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, concurred only in the judgment249 and criticized the 
majority’s understanding of the punishment at issue in prison 
conditions cases.250  Justice White first pointed to the Hutto 
Court’s acknowledgment “that the conditions of confinement are 
part of the punishment that is subject to Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny.”251  The concurrence then drew on the Court’s analysis 
in Rhodes to conclude that  
Rhodes makes it crystal clear, therefore, that Eighth 
Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement are to 
be treated like Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment 
that is “formally meted out as punishment by the statute or 
the sentencing judge,” . . . we examine only the objective 
severity, not the subjective intent of government officials.252 
 
246. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.  The Court made this point as support for its disregard 
of an argument put forth by Mr. Wilson and the United States as amicus curiae that suggested 
conditions claims could be distinguished into two categories:  (1) “‘short-term’ or ‘one-time’ 
conditions (in which a state-of-mind requirement would apply)” and (2) “‘continuing’ or 
‘systemic’ conditions (where official state of mind would be irrelevant).”  Id.  The Court saw 
no logical or practical use in such a distinction but recognized that “[t]he long duration of a 
cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form of 
intent.”  Id.  
247. The Wilson Court also clarified that prisoners could not lodge challenges to 
something “so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’” unless those conditions create a “specific 
deprivation of a single human need.”  Id. at 305.  Thus:  
[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment 
violation “in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when 
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, 
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a 
low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. 
Id. at 304. 
248. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99.  
249. The majority vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for 
reconsideration.  Id. at 306.  The Sixth Circuit had previously affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to prison officials, concluding that Mr. Wilson had to meet 
Whitley’s obduracy and wantonness requirement.  Id. at 296. 
250. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). 
251. Id. at 307.  
252. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 309 (White, J., concurring). 
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In addition to criticizing the departure from precedent 
inherent in the majority’s adoption of an intent requirement, the 
concurrence predicted (rightly) that intent may be impossible to 
prove in many prison conditions cases,253 in part because of the 
institutional indifference outlined in Part I.254  
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of 
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials 
inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of 
time.  In those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent 
should be examined, and the majority offers no real guidance 
on this issue.  In truth, intent simply is not very meaningful 
when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a 
prison system . . . .  [H]aving chosen [] imprisonment as a 
form of punishment, a State must ensure that the conditions 
in its prisons comport with the “contemporary standards of 
decency” required by the Eighth Amendment.255 
Citing to the United States’ brief as amicus curiae, Justice 
White cautioned that inhumane prison conditions would be 
insulated from judicial review because of the majority’s 
requirement that the prisoner-plaintiffs engage in “an unnecessary 
and meaningless search for ‘deliberate indifference.’”256  
Notably, neither the majority nor concurrence defined what is 
meant by deliberate indifference, instead leaving that question for 
another day.257 
In the term following Wilson, the Supreme Court heard 
another Eighth Amendment case; this one focused on the inquiry 
 
253. Id. at 310.  
254. See generally supra Part I. 
255. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310-11 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago City Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989)). 
256. Id. at 311.  The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that “[s]eriously 
inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated from constitutional challenge 
because the officials managing the institution have exhibited a conscientious concern for 
ameliorating its problems, and have made efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to that end.”  Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) 
(No. 89-7376).  A relic of another era, the United States’ position in Wilson stands in stark 
contrast to the position taken by the Solicitor General in the COVID-19 cases.  See 
Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio and for an Administrative Stay at 32, William v. Wilson, 455 F. 
Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).   
257. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294, 297, 302, 303, 305, 306, 311. 
1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:43 PM 
406 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
relevant to a claim of excessive force.258  In Hudson v. McMillian, 
Keith Hudson alleged that three officers at the Louisiana State 
Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, used excessive force on him 
during the early morning hours of October 30, 1983.259  Mr. 
Hudson claimed that one officer punched him in the mouth, eyes, 
chest, and stomach while the second officer held him in place and 
the third officer, a supervisor, looked on, telling the first two 
officers “not to have too much fun.”260  As a result of the beating, 
Mr. Hudson “suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face, 
mouth, and lip,” and he had loosened teeth and a cracked dental 
plate.261  The district court found the three officers violated Mr. 
Hudson’s rights and awarded him $800 in damages.262  The Fifth 
Circuit reversed, holding that Mr. Hudson “could not prevail on 
his Eighth Amendment claim because his injuries were ‘minor’ 
and required no medical attention.”263  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.264 
The Hudson Court announced three important rules in 
support of reversal.  First, the Court made clear that the standard 
articulated in Whitley—”whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm”—applies in all prison excessive forces 
cases.265  Second, the Court determined that because 
contemporary standards of decency are violated whenever “prison 
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” a 
prisoner can bring an excessive force claim, whether or not he 
suffered significant injury.266  Third, the Eighth Amendment does 
not protect de minimis uses of physical force, so long as the “force 
is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”267 
Notably, in announcing these rules, the Court declined to 
consider the prison officials’ argument that “their conduct [could] 
 
258. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). 
259. Id.  
260. Id. 
261. Id.  
262. Id.  
263. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5. 
264. Id. at 5, 12. 
265. Id. at 6-7. 
266. Id. at 9. 
267. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). 
1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:43 PM 
2021 CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES 407 
 
not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was 
‘isolated and unauthorized.’”268  In other words, the Court refused 
to consider whether rogue acts of prison officials fall outside the 
purview of the Eighth Amendment because such acts cannot fall 
within “the scope of ‘punishment’ prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.”269  This refusal is inconsistent with the Court’s 
singular focus on what constitutes punishment in Wilson.270 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, penned a dissent in 
Hudson focused on the majority’s “expansion of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause beyond all bounds of history and 
precedent.”271  Once again harkening back to the perceived 
distinction between punishment meted out by statute or judge 
versus punishment attendant to incarceration, Justice Thomas 
reminded us that the Eighth Amendment traditionally did not 
apply “generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner 
during incarceration.”272  Therefore, because the Eighth 
Amendment only applies to “that narrow class of deprivations 
involving ‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with 
a culpable state of mind,” Justice Thomas would hold that a use 
of force that causes only insignificant harm does not amount to 
cruel and unusual punishment.273  In Justice Thomas’s view, then, 
“our society . . . has no expectation that prisoners will have 
‘unqualified’ freedom from force, since forcibly keeping 
prisoners in detention is what prisons are all about.”274  Therefore, 
the Hudson dissent points to the inconsistency in Eighth 
Amendment doctrine that requires a showing of seriousness of 
harm in medical care cases but not in excessive force cases.275  
In the Court’s next term, it heard the Helling v. McKinney 
case, which involved a Nevada prisoner’s claim that prison 
officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by 
housing him with another prisoner who smoked.276  Mr. 
 
268. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 11-12. 
269. Id.  
270. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991). 
271. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
272. Id. at 18. 
273. Id. at 18, 20. 
274. Id. at 26. 
275. Id. 
276. 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993). 
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McKinney, the Nevada prisoner, reached trial on two issues:  “(1) 
whether [he] had a constitutional right to be housed in a smoke-
free environment, and (2) whether [the prison officials] were 
deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs.”277  At 
trial, the district court granted the prison officials’ motion for a 
directed verdict, concluding that Mr. McKinney had no 
constitutional right to be housed in a smoke free environment and 
that he had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
“medical problems that were traceable to cigarette smoke or 
deliberate indifference to them.”278  The Ninth Circuit reversed 
the decision of the district court, holding that the court “erred by 
directing a verdict without permitting [Mr. McKinney] to prove 
that his exposure to [cigarette smoke] was sufficient to constitute 
an unreasonable danger to his future health.”279  The prison 
officials sought Supreme Court review of this decision, but, in the 
interim, the Court decided Wilson and, therefore, remanded the 
case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Wilson.280  
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Wilson added a subjective 
element to Mr. McKinney’s claim, but it did not otherwise change 
its prior decision, which concerned the objective component of 
the Eighth Amendment claim (i.e., whether a prisoner-plaintiff 
might be able to meet the objective component of the claim by 
demonstrating an unreasonable risk to his future health).281  The 
prison officials again sought review from the Supreme Court.282  
The Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by 
Justice White (who wrote the dissent in Wilson), holding that the 
Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated people from future 
harm.283  In reaching this holding, the Court reiterated that “the 
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment.”284  Implicitly, then, the Court harkened back to the 
pre-Wilson days when it viewed conditions claims as challenging 
 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 28-9. 
279. Id. at 29. 
280. Id. at 29-30. 
281. Helling, 509 U.S. at 30. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 33. 
284. Id. at 31.  
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not the punishment of incarceration itself but whether the 
conditions at issue rendered such punishment unconstitutional.285 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented once 
again.286  This time Justice Thomas strongly intimated that he 
would overturn Estelle if presented the opportunity, and he 
reiterated and expanded upon his belief that prison conditions are 
not and cannot be punishment protected by the Eighth 
Amendment.287  He criticized the Court’s prior decisions, 
beginning with Estelle, for never examining whether the Eighth 
Amendment’s text and purpose supported the conclusion that the 
amendment’s protections should protect against prison 
deprivations.288  To Justice Thomas, “the text and history of the 
Eighth Amendment, together with the decisions interpreting it, 
support the view that judges or juries—but not jailers—impose 
‘punishment.’”289  Therefore, the entirety of the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence with regard to prison conditions 
claims should be overturned.290 
The final case that forms the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
around Eighth Amendment claims challenging prison conditions 
is Farmer v. Brennan.291  Farmer reached the Court in 1994 and 
involved a challenge to prison conditions brought by Dee Farmer, 
a transgender woman living in men’s prisons operated by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).292  Ms. Farmer sued the BOP 
and several individual prison officials after being brutally raped 
and assaulted in the spring of 1989.293  In her complaint, Ms. 
Farmer alleged that the prison official defendants transferred her 
to a high security penitentiary “or placed [her] in its general 
population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent 
environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite 
knowledge that petitioner, as a [transgender woman] who 
‘projects feminine characteristics,’ would be particularly 
 
285. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25. 
286. Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
287. Id. at 40, 42. 
288. Id. at 42. 
289. Id. at 40. 
290. Id. at 40-42. 
291. 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
292. Id. at 829. 
293. Id. at 830. 
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vulnerable to sexual attack by” other people incarcerated in the 
penitentiary.294  Ms. Farmer claimed that these allegations 
demonstrated deliberate indifference to her safety and therefore 
stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment.295 
After the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, finding that Ms. Farmer needed to show they had 
“actual knowledge” of a potential danger, and the Seventh Circuit 
summarily affirmed without opinion, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to finally define the test for deliberate indifference.296  
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, first reiterated that Eighth 
Amendment prison conditions cases require a showing that a 
prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which 
means “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”297  
The Court then went on to define the “proper test for deliberate 
indifference.”298 
After first describing how the Court used the term deliberate 
indifference in the cases described above,299 the majority opinion 
concluded that the term must mean “something more than mere 
negligence” and “something less than acts or omissions for the 
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will 
result.”300  Settling on the conclusion that deliberate indifference 
must mean something akin to recklessness, the Court ultimately 
determined that prison officials can only be held liable for 
disregarding conditions or risks of which they are subjectively 
aware.301  In reaching this conclusion, the Court again focused on 
the idea that the Eighth Amendment only “outlaws cruel and 
unusual ‘punishments.’”302  
 
294. Id. at 830-31. 
295. Id. at 831.  
296. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831-32. 
297. Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,  297, 302-03). 
298. Id. at 835. 
299. Id. at 835-36. 
300. Id at 835.  
301. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841-42. 
302. Id. at 837 (“The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual 
‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”).  
An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm 
might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result 
society might well wish to assure compensation.  The common law reflects 
such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis.  But 
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Justice Blackmun, concurring, recognized the Court’s undue 
focus on the word punishment and reiterated that, in his view, 
“inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even 
if no prison official has an improper, subjective state of mind.”303  
Concerned with the pervasive violence in American prisons, 
Justice Blackmun highlighted his concern that, for many 
incarcerated people, the punishment of incarceration 
“degenerates into a reign of terror unmitigated by the protection 
supposedly afforded by prison officials.”304  He then went on to 
criticize Wilson’s conclusion that “only pain that is intended by a 
state actor to be punishment is punishment.”305  Rather than 
recognize that incarceration is the punishment in prison 
conditions cases, Justice Blackmun instead focused his criticism 
on the idea that someone cannot experience punishment unless a 
state actor intends for it to be so.306  He also took issue with the 
Wilson Court’s “myopic focus on the intentions of prison 
officials,” which he saw as plainly ignoring the type of 
institutional indifference that can arise from the modern 
American system of punishment.307  Justice Stevens wrote a short, 
paragraph-long, separate concurrence reiterating his belief that 
cruel and unusual punishment does not require a specific 
subjective motivation from a prison official.308  
 
an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived 
but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be 
condemned as the infliction of punishment. 
Id. at 837-38 (citations omitted). 
303. Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justice Blackmun went on to criticize the 
Court’s holding in Wilson, “to the effect that barbaric prison conditions may be beyond the 
reach of the Eighth Amendment if no prison official can be deemed individually culpable, in 
my view is insupportable in principle and is inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.”  Id. 
304. Farmer 511 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
305. Id. at 854.  
306. Id. at 854-55 (citation omitted) (finding the Wilson Court’s analysis 
“fundamentally misguided,” explaining that “‘[p]unishment’ does not necessarily imply a 
culpable state of mind on the part of an identifiable punisher.  A prisoner may experience 
punishment when he suffers ‘severe, rough, or disastrous treatment,’ regardless of whether 
a state actor intended the cruel treatment to chastise or deter.”). 
307. Id. at 855-56 (pointing to Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan’s observations on the 
Framers’ concern “with the cruelty that came from bureaucratic indifference to the 
conditions of confinement”) (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1544 (9th Cir. 
1993)); see also supra notes 143-489and accompanying text. 
308. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Finally, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence, 
agreeing only in the judgment of the Farmer majority.309  
Reiterating his view that only judges and juries inflict 
punishment, Justice Thomas once again asserted that 
“[c]onditions of confinement are not punishment in any 
recognized sense of the term.”310  To him, then, Farmer presented 
an easy case:  “[b]ecause the unfortunate attack that befell 
petitioner was not part of [her] sentence, it did not constitute 
‘punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment.”311 
As in Wilson, the Farmer Court’s focus once again ignores 
that the punishment at issue in prison conditions cases is 
incarceration itself, and the only question truly being presented 
is whether or not the conditions at issue in any given case have 
evolved such that they can now be deemed cruel and unusual.312  
However, the Court’s continued failure to recognize that 
incarceration is the punishment prisoner-plaintiffs are concerned 
with in conditions cases is no surprise when viewed in light of the 
overwhelming deference it and the broader federal judiciary have 
afforded prison officials for the past half-century. 
B. Deference to Prison Officials 
While not explicitly part of the Eighth Amendment prison 
conditions test, judicial deference to prison officials permeates 
federal court decisions applying the doctrine.313  This is no doubt 
a consequence of the explicit deference that is written into the 
other doctrines governing constitutional claims brought by 
incarcerated people.314  In non-Eighth Amendment constitutional 
challenges to prison policies, the Supreme Court has gone to great 
pains to explain the complexity and intractability of the problems 
 
309. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
310. Id. at 859. 
311. Id. 
312. See Dolovich, supra note 184, at 890.  The Farmer Court also goes one to explain 
why, in its view, the “objective” deliberate indifference test developed in City of Canton v. 
Harris is inapplicable in prison conditions cases.  See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 172-74, for 
a discussion of the Farmer Court’s treatment of Harris.  
313. Glidden, supra note 184, at 1832-33 (describing how and in what frequency 
federal courts defer to the judgment of prison officials in prison conditions cases). 
314. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-42 (discussing the doctrine of deference 
in certain constitutional claims brought by incarcerated people). 
1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:43 PM 
2021 CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES 413 
 
confronting those who run American prisons.315  Using those 
justifications, the Court has developed a doctrine that explicitly 
accounts for its desire to largely defer to the choices made by 
prison officials in running American prisons.316 
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has 
expressly rejected a doctrine that openly incorporates deference 
into the relevant standard.317  Nonetheless, “in practice, both it 
and the lower courts often defer to prison officials in analyzing 
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.”318  Moreover, the 
deliberate indifference standard itself—even if only implicitly—
developed from a clear concern that a standard that did not require 
a showing of intent might lead to increased liability of prison 
officials and increased judicial intrusion into the operation of 
prisons.319  As the prior section outlines, the current Eighth 
Amendment doctrine places undue focus on the subjective intent 
of prison officials because of a misplaced concern of ensuring that 
conditions being challenged in prison conditions cases amounted 
to punishment.320  But this undue focus can create situations 
where ongoing harms inside prisons go uncorrected either 
because an incarcerated person cannot prove the subjective intent 
 
315. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (explaining the 
policy justifications that inform the doctrine of deference as follows:  “the problems of 
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and . . . not readily susceptible of resolution 
by decree.  Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive 
branches of government . . . .  Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal 
courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”). 
316. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 7 (describing the Turner standard and the 
Court’s view of the need for a deferential standard); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
89-91 (1987). 
317. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 141 (noting that “the Court has expressly 
rejected reasonable-relationship review for Eighth Amendment claims, finding that ‘the full 
protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in prison].  The whole 
point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.’  Accordingly, ‘deference 
to the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment would reduce 
that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary.’”) (quoting 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005)). 
318. Id. at 141-42. 
319. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 844-45 (1994). 
320. See supra notes 299-306, 310 and accompanying text.  
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of an individual prison official or the institutional intent of the 
prison system itself.321 
The problem of uncorrected ongoing harms in prison 
conditions cases is playing out acutely in judicial responses to 
Eighth Amendment claims relating to the COVID-19 
pandemic.322  A close look at the decisions of federal courts in 
these cases reveals a judiciary concerned with maintaining its 
deference to prison officials, even in the face of ongoing harm and 
suffering.323  Take, for example, the decision of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on the 
Arkansas prison system’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
in the Cummins Unit, discussed at the beginning of this Part.324  
In that case, Judge Kristine Baker explicitly acknowledged that 
the number of infected people in Arkansas’s prisons (incarcerated 
people and staff alike) had increased during the “few weeks” the 
case had been pending prior to her decision on the plaintiffs’ 
request for a preliminary injunction.325  Despite this 
acknowledgment, and a recognition that the plaintiffs had 
presented evidence of staff not wearing masks and gloves,326 
incarcerated people not wearing masks as directed,327 a 
prohibition on alcohol-based hand sanitizer,328 a months-long 
delay in implementing guidance from the Centers for Disease 
Control on social distancing,329 the denial of care and testing of 
incarcerated people displaying COVID-19 symptoms,330 a lack of 
follow-up care for those with COVID-19,331 a lack of aid from 
prison staff who observe incarcerated people “too weak to care 
 
321. See Glidden, supra note 184, at 1833-37 (describing the problems with ongoing 
harms and institutional intent under the current Eighth Amendment conditions test); see also 
Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (discussing the difficulty of proving institutional intent in 
Eighth Amendment conditions cases seeking injunctive relief). 
322. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 142.  
323. Id. at 142 n.99 (detailing cases wherein courts explicitly deferred to prison 
officials’ judgment and response to the pandemic, despite rising infection and death rates). 
324. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
325. Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 842 (E.D. Ark. 2020). 
326. Id. at 838. 
327. Id.  
328. Id. at 839. 
329. Id. at 839-40. 
330. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 841. 
331. Id.  
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for themselves or to seek medical care,”332 and the presence of 
positive, asymptomatic staff at work,333 the court declined to 
grant the incarcerated plaintiffs preliminary relief.334  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court determined the plaintiffs could not meet 
their burden to establish deliberate indifference335 and declined to 
intrude “into the core activities of the state’s prison system.”336  
At the time Judge Baker issued her order on May 19, 2020, at 
least four incarcerated people had already died in Arkansas’s 
prisons.337  Less than a month later, seven more people had 
died.338  And while the incarcerated plaintiffs are still litigating 
their case, the death rate in Arkansas prisons has continued to rise, 
with more than fifty people now dead.339 
 
* * * 
Eighth Amendment doctrine is built to sustain judicial 
indifference to the suffering, harm, and death of the 
incarcerated.340  The doctrine ignores the Eighth Amendment’s 
textual purpose:  to prevent cruel and unusual punishments by the 
State.341  In our current criminal system, criminal courts mete out 
punishment as a sentence of incarceration, usually for a term of 
years.342  That term of years is meant to be served in self-
contained societies created by the state—i.e., prisons.343  While 
those sentences do not have to be comfortable,344 the conditions 
 
332. Id.  
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 846. 
335. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (noting that “the Court concludes that plaintiffs 
have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the subjective prong of their Eighth 
Amendment claims”). 
336. Id. at 846. 
337. See generally id.; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
340. See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 157. 
341. Id. at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both 
England and the United States); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing 
scholars’ acceptance that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to 
prohibit certain methods of punishment). 
342. Glossary of Federal Sentencing- Related Terms, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, (Sept. 
2021), [https://perma.cc/M6AZ-UGV5]. 
343. Id.  
344. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).  
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in which they are served cannot be inhumane nor can they 
fundamentally alter the punishment meted out by the state.345   
However, under current doctrine, inhumane prison 
conditions will be found perfectly constitutional by the federal 
courts so long as an incarcerated plaintiff is unable to prove that 
prison officials knowingly imposed those conditions despite 
knowledge of the risk of harm.346  This outcome can be seen in 
the myriad of cases around the country challenging prison 
conditions since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.  In 
those cases, plaintiffs have presented ample evidence that the self-
contained societies created by the State have become so toxic that 
they are acting as death traps, thereby transforming the state-
sanctioned punishment into an extrajudicial death sentence for 
some incarcerated people, even in prison systems where officials 
are taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by the virus.347  
Such a result should not be sustained under the Eighth 
Amendment.  But the COVID-19 pandemic has seen this result 
upheld time-and-again because Eighth Amendment doctrine 
encapsulates an inherent indifference to suffering that cannot be 
attributed to the intentions of an individual defendant.348  Even 
where prison officials are well-motivated individuals, conditions 
that pose a risk of death should be unconstitutional.  Under our 
current system, they are not because the doctrine governing 
conditions claims is inherently indifferent to the suffering of 
incarcerated people.  Thus, the doctrine creates the second strand 
of indifference that primed American prison systems for disaster 
during the COVID-19 pandemic:  judicial indifference. 
III.  SOCIETAL INDIFFERENCE: APATHY TO THE 
INCARCERATED 
The final strand of indifference that has allowed for the 
harms experienced by incarcerated people during the course of 
the COVID-19 pandemic is the general societal apathy toward 
people behind bars.  The causes of this indifference are myriad 
 
345. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
346. Id. at 829, 834. 
347. See supra Section III.B; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
348. See Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 837 (E.D. Ark. 2020). 
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and complex but can in part be attributed to three overlapping 
realities of the American carceral system.  First, American prisons 
are opaque institutions, and the lack of transparency of most 
American prisons means that society remains largely ignorant of 
what is going on behind bars at any given time.  Second, 
American prisons are filled with people who are generally 
marginalized by society.  Finally, the culture of fear that 
permeates the American imagination allows society to take the 
view that people behind bars “are bad guys, just getting what they 
deserve.”349 
A. A Lack of Transparency 
Mainstream American society has little understanding of 
what goes on inside American prison walls due to the prison 
system’s lack of transparency.350  While the United States 
incarcerates nearly 2.2 million people, “the indignities suffered 
each day by the human beings living in American prisons and jails 
occur largely out of sight from the general public.”351  This lack 
of transparency deprives the American public of the ability to 
critically assess whether the societal attitude of “they deserve 
what they get” actually withstands scrutiny when the public learns 
what “what they get” actually means for incarcerated individuals.  
In other words, the American public has little means to examine 
whether the punishment occurring through incarceration matches 
the imagined punishment meted out at a criminal sentencing.  For 
example, as Andrea Armstrong acutely observes: 
[i]t would be barbaric for a judge to order a person to be 
sexually violated as a consequence of a crime.  Is it any less 
barbaric if it happens incidental to lawful imprisonment?  
The same could be said for people denied medical and 
mental health care.  Serving a certain amount of time in jail 
 
349. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 1. 
350. Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in 
Criminal Justice Reform, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that “[j]ail and prison 
conditions matter because they are involuntary homes for millions of people without 
meaningful public oversight, transparency, or accountability”). 
351. Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1115. 
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or prison is the intended punishment, not death or injury by 
neglect.352 
While we can of course not know how the American public 
might react if it knew of the true conditions within the nation’s 
prisons, we may never learn if prisons remain “the black boxes of 
our society.”353  
One thing we have learned, however, from the Black Lives 
Matter movement, is that when brave passersby record police 
officers and make those recordings public, people start to pay 
attention.354  “But what about places in the United States where 
people can’t have cellphone cameras and the state-sponsored 
violence against Black people is often ignored or never revealed 
to the public?  This happens in prisons all the time.”355  What is 
going on in prisons is not visible to the public in the same way 
that the tragic killings of Black and brown men has been in recent 
years, but it is equally as problematic.356  But society has granted 
itself “permission to look away from the truth” because it views 
incarcerated people as “disposable.”357   
B. The American Underclass 
The reason incarcerated people are often viewed as 
“disposable” stems from the country’s long-standing belief that 
social problems arise from individual moral failings rather than 
structural and societal problems.358  By attributing social 
problems to individual faults, American society has long turned 
to segregation and detention to remove these so-called “inferior” 
 
352. Armstrong, supra note 353, at 18. 
353. Dewan, supra note 68. 
354. Johnny Perez, As We Work to Make Black Lives Matter, Let’s Remember That 
Incarcerated Lives Matter, Too, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GN8F-
YGJK]. 
355. Id.  
356. Id.  
357. Id.  
358. Laura I. Appelman, Pandemic Eugenics: Discrimination, Disability, & Detention 
During COVID-19, 67 LOYOLA L. REV. 329, 335 (2021) (noting that “[e]ugenic theory was 
closely intertwined [in] the late nineteenth century idea that social problems, including 
insanity, dependency, poverty, and disability, were fundamentally individual and moral in 
nature.”).  
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populations from mainstream American society.359  This trend 
continues today:  it is no secret that the vast majority of people 
that we lock up in this country are poor people and people of color 
who belong to historically disadvantaged groups.360 
Class and classism matter here; this isn’t something that 
springs up out of nowhere.  We treat being poor, being from 
the inner city, being from the country as reasons to be 
ashamed even though no one controls the circumstances of 
their own birth.  We look at places that are being starved of 
resources, where being tough is a matter of survival, and then 
we say, “[i]n order to have safety, financial stability, housing 
that isn’t subpar, you have to be willing to cut away 
everything that made you,” and when some people can’t or 
won’t do that we punish them for it.  It’s assimilation, not 
acculturation, that is demanded of people who are already 
sacrificing, already making hard choices.361 
By creating this class of other—of groups of people who are 
faulted for the circumstances of their birth—American society has 
created an underclass of people who are viewed and treated as 
less valuable by society as a whole.362  Because incarcerated 
people fall squarely within this underclass, society has remained 
largely indifferent to their plight during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
To the extent the incarcerated underclass saw any reprieve 
during the pandemic, the amnesty was limited to only those who 
could be viewed as “non-violent.”  This limitation is driven by the 
 
359. Id. at 336, 108 (“From the very beginning of the United States, segregation and 
detention have been used to control those on the margins:  the poor (in almshouses, 
workhouses, and ghettos), minorities (in convict labor farms and correctional institutions), 
and those who are disabled (in cages, asylums, and hospitals).”); see also Sharon Dolovich, 
Mass Incarceration, Meet COVID-19, 11/16/20 U. CHI. LAW REV. ONLINE *4, *6-*7 (2020) 
(noting that the individualist nature of our narratives around who is deserving of punishment 
leave “us collectively unable to reckon with the [] drivers of criminal activity” and “blind us 
to the community costs of a default carceral response”).  
360. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that the “carceral state has 
disproportionately hurt African American men.  But it also has been targeting a rising number 
of people from other historically disadvantaged groups,” including women, Hispanics, and 
poor whites); Dolovich, supra note 363 at 5 (noting that it “is impossible to disentangle . . . 
the structural racism that has driven the glaring overincarceration of African Americans and 
other people of color and helped shape the brutality of the American carceral experience”).   
361. MIKKI KENDALL, HOOD FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE WOMEN THAT A 
MOVEMENT FORGOT 139 (2020). 
362. Appelman, supra note 358, at 331-33 (attributing our lack of care for this 
underclass during the COVID-19 pandemic to long-standing American eugenic philosophy).  
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longstanding dichotomy made between “violent” and 
“nonviolent” crime, a dubious distinction that is driven in large 
part by the American culture of fear. 
C. A Culture of Fear 
While some incarcerated people were able to secure release 
during the COVID-19 pandemic through compassionate release 
efforts, executive clemency actions, expedited parole 
proceedings, and home confinement orders, mass release efforts 
were often stymied by fear of releasing people who committed 
“violent” crimes.363  But the “violent” versus “nonviolent” 
dichotomy that characterizes much of the American criminal 
punishment system is largely misleading, and it reinforces the 
racial stereotypes upon which the criminal punishment system is 
built.  
First, the label “violent” is often applied to crimes that many 
people might not actually believe to be violent.364  For example, 
in some jurisdictions “failing a urine test repeatedly” is classified 
as a violent crime.365  Moreover, even for those individuals who 
did commit a violent crime, “data shows that most people age out 
of ‘violent crime,’” and recidivism rates for older people are 
diminishingly low.366 
Not only is the “fearmongering” rhetoric used to describe 
people accused of violent crimes unsupported by data, it can also 
be used to reinforce racial stereotypes.367  Social science research 
demonstrates that Black people are not only more likely to be 
stopped by police, but they are also more likely to be detained 
pretrial, charged with more serious crimes, and sentenced more 
 
363. April Rodriguez, We Won’t Address Our Mass Incarceration Crisis Until We 
Rethink Our Approach To “Violent Crime”, ACLU (June 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/4T7W-9C5W] (explaining how “many judges have dismissed release as a 
viable option for people accused or convicted of violent charges”). 
364. Eli Hager, When “Violent Offenders” Commit Nonviolent Crimes, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2019),  [https://perma.cc/3LSB-DTSJ] (explaining that “many 
of the ‘violent offenders’ in U.S. prisons are there for crimes not everyone would classify as 
violent,” including “purse snatching,” “manufacture of methamphetamines,” and “theft of 
drugs”). 
365. Rodriguez, supra note 363. 
366. Id. 
367. Id.  
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harshly than white people.368  While these disparate outcomes 
may not always “be the result of overt racism,” they often arise 
from the implicit bias of prosecutors, judges, and juries.369  “This 
means that what society chooses to prosecute as violent is heavily 
influenced by race. Standard definitions of what and who we 
consider dangerous are not natural or self-evident; they are 
made.”370 
Thus, unless and until society works to overcome the false 
dichotomy created by speaking of incarcerated people in terms of 
those who committed “violent” offenses and those who 
committed “non-violent” offenses, the culture of fear that 
surrounds “violent” crimes will prevent societal recognition of the 
humanity of all people behind bars.371  Unless and until we can 
overcome this culture and rhetoric of fear, societal indifference to 
the lives of incarcerated people will continue to flourish by 
allowing society to ignore the individualized harms being 
suffered by people behind bars.  
 
* * * 
The institutional and judicial indifference described in Parts 
I and II of this Article is allowed to perpetuate because of an 
overarching societal indifference to the harms suffered by people 
behind bars.  That societal indifference is driven in part by the 
lack of transparency inherent to prison systems.  But even as 
advocates and journalists have made strides in recent years to 
expose what is happening behind bars,372 greater transparency has 
not fully eradicated this societal indifference.  This is because 
such indifference is tied to broader cultural attitudes toward 
marginalized groups and the culture of fear created by and which 
sustains unwarranted racial stereotypes.  Until this indifference is 
addressed, the other strands of indifference that created a carceral 
 
368.  Elizabeth Hinton, LeShae Henderson, & Cindy Reed, An Unjust Burden: The 
Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA EVIDENCE 
BRIEF 1-9 (May 2018). 
369. Id. at 7.   
370. Rodriguez, supra note 363. 
371. Id. 
372. See, e.g., Nicole B. Godfrey, Suffragist Prisoners and the Importance of 
Protecting Prisoner Protests, 53 AKRON L. REV. 279, 280 n. 7 (2019) (providing examples 
of recent exposés about what is happening behind bars). 
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system ripe for widespread harm in the face of emergencies like 
the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to persist. 
CONCLUSION 
From the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, incarcerated 
people and their advocates knew that the pandemic would prove 
devastating to the incarcerated unless the prisons, the courts, and 
society took dramatic and immediate steps to depopulate the 
prisons.373  Yet, the institutional indifference of the prison 
systems themselves, the judicial indifference of the doctrine 
governing incarcerated people’s requests for emergency relief, 
and the societal indifference of the American public and its 
attitude toward the incarcerated combined to make depopulation 
efforts nearly impossible.  
In describing these three interwoven causes of the failure to 
protect incarcerated lives during the pandemic, I used the term 
indifference purposefully.  Derived from the constitutional 
doctrine meant to protect people from cruel and unusual 
incarceration (the punishment most utilized by the American 
criminal system), the word indifference holds special meaning in 
the carceral context.  Under the current state of the law, an 
incarcerated person can only gain protection from cruel and 
unusual prison conditions when they can demonstrate that the 
cause of those conditions is the deliberate indifference of prison 
officials.374  But what I’ve tried to demonstrate in the above 
discussion is that the entire carceral system is built upon and 
sustained by these three strands of indifference:  institutional, 
judicial, and societal.  And because these three strands of 
indifference are structural in nature, it can be no surprise that they 
operate to create cruel and unusual results—i.e., unnecessary 
harms—in the face of an emergency like the pandemic.  
Ultimately, the continued existence of these three strands of 
indifference—despite demonstrable evidence of the daily 
suffering occurring within our modern punishment regime—
 
373. Kaste, supra note 13; see also Stacy Weiner, Prison Should Not Be a COVID-19 
Death Sentence, AAMC (Aug. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QLN4-DYFZ]. 
374. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994). 
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lends itself to the conclusion that they are nothing short of 
deliberate.  
While this Article has been largely diagnostic and 
descriptive in its assessment of the strands of indifference that 
combined to create the cautionary tales of American prisons, I 
plan to provide prescriptive policy and jurisprudential reforms in 
future work aimed at eliminating these strands of indifference.  
But, any reform efforts must be informed by the lessons of 
abolitionists, who have explained to us that reform efforts “must 
be a cultural intervention,”375 that the modern prison developed 
from reform efforts rooted “in the paradigmatic national power 
relations of racial chattel” and has remained “stubbornly brutal, 
violent and inhumane” through successive reform efforts,376 that 
conceptions of justice must expose hypocrisy “entrenched in 
existing legal practices,”377 and that a radical reorganization of 
American society is necessary to truly dismantle the “issues of 
systemic and structural racism [that] should have been addressed 
more than 100 years ago.”378  If we are to truly dismantle the 
strands of interwoven indifference that allowed American prisons 
to become the epicenters of the pandemic, we must take seriously 
the calls of these abolitionists and think critically about how we 




375. Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance, 
Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1694 (2019). 
376. Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as a Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 1575, 1582, 1597 (2019) (quoting Mariame Kaba, Prison Reform’s in Vogue and 
Other Strange Things . . ., TRUTHOUT (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/T5HP-CXSN]). 
377. Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 
1615 (2019). 
378. Angela Y. Davis, Why Arguments Against Abolition Inevitably Fail, MEDIUM 
(Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/SE9S-8SV9]. 




Mark A. Graber* 
 
Mark Killenbeck’s Korematsu v. United States1 has 
important affinities with Dred Scott v. Sandford.2  Both decisions 
by promoting and justifying white supremacy far beyond what 
was absolutely mandated by the constitutional text merit their 
uncontroversial inclusion in the anticanon of American 
constitutional law.3  Dred Scott held that former slaves and their 
descendants could not be citizens of the United States4 and that 
Congress could not ban slavery in American territories acquired 
after the Constitution was ratified.5  Korematsu held that the 
military could exclude all Japanese Americans from portions of 
the West Coast during World War II.6  Both decisions 
nevertheless provided progressives with important doctrinal tools 
that they later employed when building a more egalitarian future.  
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott advanced a 
particularly robust notion of citizenship that Republicans, after 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cited when vesting 
newly freed persons of color with a substantial array of rights.7  
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test into American law 
 
* Mark A. Graber is the Regents Professor at the University of Maryland Carey School 
of Law.  He is grateful for the help provided by the Arkansas Law Review at the University 
of Arkansas, most notably by Keaton Barnes, Taylor Spillers, and Tyler Mlakar, the 
comments given by Associate Peter Danchin and his colleagues at the University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law, and other comments by Mark Killenbeck, Sandy Levinson 
and Jack Balkin. 
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
3. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 406-12, 422-27 (2011); 
Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 
151, 151-52 (2021). 
4. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 423. 
5. See id. at 452. 
6. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.  
7. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 101 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1231 (1866). 
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that the Warren and Burger Courts relied on when striking down 
numerous laws that discriminated against persons of color.8 
Killenbeck celebrates strict scrutiny as a remarkable advance 
on the doctrines that structured the constitutional law of racial 
equality in the racist past of the United States.9  Federal and state 
courts before the Civil War provided almost no protection for 
persons of color, even in the few instances when judges 
acknowledged that persons of color might be state or federal 
citizens.10  At the turn of the twentieth century, federal and state 
courts did almost nothing to oppose the redemption of the South 
and the establishment of Jim Crow.11  Plessy v. Ferguson 
sustained legislation mandating separate but equal.12  Giles v. 
Harris announced courts could do little when states adopted 
subterfuges that disenfranchised almost all black citizens.13  
African Americans fared better in federal courts in the decades 
before Korematsu.14  Still, most judicial successes before World 
War II were confined to particularly egregious facts and easily 
evaded.15  The strict scrutiny test was the first occasion in which 
a Supreme Court majority announced a broad standard of review 
that could be wielded against white supremacy more generally 
rather than merely against discrete instances of white 
supremacy.16 
This essay explores how the constitutional law of race 
equality has evolved in the United States in ways that provide 
 
8. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 
U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).  For the development of the strict scrutiny test in race cases, see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275-78 (2007). 
9. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201. 
10. See infra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.  
11. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8-60 (2004). 
12. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). 
13. 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903). 
14. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 11. 
15. The judicial decision outlawing state mandated residential segregation in 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917), was effectively undermined by the judicial 
decision sanctioning racially restrictive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 332 
(1926).  The judicial decisions in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927), and Nixon 
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932), striking down state laws prohibiting persons of color 
from voting in Democratic primaries were effectively undermined by the judicial decision in 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1935), which permitted the Democratic Party to 
prohibit persons of color from voting in Democratic primaries. 
16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
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greater context for the strict scrutiny test and the Korematsu 
decision.  The contemporary Korematsu regime is structured by 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
judicial supremacy, and strict scrutiny.17  The Equal Protection 
Clause provides the textual hook for evaluating the 
constitutionality of race conscious measures, the Supreme Court 
of the United States is the institution primarily responsible for 
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, and strict scrutiny is 
the test or standard the Supreme Court uses to determine whether 
race conscious measures pass constitutional muster.18  Other 
regimes have been structured by different textual hooks, 
alternative conceptions of institutional authority, and other tests 
or standards for evaluating race conscious measures.  The Turner 
regime of the mid-1860s regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as 
the foundation for the constitutional law of racial equality.19  The 
Turner regime and the successor Strauder regime of the 1870s 
and 1880s vested Congress with the primary responsibility of 
determining how to implement the constitutional obligation to 
end the slave system and make persons of color full citizens.20  
The Strauder regime and successor Plessy regime of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries banned, at least 
officially, all race discriminations.21   
The Korematsu regime is clearly more egalitarian than the 
Costin/Manuel regime that structured the constitutional law of 
race equality before the Civil War, but the former has features that 
make that regime arguably less egalitarian in certain 
circumstances than the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes.  
The Turner regime that based the constitutional law of racial 
equality on the Thirteenth Amendment was more open than the 
Korematsu regime to race conscious measures designed to benefit 
persons of color and had no state action limit on federal laws that 
mandated racial equality.22  The Turner and Strauder regimes that 
 
17. See Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201. 
18. Id. 
19. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339-40 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
20. Id.; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879). 
21. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310-12; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
22. Compare Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40, with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944). 
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required Congress to be the first mover when implementing 
constitutional commitments to racial equality were more 
conducive to racial equality than the Korematsu regime whenever 
the national legislature had a more expansive understanding of 
racial equality than the national judiciary.  The Strauder and 
Plessy regimes would, at least in theory, have declared 
unconstitutional the military order sustained in Korematsu 
because those regimes prohibited all race discriminations.   
The following pages contextualize rather than praise or bury 
the Korematsu regime.  Whether one particular regime better 
promotes racial equality than another depends on the particular 
problem, the balance of power in different institutions at a 
particular time, and particular perspectives.  Strict scrutiny might 
be a better approach than a per se ban on race classifications when 
regulating racial gangs in prisons.  The Supreme Court could not 
have decided Brown v. Board of Education when the Turner and 
Strauder regimes structured the constitutional law of racial 
equality because those regimes required Congress to be the first 
mover when implementing the post-Civil War Amendments.  
Whether a regime that permits affirmative action is better than 
one that does not depends on contested beliefs about whether 
affirmative action promotes race equality.  The argument below 
is simply that the Korematsu regime is one way of structuring the 
constitutional law of racial equality, not the only way.  That 
Americans committed to racial equality have adopted different 
regimes in the past opens questions about whether Americans  
might adopt different regimes in the future. 
Strict scrutiny is a standard only for race conscious measures 
such as the military order banning Japanese Americans from the 
West Coast.  That standard does not help determine whether a 
military order in 1943 banning disloyal citizens would have been 
considered a race discrimination if implemented only in 
California or, for that matter, whether the executive order at issue 
in Trump v. Hawaii23 that Killenbeck explores with great 
sophistication24 was a “Muslim ban.”  Korematsu’s ancestors 
 
23. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
24. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 201-23. 
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include such cases as Costin v. Washington,25 In re Turner,26 
Strauder v. West Virginia,27 and Plessy v. Ferguson.28  These 
decisions considered whether explicit race conscious measures 
passed constitutional muster.29  Although Killenbeck and the 
major opinions in Trump debated whether Korematsu belonged 
on Trump’s family tree,30 Trump’s more legitimate lineal 
ancestors include United States v. Cruikshank,31 Williams v. 
Mississippi,32 and McCleskey v. Kemp.33  The Justices in these 
instances refused to see or find race discrimination lurking behind 
laws or actions that on their face were not race conscious.34   
This essay explores the constitutional law of explicit race 
conscious measures.  This myopia admittedly exaggerates the 
egalitarian commitments of the Turner, Strauder, Plessy, and 
Korematsu regimes.  Racial hierarchies in the United States in the 
past and at present are as often structured by the refusal to 
acknowledge race as by what Americans do when they 
acknowledge race.  Americans, this essay documents, have often 
shamefully justified their willingness to use race conscious 
measures that discriminate against persons of color.  Americans 
have even more shamefully refused to see race discrimination 
when government employs ostensibly neutral measures in ways 
that oppress, often by intention, black Americans and other 
persons of color. 
I.  THE COSTIN/MANUEL REGIME 
Judge William Cranch’s opinion in Costin v. Washington  
articulated the principles that structured the status of citizens of 
 
25. 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266). 
26. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
29. See Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613-14; Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40; Strauder, 100 U.S. 
at 303; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540. 
30. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 152-159. 
31. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
32. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
33. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
34. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556; Williams, 170 U.S. at 225; McCleskey, 481 U.S. 
at 319. 
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color under antebellum constitutional law.35  The issue in that 
case was the constitutionality of the onerous restrictions that the 
corporation governing Washington D.C. placed on persons of 
color.36  Persons of color were required to register, provide bonds 
for good behavior, and obtain certificates from three white 
persons vouching for their character and employment.37  In sharp 
contrast to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion in Dred 
Scott,38 Cranch’s opinion in Costin assumed that persons of color 
were citizens of the United States entitled to the rights of citizens 
of the United States.39  Costin acknowledged that “the 
constitution gives equal rights to all the citizens of the United 
States.”40  Cranch insisted, however, that governing officials 
could make legal distinctions among citizens.  Race was one 
important basis for legal distinctions.  Costin stated: 
In all the states certain qualifications are necessary to the 
right of suffrage; the right to serve on juries, and the right to 
hold certain offices; and in most of the states the absence of 
the African color is among those qualifications.  Every state 
has the right to pass laws to preserve the peace and the 
morals of society; and if there be a class of people more 
likely than others to disturb the public peace, or corrupt the 
public morals, and if that class can be clearly designated, it 
has a right to impose upon that class, such reasonable terms 
and conditions of residence, as will guard the state from the 
evils which it has reason to apprehend.41 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Manuel 
relied on similar principles when the judges concluded black 
citizenship was consistent with substantial race discrimination.42  
A unanimous court ruled that persons of color convicted of crimes 
could be hired out, even though white persons convicted of the 
 
35. 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). 
39. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613. 
40. Id.  But cf. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (holding that persons of color were not 
citizens of the United States and were therefore not entitled to the rights of United States 
citizens). 
41. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613. 
42. 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838). 
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same crimes could not suffer this sanction.43  Judge William 
Gaston declared, “[h]is color and his poverty are the aggravating 
circumstances of his crime.”44  Gaston insisted that real 
differences between the races justified punishing citizens of color 
more severely than white citizens: 
Whatever might be thought of a penal Statute which in its 
enactments makes distinctions between one part of the 
community and another capriciously and by way of 
favoritism, it cannot be denied that in the exercise of the 
great powers confided to the legislature for the suppression 
and punishment of crimes, they may rightfully so apportion 
punishments according to the condition, temptations to 
crime, and ability to suffer, of those who are likely to offend, 
as to produce in effect that reasonable and practical equality 
in the administration of justice which it is the object of all 
free governments to accomplish.45 
That William Manuel was a citizen of North Carolina did not 
immunize him from discriminatory punishments because he was 
in a racial class that the state legislature had determined needed 
more severe sanctions to deter them from crime.   
The constitutional law of race equality in antebellum 
America was indistinguishable from the constitutional law of 
equality, more generally.  The Costin/Manual regime emphasized 
arbitrary laws rather than suspect classifications.46  No legal 
distinction was inherently more suspect than another or required 
legislators to meet a higher standard of proof—either as the end 
to be achieved or the relationship between the discrimination and 
that end.  John Marque Lundin points out that while antebellum 
law respected principles of “equality, reasonableness, 
impartiality, and protection of fundamental rights, the prohibited 
classification principle” dates from Reconstruction.47  Laws that 
singled out persons of color were constitutionally no different 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 35. 
45. Id. at 37. 
46. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 54-55 (Duke Univ. Press 
1993); John Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1999). 
47. Lundin, supra note 46, at 1139.  
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than laws that singled out bankers, taverns, women, or residents 
of E street.   
The constitutionality of legal distinctions and 
discriminations depended on whether they were based on real 
differences between the regulated and unregulated classes and 
whether the distinction or discrimination served the public 
interest.48  Any legislative distinction that served the public 
interest and was based on real differences between persons was 
constitutional.  Howard Gillman notes that the master principle of 
nineteenth century constitutional law was that when “a statute is 
enacted applying only to a particular class, it must appear that the 
public welfare demands such legislation by reason of the 
distinguishing characteristic of the class.”49  Abolitionists and 
antislavery advocates aside,50 no one considered race 
discriminations the paradigmatic example of an unconstitutional 
arbitrary distinction.  Most successful equality claims concerned 
property rights51 rather than discrimination based on race, gender, 
or ethnicity.52  No state court opinion issued before the Fourteenth 
Amendment indicated that a central purpose of any constitutional 
provision mandating equality was to limit race discriminations, 
that race discriminations were particularly offensive in light of 
constitutional commitments to equality, or that race 
discriminations required a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than 
other legislative discriminations.53   
Costin and Manuel were structured by this understanding of 
constitutional equality.  Neither treats race distinctions as any 
 
48. Id. at 1184–85. 
49. GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 93 (quoting Anonymous, Some Restrictions upon 
Legislative Power, 43 ALB. L.J. 25, 25–27 (1891)). 
50. See  JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 95, 96-97 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1951); Howard Jay Graham, The Early 
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part I, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479, 491, 
506 (1950); Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Part II, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 610, 613 (1950); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988).   
51. See Planter’s Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 325 (1848) (“This is . . . very 
invidious legislation, when applied to classes or to particular kinds of property before 
allowed to be held generally.  Legislation for particular cases or contracts . . . is of very 
doubtful validity.”). 
52. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1141.  
53. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1181. 
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more or less offensive to the law than other distinctions.  Both 
explore whether real differences exist between the races and 
whether the law based on these differences serves the public 
interest.  Both conclude that racial differences exist that justify 
laws in the public interest.54  Neither assumes a different mode of 
analysis would be appropriate if white persons were being legally 
burdened.  Both treat constitutional equality as requiring justices 
to make fact judgments rather than rely on categorical analyses.55   
Many antebellum judicial decisions justifying racial 
discrimination did so by claiming that the main difference 
between white persons and persons of color was that only white 
persons were citizens.56  The Supreme Court of Tennessee, when 
sustaining a ban on black immigration to the state declared, “free 
negroes . . . are not citizens in the sense of the Constitution; and 
therefore when coming among us are not entitled to all the 
‘privileges and immunities’ of citizens of this State.”57  The 
Supreme Court of South Carolina, in White v. Tax Collector of 
Kershaw District, determining that free blacks were subject to a 
special tax, declared, “[a] firm and wise policy has excluded this 
class from the rights of citizenship in this and almost every State 
in which they are found.”58  Slaves gained few rights, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia declared, when freed by their former masters.59  
Bryan v. Walton decreed, “the act of manumission confers no 
 
54. Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts v. City of Boston engaged in similar analysis when 
holding that segregated schools were consistent with the equality and citizenship rights 
enjoyed by persons of color because separating the races promoted the public welfare.  He 
claimed, the school board could reasonably conclude that “the good of both classes of schools 
will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and for white 
children . . . .”  59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849). 
55. See Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266); 
State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20 (N.C. 1838). 
56. See Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 512, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (1846); Aldridge v. 
Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824) (declaring that persons of 
color were not “comprehended” by the state “Constitution or Bill of Rights”); Bryan’s Heirs 
v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445, 453–54 (1852) (declaring that free persons of color are “neither 
freemen nor slaves”); Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 344 (1822); see also MARK A. 
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2006).  
57. State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 341 (1838); see Pendleton, 6 Ark. at 509, 
___ S.W.3d at ___ (sustaining a state ban on black immigration because persons of color 
could be neither citizens of the United States nor citizens of Arkansas). 
58. 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1846). 
59. See Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201-02 (1853). 
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other right but that of freedom from the dominion of the master, 
and the limited liberty of locomotion; that it does not and cannot 
confer citizenship, nor any of the powers, civil or political, 
incident to citizenship.”60  Florida case law maintained that free 
persons of color could not claim any rights at all as a matter of 
constitutional grace.61  “[T]he rights of free negroes,” Clark v. 
Gautier stated, “depend entirely upon municipal regulations.”62   
Costin and Manual established that black citizenship was no 
bar against race discrimination.  Jacksonians were convinced that 
real differences existed between white persons and persons of 
color.  Chancellor James Kent’s extraordinarily influential 
Commentaries on American Law declared that “[t]he African 
race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior 
rank and condition in society.”63  Sidney George Fisher, a leading 
northern political and constitutional commentator, maintained: 
These races are distinguished by clearly defined and 
different organic physical structure, and also by different 
mental and moral traits, more especially by inequality of 
mental and moral force, and have been so distinguished, 
without change, in all ages.64 
The same principles, at least in theory, governed actual laws 
that discriminated against persons of color as hypothetical laws 
that discriminated against white persons.  The crucial issue in 
both circumstances was whether racial differences were real and 
whether the law served the public interest.  This inquiry required 
justices to make fact inquiries.  Constitutional decision makers 
had to determine whether a real difference existed between the 
races.  They then had to determine whether the law based on that 
real difference served the public interest.  Such laws, providing 
benefits to black Americans denied to their white neighbors, did 
not exist before the Civil War because neither Jacksonian 
legislators nor Jacksonian judges could imagine a real difference 
 
60. Id. at 198. 
61. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 362 (1859). 
62. Id. at 363. 
63. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (John M. Gould ed., 
Little, Brown, & Co., 14th ed. 1896).  See, e.g., Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 346 (1834).  
64. SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE LAWS OF RACE, AS CONNECTED WITH SLAVERY 
10 (Philadelphia, Willis P. Hazard 1860).  
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between white persons and persons of color that might justify a 
law that placed special burdens on white persons or gave special 
benefits to persons of color.65 
Judges enforced the constitutional law of equality during the 
Costin/Manual regime.  By the Civil War, a well-developed state 
jurisprudence existed establishing the basic parameters of 
constitutional equality.66  The Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
which was quite deferential in Manual when sustaining race 
discriminations against persons of color, was a judicial leader in 
setting the standards for scrutinizing discriminations between 
different classes of white persons.  Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 
when striking down a law that forbade courts from hearing certain 
lawsuits brought for the benefit of other persons, insisted that 
“every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or 
affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording 
remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and 
void.”67  Justice Nathan Green elaborated on the judicial 
responsibility for implementing constitutional “law of the land” 
clauses, declaring, “[d]oes it not seem conclusive then, that this 
provision was intended to restrain the legislature from enacting 
any law affecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at 
the same time the rights of all others in similar circumstances 
were equally affected by it?”68 
An examination of race cases only would barely detect this 
commitment to judicial power.  Courts sustained almost all race 
conscious measures that were adjudicated before the Civil War.  
With the exception of a California decision holding that a state 
 
65. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 245, 252–54 (1997). 
66. See GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 54; Saunders, supra note 65, 252–54; see also 
Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 465 (1871) (citing numerous cases from numerous 
state courts decided before 1865 for the “principle of constitutional law which prohibits 
unequal and partial legislation upon general subjects . . . .”).  
67. 10 Tenn. 554, 555 (1831); see Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 260, 269-70 (1829) 
(“That a partial law, tending directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual 
or rights to property, or to the equal benefits of the general and public laws of the land, is 
unconstitutional and void, we do not doubt.”); James v. Adm’rs of G.W. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 
250, 252 (1847) (“[G]eneral public laws, binding all the members of the community under 
similar circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private 
individuals, or classes of individuals.”). 
68. State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831).  
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tax on Chinese immigrants was inconsistent with federal 
commerce power,69 no free state court declared unconstitutional 
any law discriminating against free persons of color.70  Free state 
justices sustained or implemented without commentary laws 
limiting the testimony of persons of color,71 allocating taxes on 
the basis of race,72 mandating different guardianship rules on the 
basis of race,73 prohibiting persons of color from attending public 
schools,74 banning persons of color from voting75 or holding 
public offices,76 forbidding persons of color from marrying a 
white person77 or performing marriages,78 and refusing to permit 
persons of color to reside in the state.79   
Southern courts were even worse.  The Supreme Court of 
Georgia in Bryan v. Walton highlighted the narrow distance 
between the legal status of free persons of color and the legal 
status of slaves when noting that:   
[T]he status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free, 
is such that he has no civil, social or political rights or 
capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed on him by 
 
69. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (1857). 
70. But see Op. of J. Appleton, 44 Me. 521, 575–76 (1857) (declaring in an advisory 
opinion that free persons of color had a right to vote in Maine). 
71. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 361 (1859). 
72. See White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw Dist., 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 136 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1846).  
73. See Thaxter v. Grinnell, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 13, 14–15 (1840). 
74. See Williams v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist., No. 6, Wright 579, 580 (Ohio 1834); Chalmers 
v. Stewart, 11 Ohio 386, 387 (1842); Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 332 (1850) (separate 
schools may be organized, but not constitutionally required); Draper v. Cambridge, 20 Ind. 
268, 269 (1863). 
75. See Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 555-56 (Pa. 1837); State v. Deshler, 25 N.J.L. 
177, 188 (N.J. 1855); People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 438 (1866); Anderson v. Milliken, 9 
Ohio St. 568, 570 (1859); Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304, 306 (1863). 
76. See State ex rel. Dirs. of E. & W. Sch. Dists. v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178, 197 (1850) 
(holding that a school board director is not an officer of the state that must be held by a white 
person). 
77. See Samuel v. Berry, 7 Mich. 467 (1859); Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77, 78 (1852); 
Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 57 (1810). 
78. State v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 20, 22 (Ohio 1843).  
79. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 170 (1857); Barkshire v. State, 7 Ind. 389, 389 
(1856); Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390, 390 (1864); Glenn v. People, 17 Ill. 105, 106-07 (1855) 
(upholding a ban on persons of color residing in the state though refusing to enforce the ban 
on other grounds).  Three Supreme Court Justices in the Passenger Cases approved state 
laws banning persons of color.  Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 429 (1849).  See also 
People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 146 (1860) (dicta suggesting that prosecutors should be 
permitted to present evidence that Chinese residents tend to resist tax collection). 
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Statute; that he can neither contract, nor be contracted with; 
that the free negro can act only by and through his guardian; 
that he is in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship; and 
that this condition he can never change by his own volition. 
. . . . 
He is associated still with the slave in this State, in some of 
the most humiliating incidents of his degradation.  —Like 
the slave, the free person of color is incompetent to testify 
against a free white citizen.  He lives under, and is tried by 
the same Criminal Code.  He has neither vote nor voice in 
forming the laws by which he is governed.  He is not allowed 
to keep or carry fire-arms.  He cannot preach or exhort 
without a special license, on pain of imprisonment, fine and 
corporeal punishment.  He cannot be employed in mixing or 
vending drugs or medicines of any description.  A white man 
is liable to a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment 
in the common jail, at the discretion of the Court, for 
teaching a free negro to read and write; and if one free negro 
teach another, he is punishable by fine and whipping, or fine 
or whipping, at the discretion of the Court.  To employ a free 
person of color to set up type in a printing office, or any other 
labor requiring a knowledge of reading or writing, subjects 
the offender to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.80 
Free persons of color did not get an “0-fer” in slave state 
courts.  City of Memphis v. Winfield81 declared unconstitutional a 
curfew limited to free black citizens.  The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee described the measure as “an attempt to impair the 
liberty of a free person unnecessarily, to restrain him from the 
exercise of his lawful pursuits, and to make an innocent act a 
crime . . . .”82  The Supreme Court of Kentucky when declaring 
unconstitutional a law forbidding persons of color from defending 
themselves from an assault initiated by a white person declared 
that the legislative power in question “can not [be] exercise[d] 
over any man or class of men, be they aliens, free persons of color, 
or citizens.”83  The Supreme Courts of Virginia and Georgia held 
that a free person of color claimed as a slave had a right to habeas 
corpus, although both decisions interpreted statutes that did not 
 
80. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198, 202-03 (1853). 
81. 27 Tenn. 707, 709 (1848). 
82. Id. 
83. Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70, 75 (1820). 
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make explicit race discriminations.84  After noting that the statute 
granting rights to habeas corpus did not make a racial distinction, 
Judge Tucker of the Virginia Supreme Court stated, “[a] free 
negro, as well as a free white man, must be entitled to the benefit 
of the habeas corpus act, both according to its language, which is 
broad and general, and still more according to its spirit, which is 
yet more liberal and beneficent.”85  Georgia justices in State v. 
Philpot stated, “the free person of color enjoying personal liberty 
has the benefit of the habeas corpus secured to him by a 
constitutional guaranty.”86  No state court reached the conclusion 
that the legislature had unconstitutionally discriminated against 
free blacks, that a law that subjected all persons to the disabilities 
the legislature had imposed solely on the basis of race would have 
been constitutional. 
No consensus developed in the antebellum United States on 
the best textual hook to hang constitutional commitments to 
equality.  Cranch did not point to any provision in any constitution 
when in Costin he claimed, “the constitution gives equal rights to 
all the citizens of the United States . . . .”87  State courts were 
promiscuous when providing the constitutional underpinnings for 
equal rights.88  State decisions were rooted in general equality 
provisions,89 in “due process” or “law of the land” provisions,90 
on constitutional provisions prohibiting exclusive privileges or 
special laws,91 on separation of powers grounds92 or on general 
 
84. DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 449 (1836); State v. Philpot, 1 Dud. 46, 46 (Super. 
Ct. Richmond Cnty. 1831). 
85. DeLacy, 34 Va. at 444. 
86. 1 Dud. at 52. 
87. Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).  
But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-27 (1857). 
88. Saunders, supra note 65, at 258. 
89. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 360-61 (Ala. 1838); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336-37 
(1825); City of Lexington v. McQuillan’s Heirs, 39 Ky. 513, 516 (1839) (relying on both the 
general equality provisions and provisions requiring “equal and uniform” taxation). 
90. Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. 483, 490-93 (1842); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. 
Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858). 
91. See Thomas v. Bd. of Comm’rs., 5 Ind. 4, 8 (1854) (citing numerous Indiana 
decisions declaring legislation “not within the constitutional prohibition of special and local 
legislation”); Smith’s Adm’rs. v. Smith, 2 Miss. 102, 103 (1834); McRee v. Wilmington, 47 
N.C. 186, 190 (1855); Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa 491, 496-97 (1858); Norwich Gaslight Co. 
v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19, 38 (1856). 
92. See Regents of Univ. of Md., 9 G. & J. at 411. 
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constitutional principles.93  The Supreme Court of Vermont, in 
Ward v. Barnard, without citing any particular provision in the 
state constitution, struck down a legislative act on the ground that 
“[a]n act conferring upon any one citizen, privileges to the 
prejudice of another, and which is not applicable to others, in like 
circumstances . . . , does not enter into the idea of municipal law, 
having no relation to the community in general.”94  Costin appears 
to have relied on the same belief that equality was implicit in 
American constitutionalism, even when not explicitly provided 
for by constitutional text. 
II.  THE TURNER REGIME 
Chief Justice Salmon Chase’s brief opinion on circuit in In 
re Turner captured the constitutional law of race equality during 
Reconstruction.95  Elizabeth Turner was emancipated by the 
Constitution of Maryland on November 1, 1864.96  She was 
almost immediately indentured to her former master Philemon T. 
Hambleton.97  The Maryland law of indentures at the time made 
a sharp distinction between whites and persons of color.98  As 
Chase summarized:  
The petitioner, under this indenture, is not entitled to any 
education; a white apprentice must be taught reading, 
writing, and arithmetic.  The petitioner is liable to be 
assigned and transferred at the will of the master to any 
person in the same county; the white apprentice is not so 
liable.  The authority of the master over the petitioner is 
 
93. Norwich Gaslight Co., 25 Conn. at 38. 
94. Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 128 (Vt. 1825); see Lewis, 3 Me. at 332-34; Reed v. 
Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27, 28 (Iowa 1849) (treating “law of the land” as a general principle); 
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404-05 (1814); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 70-71 
(1836); State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 
554, 555 (1831); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,502). 
95. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).  For a discussion of Turner, see  
HAROLD H. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE TURNER 
AND TEXAS V. WHITE 127-39 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1997). 
96. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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described in the law as a ‘property and interest;’ no such 
description is applied to authority over a white apprentice.99 
Chase granted Turner’s petition for habeas corpus, releasing her 
from Hambleton’s custody on two grounds.  First, he declared that 
the indenture was an involuntary servitude that directly violated 
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment.100  Second, Chase 
ruled that the Maryland indenture law violated the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, which was a constitutional exercise of congressional 
power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.  In re 
Turner stated: 
[T]he indenture set forth in the return does not contain 
important provisions for the security and benefit of the 
apprentice which are required by the laws of Maryland in 
indenture of white apprentices, and is, therefore, in 
contravention of that clause of the first section of the civil 
rights law enacted by congress on April 9, 1866, which 
assures to all citizens without regard to race or color, “full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.”101 
The constitutional law of racial equality in the Turner regime 
had three foundations.  The Thirteenth Amendment supplied the 
textual hook.  Congress was the institution primarily responsible 
for implementing the constitutional ban on slavery.  Chase 
declared Hambleton’s failure to provide Turner with the benefits 
the Maryland law mandated for white persons violated federal 
legislation passed under Section Two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.102  He did not maintain that those provisions of the 
indenture would be unconstitutional in the absence of federal 
legislation.  Congress was the first mover.  Congress when 
implementing the Thirteenth Amendment could take all steps 
necessary to ensure that former slaves were transformed into full 
citizens.  Chase claimed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was 
constitutional because “[c]olored persons equally with white 




101. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 340. 
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Republicans when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act emphasized the Thirteenth 
Amendment as the proper textual hook for the constitutional law 
of racial equality.104  Senator Lyman Trumbull’s speech 
introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Senate declared 
with reference to the Black Codes, “[t]he purpose of the bill under 
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry 
into effect the constitutional amendment.”105  The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on slavery extended to discriminations against 
persons of color because race discriminations in both the free and 
slave states were “badges of servitude made in the interest of 
slavery and as part of slavery.”106  Trumbull asserted, “[t]hey 
never would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but for 
slavery, and when slavery falls they fall also.”107   
Republican members of the House and Senate during early 
Reconstruction insisted that Congress was the institution 
primarily responsible for implementing the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s commitment to racial equality.  Their Thirteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress to legislate, not courts to 
constrain.  Senator Charles Sumner spoke of a “pledge[] to 
maintain the emancipated slave in his freedom,” a pledge that 
“must be performed by the national government.”108  “[W]hat 
makes this constitutional amendment a practical, living thing,” 
Senator William Stewart of Nevada stated, “is the power given to 
Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation.”109  In his view, 
“it must for years be the effective power of Congress, cooperating 
with the Executive, that will protect the freedmen from 
oppression . . . .”110  Litigation standing alone, Republicans 
insisted, could not destroy the badges and incidents of slavery or 
the slave system.  When Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania 
suggested that persons of color sue to protect their rights,  Senator 
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts responded, “the Senator says that 
 
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1865). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 322. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 91. 
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1865). 
110. Id. 
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the Constitution of the United States protects these people.  I 
agree that it does so far as the Constitution can do it; and the 
amendment to the Constitution empowers us to pass the necessary 
legislation to make them free indeed . . . .”111  Representative 
Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota stated, “a grand abstract 
declaration, unenforced by the arm of authority, is not a 
protection.”112  
Congress was empowered under the Thirteenth Amendment 
to pass any legislation that helped transform former slaves into 
full citizens.  The revised Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill 
covered:  
[A]ll loyal refugees and freedmen, so far as the same shall 
be necessary to enable them as speedily as practicable to 
become self-supporting citizens of the United States, and to 
aid them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation 
of the commander-in-chief, by emancipation under the laws 
of States, and by constitutional amendment, available to 
them and beneficial to the republic.113 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois maintained: 
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now 
adopted, and which declares that slavery shall no longer 
exist, and which authorizes Congress by appropriate 
legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we 
have a right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is 
deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in 
view, secure freedom to all people in the United States.  The 
various State laws to which I have referred—and there are 
many others—although they do not make a man an absolute 
slave, yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman; and it is 
perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where 
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not 
allow a colored person to go from one county to another is 
certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman.  A 
law that does not allow a colored person to hold property, 
does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is 
 
111. Id. at 340. 
112. Id. at 588. 
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-74 (1866). 
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certainly a law in violation of the rights of a freeman, and 
being so may properly be declared void.114 
This power to strike a death blow to slavery included the power 
to eradicate the slave system as well as slavery.  “Having 
prohibited slavery,” Donnelly insisted, “we must not pause for an 
instant until the spirit of slavery is extinct, and every trace left by 
it in our laws is obliterated.”115  Congress had to grant persons of 
color sufficient rights so that no vestige of human bondage 
remained.  Sumner stated, “[b]eyond all question the protection 
of the colored race in civil rights is essential to complete the 
abolition of slavery . . . .” 116 
Trumbull captured the essence of the Turner regime when 
he declared: 
I have no doubt that under this provision of the Constitution 
we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights 
against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional 
amendment amounts to nothing.  It was for that purpose that 
the second clause of that amendment was adopted, which 
says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate 
legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting 
slavery.  Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation 
is to be?  The Congress of the United States; and it is for 
Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may 
think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end.  If 
we believe a Freedmen’s Bureau necessary, if we believe an 
act punishing any man who deprives a colored person of any 
civil rights on account of his color necessary—if that is one 
means to secure his freedom, we have the constitutional right 
to adopt it.  If in order to prevent slavery Congress deem it 
necessary to declare null and void all laws which will not 
permit the colored man to contract, which will not permit 
him to testify, which will not permit him to buy and sell, and 
to go where he pleases, it has the power to do so, and not 
only the power, but it becomes its duty to do so.117  
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination against 
persons of color when prohibiting slavery.  Congress was the 
 
114. Id. at 475. 
115. Id. at 585.   
116. Id. at 684. 
117. Id. at 322. 
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institution authorized to determine the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  Congress could pass any measure that promoted racial 
equality and full citizenship. 
The logic of Thirteenth Amendment foundations for the 
constitutional law of racial equality supported race conscious 
programs that benefitted persons of color as well as 
antidiscrimination measures.118  The fundamental question in the 
Turner regime was whether the law undermined slavery, the slave 
power, or the slave system.119  Laws that prevented discrimination 
against persons of color and laws that provided specific benefits 
to persons of color were both constitutional means for 
undermining the slave system and for making former slaves full 
citizens of the United States.  Representative Samuel W. Moulton 
of Illinois stated, “[t]he very object of the [Second Freedmen’s 
Bureau Bill] is to break down the discrimination between whites 
and blacks . . . .  Therefore I repeat that the true object of this bill 
is the amelioration of the condition of the colored people.”120  
Race conscious measures that protected persons of color were 
justified because real differences existed between longstanding 
white citizens and newly freed slaves.  
[N]ever before in the history of this Government have nearly 
four million people been emancipated from the most abject 
and degrading slavery ever imposed upon human beings; 
never before has the occasion arisen when it was necessary 
to provide for such large numbers of people thrown upon the 
bounty of the Government, unprotected and unprovided for 
. . . .  [C]an we not provide for those among us who have 
been held in bondage all their lives, who have never been 
permitted to earn one dollar for themselves, who, by the great 
constitutional amendment declaring freedom throughout the 
land, have been discharged from bondage to their masters 
who had hitherto provided for their necessities in 
consideration of their services?121   
Laws that discriminated against persons of color, by comparison, 
sought to re-establish in different form rather than eradicate 
 
118. This paragraph relies heavily on Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the 
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). 
119. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 388 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866). 
121. Id. at 939.  
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human bondage.  Trumbull stated, “under this provision of the 
Constitution we may destroy all these discriminations in civil 
rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional 
amendment amounts to nothing.”122  
The Thirteenth Amendment law of racial equality did not 
have a state action limitation.  Chase in Turner declared the 
indenture unconstitutional, not the state law mandating different 
treatment for white apprentices and apprentices of color.123  “The 
alleged apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary 
servitude,” he maintained, “within the meaning of the[] words in 
the amendment.”124  Chase then observed “the indenture” violated 
the Civil Rights Act because that private bargain “d[id] not 
contain important provisions for the security and benefit of the 
apprentice, which are required by the laws of Maryland in 
indentures of white apprentices . . . .”125 
Charles Sumner when making a Thirteenth Amendment 
defense of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made no 
reference to any state action limit on federal authority to make 
persons of color equal citizens.  The senior Senator from 
Massachusetts insisted that the scope of Congressional power 
under the constitutional ban on slavery was as broad as the scope 
of government power.126  If the federal or state government could 
regulate an institution, the federal government under the 
Thirteenth Amendment could require that institution to refrain 
from discriminating against persons of color.  Sumner declared, 
“[s]how me . . . a legal institution, anything created or regulated 
by law, and I show you what must be opened equally to all 
without distinction of color.”127  “Theaters and other places of 
public amusement” could be prohibited from engaging in race 
discrimination, even if they had no common law obligation to 
serve all customers because “they are public institutions, 
regulated if not created by law . . . .”128  Congress had the power 
 
122. Id. at 322. 
123. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 825 (1870). 
127. Id. at 242. 
128. Id. at 383. 
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to “open to all persons, without distinction of color” all 
“institutions which have the sanction of law, which depend upon 
law, which depend upon State or municipal authority.”129  
Regulations could be benefits.  “Whoever seeks the benefit of the 
law,” Sumner declared, “must show equality.”130  He insisted that 
private colleges be prohibited from discriminating against 
persons of color.  “I wish under this law to make it impossible for 
Harvard College to close its gates against a colored person[,]” he 
declared on May 21, 1873.131  “Take all our great institutions of 
learning.  They are not sustained by ‘moneys derived from 
general taxation,’ but they are ‘authorized by law.’”132  Sumner’s 
Civil Rights Act would have prohibited religious institutions from 
engaging in discrimination.  “[W]hen a church organization asks 
the benefit of the law by an act of incorporation,” Sumner stated, 
“it must submit to the great primal law of this Union—the 
Constitution of the United States, interpreted by the Declaration 
of Independence.”133 
III.  THE STRAUDER REGIME 
The Supreme Court in the 1870s modified the Turner regime 
by changing the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  Strauder v. West Virginia,134 Ex parte Virginia,135 and 
Commonwealth v. Rives136 completed the process by which the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment replaced 
the Thirteenth Amendment as the foundation for attacks on race 
discrimination.  The shift in textual hook had doctrinal 
consequences.  The cabining of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
corresponding rise of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One 
 
129. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1869).  
130. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1869); see id. (“[A]ll that my bill 
proposes is that those who enjoy the benefits of law shall treat those who come to them with 
equality.”). 
131. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3267 (1870). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 823; see id. at 896 (“[T]o apply to an incorporated association the great 
principles of our Government . . . does not in any respect interfere with religion . . . .”); 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 3 (1870). 
134. 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). 
135. 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879). 
136. 100 U.S. 313, 317 (1879). 
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introduced the state action doctrine to the constitutional law of the 
United States.137  Constitutional decisionmakers interpreting the 
race-neutral Equal Protection Clause were far more prone to use 
colorblind rhetoric than Republicans during early Reconstruction 
who spoke of a constitutional obligation to transform former 
slaves into full citizens.138  Intimations of legislative supremacy 
morphed into commitments to legislative primacy.  Congress 
remained the institution constitutionally charged with 
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme 
Court determined the scope and nature of that constitutional 
commitment to racial equality. 
The Strauder regime was anticipated by influential dicta in 
the Slaughter-House Cases asserting that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment banned race discrimination 
and only race or analogous discrimination.139  Justice Samuel 
Miller’s brief analysis in that case on the constitutional ban on 
slavery limited the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
“servitude.”140  The Fourteenth Amendment, in his view, 
contained the provisions that protected the rights of newly freed 
slaves.141  The Equal Protection Clause, Miller declared, was the 
constitutional provision that banned race discrimination.142  “The 
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated 
negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and 
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by 
[the Equal Protection C]lause . . . .”143  The Slaughter-House 
majority severed equal protection completely from the 
antebellum concerns with arbitrary discriminations that 
structured the Costin/Manuel regime and help explain why the 
persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment preferred race 
neutral language to a more explicit ban on race discrimination.144  
 
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
138. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309. 
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872). 
140. Id. at 69; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (rejecting a claim that 
private discrimination violates the Thirteenth Amendment). 
141. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81. 
142. Id. 
143. Id.  
144. The best discussion of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s decision to adopt 
a race neutral Equal Protection Clause rather than an explicit ban on race discrimination is 
2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:47 PM 
448 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
Slaughter-House’s Equal Protection Clause prohibited race 
discrimination, whether arbitrary or not, and hardly any, if any, 
other discriminations, no matter how arbitrary.  Miller concluded: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not 
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a 
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come 
within the purview of this provision.  It is so clearly a 
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case 
would be necessary for its application to any other.145   
The Supreme Court in Strauder officially made the 
Fourteenth Amendment the constitutional foundation for the law 
of racial equality.146  Justice William Strong’s majority opinion, 
after quoting the text of Section One, declared: 
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be 
the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, 
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws 
of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose 
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no 
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of 
their color?  The words of the amendment, it is true, are 
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a 
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored 
race,—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation 
against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from 
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which 
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.147 
Racial discriminations stood on a different constitutional footing 
than other discriminations.  States, Strong wrote, “may confine 
[jury] selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons 
within certain ages, or to persons having educational 
 
Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the 
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.  287 (2015). 
145. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at  81. 
146. For an important discussion of Strauder, see Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. 
West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the Tensions Contained 
Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS L. J. 603 
(2018).  
147. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879). 
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qualifications.”148  Echoing Slaughter-House on the limited scope 
of equal protection, the Strauder opinion continued, “[w]e do not 
believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit 
this.  Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose.  Its 
aim was against discrimination because of race or color.”149   
Strong endorsed the Turner regime’s commitment to an 
absolute ban on discrimination against former slaves.150  The 
Strauder/Virginia/Rives opinions followed Turner by not 
exploring whether real differences existed between white persons 
and persons of color that might justify limiting juries only to 
white people.  Strong never discussed whether the West Virginia 
law prohibiting persons of color from serving on criminal juries 
served a social interest.  He did not consider whether real 
differences existed between white persons and persons of color 
that justified excluding persons of color from juries.  What 
mattered for the purpose of the constitutional law of equality 
under the Fourteenth Amendment was that the State had engaged 
in race discrimination.  Strong’s majority opinion in Rives 
declared, “[t]he plain object of [the post-Civil War Amendments] 
was to place the colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a 
level with whites.  They made the rights and responsibilities, civil 
and criminal, of the two races exactly the same.”151  Ex parte 
Virginia reiterated this claim.152  Strong asserted: 
One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the 
colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude 
in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect 
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the 
jurisdiction of the States.  They were intended to take away 
all possibility of oppression by law because of race or 
color.153   
 
148. Id. at 310. 
149. Id.; see also State v. Underwood, 63 N.C. 98, 99 (1869) (striking down without 
explaining in any detail a state law prohibiting persons of color from testifying against white 
persons as inconsistent with the state constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866). 
150. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
151. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879). 
152. See 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879). 
153. Id.; see also Underwood, 63 N.C. at 98-99. 
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Justice John Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy more 
explicitly captured the distinction the Turner and Strauder 
regimes made between sociological difference and racial 
equality.154  Harlan endorsed the Costin/Manuel regime’s 
understanding that real differences exist between the races.  He 
wrote: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country.  And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in 
education, in wealth and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty.155 
These sociological differences, however, did not make a legal 
difference.  Harlan continued: 
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there 
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal 
before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the most 
powerful.  The law regards man as man, and takes no account 
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.156 
Discrimination was unconstitutional, Harlan made clear, even 
when real differences existed between the races. 
Strauder broke from the Turner regime by adopting what 
later became known as a “banned categories” approach rather 
than a ban on discrimination against persons of color.157  
Congress, when implementing the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
mandate for racial equality, had passed race conscious measures 
that favored former slaves, while insisting that persons of color 
enjoy the civil rights of white persons.158  Strauder and 
subsequent cases ruled out legislation making African Americans 
“the special favorite of the laws . . . .”159  A constitutional law of 
 
154. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-56 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. at 559. 
156. Id. 
157. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 383-84 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986). 
158. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. 
159. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
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racial equality rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to secure a “perfect 
equality of civil rights” rather than provide former slaves and 
persons of color with the rights and resources necessary to 
become full American citizens.160 
The late Strauder regime introduced the state action doctrine 
to American law.161  The Thirteenth Amendment that provided 
the foundations for the Turner regime banned slavery in toto, not 
merely state laws that sanctioned slavery.162  Turner working 
within those parameters explored whether the agreement between 
Hambleton and Turner was constitutional and whether that 
agreement violated federal laws implementing the Thirteenth 
Amendment.163  Justice John Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights 
Cases articulated the Turner regime’s understanding that 
individual behavior as well as government action was subject to 
constitutional regulation.  He maintained: 
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce [the 
Thirteenth A]mendment, by appropriate legislation, may 
enact laws to protect that people against the 
deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights granted 
to other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may 
be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States, 
their officers and agents, and, also, upon, at least, such 
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and 
wield power and authority under the State.164 
The Fourteenth Amendment that provided the foundation for the 
Strauder regime excluded private discrimination when declaring, 
“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”165  The majority opinion in the Civil 
Rights Cases emphasized the insertion of “No State” in Section 
One.166  Justice Joseph Bradley insisted:  
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.  
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-
 
160. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879). 
161. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 6. 
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
163. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
164. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
166. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12. 
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matter of the amendment.  It has a deeper and broader scope.  
It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State 
action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures 
them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, 
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the 
laws . . . .  It does not invest Congress with power to legislate 
upon subjects which are within the domain of State 
legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State 
legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to.  It does 
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for 
the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of 
redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of 
State officers executive or judicial, when these are 
subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the 
amendment.  Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured 
by way of prohibition against State laws and State 
proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by 
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of 
carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation 
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State 
laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction 
of their operation and effect.167 
In sharp contrast to Turner’s focus on the legal relationship 
between Hambleton and Turner, Justice Bradley’s opinion 
discussed only what state officials had done and had not done.  
The relationship between Robinson and the Memphis & 
Charleston Railroad Company under the Strauder regime was 
none of the Constitution’s business.168 
Strong’s majority opinions in Ex parte Virginia, Strauder, 
and Rives modified the Turner regime’s institutional 
commitments by developing what we might call legislative 
primacy.169  Ex parte Virginia introduced legislative primacy to 
the constitutional law of the United States when declaring: 
It is not said the judicial power of the general government 
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting 
 
167. Id. 
168. See id. at 13. 
169. See generally Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). 
2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:47 PM 
2021 KOREMATSU’S ANCESTORS 453 
 
the rights and immunities guaranteed.  It is not said that 
branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void 
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions.  It is the 
power of Congress which has been enlarged.  Congress is 
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate 
legislation.  Some legislation is contemplated to make the 
amendments fully effective.  Whatever legislation is 
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce 
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to 
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights 
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or 
invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
congressional power.170 
The constitutional law of race equality under legislative primacy 
requires that Congress be the first mover.  Litigants may assert 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause only after Congress 
passes a statute implementing the Equal Protection Clause.  
Congress may implement, but not interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Federal courts must review all exercises of 
congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ensure that Congress, when regulating race 
discrimination, has remained within judicially enforceable 
constitutional limits on federal power.171   
Strauder illustrates legislative primacy in action.  Strong 
insisted the litigants base their claim on federal constitutional and 
federal statutory law.172  After “[c]oncluding . . . that the statute 
of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors . . . 
against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws to a colored man,” he did not 
immediately declare the law unconstitutional.173  Instead, Strong 
turned to federal statutory law.  Strauder continued, “it remains 
only to be considered whether the power of Congress to enforce 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate 
legislation is sufficient to justify the enactment of sect. 641 of the 
 
170. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46. 
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
172. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
173. Id. at 310. 
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Revised Statutes.”174  Strauder succeeded in Strauder because 
Congress had passed a law implementing his right against race 
discrimination in jury selection and the Justices independently 
determined that the federal law in question passed constitutional 
muster.175  Strauder and Ex parte Virginia were correct because 
the West Virginia state legislature and Virginia bench were 
violating a congressional ban on race discrimination in jury 
selection and Congress had the power to pass that ban under 
Sections One and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.176  At no 
point did any decision in the Strauder/Virginia/Rives trilogy 
indicate the federal judiciary could in the absence of a federal 
statute declare unconstitutional under Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment state laws limiting juries to white 
citizens.   
Federal judicial practice in race cases during the late 
nineteenth century was structured by this institutional 
commitment to legislative primacy.  From 1868 until 1896, every 
case the Supreme Court decided on the constitutional meaning of 
racial equality concerned the constitutionality and scope of 
federal laws implementing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or 
Fifteenth Amendments.177  Some cases were brought by persons 
of color claiming rights under the federal statutes Congress 
passed when implementing the post-Civil War Constitution.178  
Other cases were brought by white persons claiming the federal 
law under which they were indicted was not warranted by the 
post-Civil War Constitution or that their indictments were not 
warranted by federal laws implementing the post-Civil War 
Constitution.179  The Justices acknowledged in dicta the 
 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 310-11. 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
177. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
178. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 365 (1886); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 
113-14 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1880); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304; 
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 315 (1879).  In Pace v. Alabama, Justice Stephen Field 
declared that the plaintiff claimed that laws prohibiting interracial marriage “conflict[] with 
. . . the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”  106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883).  Field’s brief analysis, 
however, also maintained that the prohibition did not conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.  Id. at 584-85. 
179. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1887); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 
629, 641 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 
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possibility of claims to racial equality that had no statutory 
foundation.  “Th[e] [Thirteenth A]mendment, as well as the 
Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights 
Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without any 
ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any 
existing state of circumstances.”180  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court for a quarter of a century did not adjudicate a single claim 
that persons had rights under the post-Civil War Amendments 
independent of the rights Congress had granted by federal law.  
Judge William Woods in United States v. Hall captured the 
foundational institutional principle of judicial practice in cases 
raising constitutional questions about racial equality when he 
declared, “to guard against the invasion of the citizen’s 
fundamental rights, and to insure their adequate protection, as 
well against state legislation as state inaction, or incompetency, 
the [Fourteenth A]mendment gives congress the power to enforce 
its provisions by appropriate legislation.”181  When discussing the 
Equal Protection Clause in particular, Woods asserted, 
“[C]ongress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect 
the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States against 
unfriendly or insufficient state legislation . . . .”182 
IV.  THE PLESSY REGIME 
The Supreme Court in Plessy maintained the textual hook of 
the Strauder regime, while abandoning post-Reconstruction 
institutional commitments and modifying racial equality 
 
339, 340 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544-46 (1875); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1875); see also Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 
590 (1871) (finding that Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not permit removal of a case to federal 
court when state law forbade the witnesses of color from testifying in a criminal case).  The 
Supreme Court in a series of cases also sustained federal laws protecting persons of color as 
constitutional exercises of congressional power under Article I, Section 4 or inherent federal 
authority to protect the integrity of federal elections or federal prisoners.  See Ku-Klux Cases, 
110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (Congress has power independently of the post-Civil War 
Amendments to prohibit private persons from preventing persons of color from voting); 
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892).  For an important discussion of these 
powers, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
180. 109 U.S. at 20. 
181. 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). 
182. Id. at 81. 
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doctrine.183  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment during the late nineteenth and first part of the 
twentieth centuries provided the textual foundation for the 
constitutional law of racial equality.  Federal courts replaced 
Congress as the institution primarily responsible for 
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality.  
The constitutional law of racial equality bifurcated.  Racial 
discriminations remained per se unconstitutional.  Racial 
distinctions were constitutional if, as the revived antebellum 
Costin/Manuel regime mandated, they were rooted in real 
differences between the races and advanced the public welfare.184 
Plessy further entrenched the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality.  Justice 
Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion, following Slaughter-
House185 and the Civil Rights Cases,186 cast aside arguments that 
race discrimination was an aspect of slavery or a slave system.  
“Slavery,” he said when rejecting a Thirteenth Amendment attack 
on a Louisiana law mandating race segregation in street cars, 
“implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the 
ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the 
labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the 
absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property 
and services.”187  As Miller asserted in Slaughter-House,188 
Brown in Plessy maintained the Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted because the constitutional ban on slavery did not cover 
the Black Codes or related discriminations against former 
slaves.189  The Thirteenth Amendment, he stated, “was regarded 
 
183. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896). 
184. See id. at 543-44, 548, 550-52; Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 
(C.C.D.C. 1821) (No, 3,266); State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838).  
185. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (construing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 69 (1872)).   
186. See 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).  
187. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542. 
188. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70-71 (the Black Codes “forced upon the 
statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the 
rebellion, and who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the 
result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of 
constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much.  They 
accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment . . . .”). 
189. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-44. 
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by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored 
race from certain laws which have been enacted in the Southern 
States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and 
burdens . . . .”190  The Fourteenth Amendment was Brown’s 
source for the constitutional commitment to “the absolute equality 
of the two races before the law . . . .”191  The ensuing discussion 
in Plessy elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole.  
Brown did not consider the distinctive meaning of any provision 
in Section One.  Plessy concluded, “we think the enforced 
separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the 
state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored 
man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor 
denies him the equal protection of the laws . . . .”192 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
became the specific textual hook for the constitutional law of 
racial equality over the next thirty years.  Justice John Harlan did 
not mention the Due Process Clause when discussing what 
clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment supported a judicial 
decision sustaining a local law that provided high school 
education for white children but not for children of color.  His 
opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 
declared:  
[W]e cannot say that this action of the state court was, within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the 
state to the plaintiffs and to those associated with them of the 
equal protection of the laws or of any privileges belonging 
to them as citizens of the United States.193 
Gong Lum v. Rice omitted  the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
as a textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality.194  
Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s unanimous opinion stated:  
The case then reduces itself to the question whether a state 
can be said to afford to a child of Chinese ancestry born in 
this country, and a citizen of the United States, the equal 
protection of the laws, by giving her the opportunity for a 
 
190. Id. at 542. 
191. Id. at 543. 
192. Id. at 548. 
193. 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). 
194. See 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927).  
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common school education in a school which receives only 
colored children of the brown, yellow or black races.195   
When federal courts immediately before the New Deal spoke on 
the constitutional law of racial equality, they interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause and only the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in Nixon v. Herndon declared 
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting persons of color from 
voting in primary elections because the Fourteenth Amendment 
“denied to any State the power to withhold from [African 
Americans] the equal protection of the laws.”196 
The Plessy regime divided the law of racial equality into the 
law of race discriminations and race distinctions.  Gilbert Thomas 
Stephenson’s influential Race Distinctions in American Law 
detailed the nature and significance of these categories.  He wrote: 
[T]here is an essential difference between race distinctions 
and race discriminations.  North Carolina, for example, has 
a law that white and Negro children shall not attend the same 
schools, but that separate schools shall be maintained.  If the 
terms for all the public schools in the State are equal in 
length, if the teaching force is equal in numbers and ability, 
if the school buildings are equal in convenience, 
accommodations, and appointments, a race distinction exists 
but not a discrimination.197 
Race discriminations were per se unconstitutional.  Such a law, 
Stephenson declared, “necessarily implies partiality and 
favoritism.”198  Race distinctions were constitutional if, as the 
Costin/Manuel regime required, they were based on real 
differences between the races and promoted the good of both 
races.  Race Distinctions in American Law explained: 
Identity of accommodation is not essential to avoid the 
charge of discrimination.  If there are in a particular school 
district twice as many white children as there are Negro 
 
195. Id. 
196. 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) 
(“The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal 
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the court to level by its judgment 
these barriers of color.”). 
197. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 2-3 
(1910). 
198. Id. at 4. 
2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:47 PM 
2021 KOREMATSU’S ANCESTORS 459 
 
children, the school building for the former should be twice 
as large as that for the latter.  The course of study need not 
be the same.  If scientific investigation and experience show 
that in the education of the Negro child emphasis should be 
placed on one course of study, and in the education of the 
white child, on another; it is not a discrimination to 
emphasize industrial training in the Negro school, if that is 
better suited to the needs of the Negro pupil, and classics in 
the white school if the latter course is more profitable to the 
white child.  There is no discrimination so long as there is 
equality of opportunity, and this equality may often be 
attained only by a difference in methods.199 
State courts during the second half of the nineteenth century 
had struggled with whether to distinguish race discriminations 
from race distinctions.  Sumner, serving as counsel in Roberts v. 
City of Boston, insisted that Boston engaged in unconstitutional 
race discrimination when mandating separate schools for white 
children and children of color.200  He declared, “[t]he separation 
of children in the public schools of Boston, on account of color or 
race, is in the nature of caste, and is a violation of equality.”201  
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s unanimous opinion in Roberts 
maintained that government authorities had made a constitutional 
race distinction.  Shaw “[c]onced[ed] . . . in the fullest manner, 
that colored persons . . . are entitled by law . . . to equal rights,”202 
but insisted that governing authorities could consistently develop, 
with this state constitutional commitment to equality, a “system 
of distribution and classification” as long as “this power is 
reasonably exercised” and served “the best interests of both 
classes of children . . . .”203  Controversies over segregation 
intensified in state courts after the Civil War.204  Some state courts 
 
199. Id. at 3. 
200. See 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 201-03 (1849). 
201. Id. at 202 (argument of Charles Sumner). 
202. Id. at 206. 
203. Id. at 209.  For a detailed account of the debate over segregated schools in Boston, 
see J. Morgan Kousser, “The Supremacy of Equal Rights”: The Struggle Against Racial 
Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 941 (1988). 
204. For the struggle over school segregation in state constitutional law and practice 
during the fifty years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see J. Morgan Kousser, 
Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford (Feb. 28, 1985), in DEAD END: 
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in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took Sumner’s 
position that state segregation laws were racial discriminations.  
The Supreme Court of Iowa, when declaring unconstitutional a 
local ordinance segregating schools, deduced from the principle 
that “all the youths are equal before the law” the holding that a 
school board could not constitutionally “deny a youth admission 
to any particular school because of his or her nationality, religion, 
color, clothing or the like.”205  Other state courts followed Roberts 
and sustained such measures as race distinctions.  The Supreme 
Court of Ohio channeled Chief Justice Shaw when concluding, 
“[e]quality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating 
white and colored persons in the same school . . . .”206  “Any 
classification which preserves substantially equal school 
advantages,” Judge Day’s unanimous opinion concluded, “is not 
prohibited by either the State or federal constitution . . . .”207 
Plessy sided with Ohio against Iowa when sustaining a local 
ordinance mandating state segregation on streetcars.208  Brown’s 
opinion cited Roberts when anticipating Stephenson’s distinction 
between race discriminations and race distinctions.209  He 
declared:  
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN SCHOOLS (1986).  
205. Clark v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868); see also People v. Quincy, 
101 Ill. 308, 314-15 (1882); Crawford v. Sch. Bd. for Sch. Dist. No. 7, 137 P. 217, 220 (Or. 
1913). 
206. State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871); see also Puitt v. 
Comm’rs of Gaston Cnty, 94 N.C. 709, 719 (1888); State ex rel.  Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 
Nev. 342, 347-48 (1872). 
207. Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 211. 
208. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (referencing Garnes, 21 Ohio 
St. at 210).  
209. See id. at 544 (“The great principle . . . is, that by the constitution and laws of 
Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or 
condition, are equal before the law . . . .  But, when this great principle comes to be applied 
to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, 
that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that 
children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same 
treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally 
entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and 
security.”) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 
(5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)).  
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nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of 
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.210   
Race discriminations that abridged “the absolute equality of the 
two races before the law” were per se unconstitutional.211  Brown 
cited Strauder and other cases in which courts had ruled persons 
of color were unconstitutionally denied rights granted to white 
people.212  None of these cases required investigation into real 
differences between the races and whether the law advanced the 
public good.  Racial distinctions, by comparison, were governed 
by the antebellum principle that different treatment passed 
constitutional muster if the different treatment was based on real 
differences between people and promoted the public good.  
Brown’s opinion in Plessy declared, “every exercise of the police 
power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are 
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and 
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”213   
The Louisiana segregation law satisfied both prongs of the 
constitutional test for race distinctions.214  The Plessy majority 
had no doubt that real differences existed between the races.  
“[D]istinction[s] which [are] founded in the color of the two 
races,” Brown confidently stated, “must always exist so long as 
white men are distinguished from the other race by color . . . .”215  
The judicial majority was as confident that race segregation 
promoted the public welfare.  Brown maintained that state 
legislatures, when mandating racial separation, had acted “with 
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the 
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the 
preservation of the public peace and good order.”216 
Harlan appears to have accepted Plessy’s differentiation 
between race distinctions and race classifications, but not the 




212. See id. at 545-46. 
213. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. 
214. Id. at 550-51. 
215. Id. at 543. 
216. Id. at 550. 
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famously claimed in Plessy that “[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind,”217 but he was willing in other cases to treat race conscious 
measures as making race distinctions rather than race 
discriminations.218  His opinion in Cumming,219 after noting that 
the plaintiff had not attacked the constitutionality of race 
segregation per se,220 endorsed differential racial treatment that, 
Harlan claimed, was based on real differences between the races 
and advanced the public good.  His unanimous opinion for the 
court held that a local school board decision could 
constitutionally meet a financial crisis by closing the high school 
for students of color while keeping open the high school for white 
students when the alternative was closing the elementary school 
for children of color.221  The school board’s decision to keep open 
the school more children of color attended, Harlan concluded, 
“was in the interest of the greater number of colored children 
. . . .”222  The ordinance at issue in Plessy did not meet this public 
good standard.  Harlan pointed out, “[e]very one knows that the 
statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . . to exclude 
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons.”223  Segregation in this instance, he continued, did not 
advance the good of all races but was rooted in unconstitutional 
notions “that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that 
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white 
citizens[.]”224  Harlan repeated this emphasis on public purposes 
when dissenting in Berea College v. Kentucky.225  Government 
could regulate private education, in his view, when “such 
instruction is . . . harmful to the public morals or imperils the 
public safety.”226  Harlan thought the Kentucky ban on integrated 
private schools did not meet this standard because students of 
 
217. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
218. Justice Harlan joined the Supreme Court’s decision in Pace v. State, 106 U.S. 583 
(1883), which sustained an Alabama law banning interracial marriage and punishing sexual 
relationships outside of marriage more severely when the participants were of different races. 
219. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 541-45 (1899). 
220. See id. at 543-44. 
221. See id. at 544-45. 
222. Id. at 544. 
223. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
224. Id. at 560. 
225. See 211 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
226. Id. at 67.   
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different races were “receiving instruction which is not in its 
nature harmful or dangerous to the public . . . .”227 
The Plessy regime abandoned the Strauder regime’s eroding 
institutional commitment to legislative primacy in race cases.  
That commitment never took hold outside of the constitutional 
law of race equality.  No Supreme Court opinion, when discussing 
the constitutional rights of butchers and women in the Slaughter-
House Cases228 and Bradwell v. Illinois,229 respectively, 
maintained or implied that the judicial role under the post-Civil 
War Constitution was limited to determining whether 
congressional statutes implementing Section One of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were constitutional.  The 
judicial decisions that provided the foundations for the freedom 
of contract assumed that federal courts had independent power to 
declare state laws unconstitutional and need not wait for 
congressional guidance.230  Dicta shortly after Strauder was 
decided indicated that, in a proper case, the Justices would 
abandon legislative primacy when determining the constitutional 
law of race equality.  “Th[e Thirteenth] Amendment, as well as 
the Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil 
Rights Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without 
any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any 
existing state of circumstances.”231  The Justices in 1896 finally 
harmonized the constitutional law of race equality with the 
constitutional law of other facets of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Plessy and the Plessy regime exhibited the same commitments to 
judicial supremacy that developed in other areas of constitutional 
law during the late nineteenth centuries.232 
 
227. See id. at 68 (citing in support of dissent freedom of contract cases that insisted 
that government regulations that imposed differential burdens had to be based on real 
differences between people and serve the public good, but did not cite Strauder or any case 
declaring race discriminations to be per se unconstitutional).   
228. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
229. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
230. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113, 132-33 (1876). 
231. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
232. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1989). 
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Plessy was the first case discussing the constitutional law of 
racial equality in which the Justices, following existing practice 
in non-race cases, discussed only the meaning of Section One of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.233  No opinion commented on 
existing federal legislation or the debates in Congress over race 
segregation that occurred when Congress was considering what 
became the Civil Rights Act of 1875.234  Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy assumed that federal courts had 
independent authority to implement Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  He wrote, “[h]owever apparent the 
injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider 
whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States.”235  At no point did that dissent consider or even mention 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, or any other law Congress had 
passed implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.236  Justice Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion 
did not point to that failure to provide a statutory as well as a 
constitutional hook for Plessy’s complaint.  Brown assumed, with 
Harlan, that the sole issue in Plessy was whether segregation was 
consistent with the post-Civil War Constitution and not whether 
the judiciary, rather than Congress, was empowered to make that 
determination.237 
Plessy set the tone for the next fifty years.  Congress did not 
pass legislation implementing the post-Civil War 
Amendments.238  Courts did not first look to legislation already 
 
233. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1120-31 (1995). 
234. See McConnell, supra note 233, at 1120-31 (discussing such debates). 
235. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
236. Homer Plessy’s lawyers also discussed only constitutional issues.  See Brief for 
Plaintiff in Error at ___, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 1896 WL 13990; 
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson at ___, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. ___), 1893 
WL 10660. 
237. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (“The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the 
ground that it conflicts both with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing 
slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the 
part of the States.”). 
238. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power 
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
47, 56, 82 (2018) (noting that Congress debated at some length between Reconstruction and 
the Great Society measures designed to implement the Fourteenth Amendment but did not 
pass any legislation). 
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on the books when determining the constitutional law of equal 
protection.  Williams v. Mississippi, decided two years after 
Plessy, implicitly affirmed Plessy’s unspoken institutional 
premise.239  Justice Joseph McKenna’s majority opinion held that 
Mississippi’s voting laws that were race neutral on their face did 
not violate Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory administration, not merely 
discriminatory motivation.240  As in Plessy, the Justices discussed 
only the constitutional rules.  McKenna did not consider whether 
the plaintiff might have a claim under federal statutory law, nor 
did he treat federal statutory law as relevant to judicial power 
under the post-Civil War Constitution.241  Subsequent cases 
declaring race discriminations violated the Equal Protection 
Clause were as oblivious to national legislation as subsequent 
cases holding that race distinctions were constitutional.  Federal 
courts had become the first mover in the constitutional law of race 
equality.  Whether and when states could implement race 
conscious legislation depended entirely on the judiciary.  Persons 
reading such decisions as Gong Lum or Herndon would have no 
clue that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vested Congress 
with the power to implement the Equal Protection Clause or even 
that Article I of the Constitution established a national legislature. 
V.  THE KOREMATSU REGIME 
The Korematsu regime abandoned the doctrine of the Plessy 
regime, while maintaining that regime’s textual hook and 
institutional commitments.  The Justices in Korematsu insisted 
that the constitutional law of racial equality required courts to 
employ a balancing test, with a strong thumb on the side of formal 
racial equality.242  One size fits all.  Strict scrutiny became the 
governing standard whether the law at issue made what the Plessy 
regime classified as a race discrimination or a race distinction, 
and whether that law discriminated in favor of white persons or 
 
239. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
240. Id. at 222-23. 
241. See id. 
242. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-20 (1944). 
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persons of color.243  The Equal Protection Clause remained the 
source for the constitutional law of racial equality.244  Federal 
courts cited the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when determining whether race conscious state 
measures passed the strict scrutiny test.245  The justices 
maintained the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
“reverse incorporated” the Equal Protection Clause against the 
federal government when determining whether race conscious 
congressional measures passed the strict scrutiny test.246  
Legislative primacy was consigned to oblivion.  Federal courts 
were often the first mover in determining the constitutional law 
of racial equality.  That constitutional law, with the exception of 
some flirtations by Warren Court Justices with legislative 
supremacy, was what courts said was the constitutional law of 
racial equality.   
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test to American 
constitutional law.247  The first substantive paragraph of Justice 
Hugo Black’s majority opinion declared: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must 
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.248 
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s majority opinion in 
Hirabayashi v. United States seemed to reach the same 
conclusion that racial discrimination would be constitutionally 
 
243. Id. 
244. Id.  
245. Id. 
246. For reverse incorporation, see Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition? The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112  COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1532-34 (2012); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and 
Reverse Incorporation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 
(Terry Eastland ed., 1995). 
247. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20. 
248. Id. at 216; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) 
(Murphy, J., concurring) (“Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this 
kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction would not be regarded as in 
accord with the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment.”). 
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tolerated only when state or federal laws were motivated by 
pressing public necessity.249  Stone stated: 
Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows 
that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the 
Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account 
those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures 
for our national defense and for the successful prosecution 
of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one 
ancestry in a different category from others.250  
The strict scrutiny test, as applied in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi, was arguably less protective of Japanese Americans 
than the standards laid down during the Strauder and Plessy 
regimes.  The Japanese exclusion order was a race discrimination 
rather than a race distinction.  In sharp contrast to Cumming, no 
justice maintained that removal benefited more Japanese 
Americans than the order harmed.  No justice pretended that the 
military believed with Stephenson that “equality of opportunity” 
on the West Coast for white persons and persons of color was best 
“attained only by a difference in methods.”251  The burdens of 
exclusion fell entirely on Japanese Americans.  Constitutional 
decision makers from Reconstruction to World War II had 
insisted that such race discriminations were per se 
unconstitutional.  Plessy stated, “[t]he object of the [Fourteenth 
A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of 
the two races before the law . . . .”252  Korematsu and Hirabayashi 
violated that principle.  The Korematsu regime was the first to 
interpret the post-Civil War Constitution as permitting 
constitutional authorities to engage in race discrimination when 
that race discrimination served a public interest, albeit a very 
pressing public interest.253  Justice Frank Murphy in Hirabayashi 
observed, “[t]oday is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we 
have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of 
 
249. 320 U.S. at 113-14. 
250. Id. at 100. 
251. STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 3. 
252. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
253. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19. 
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citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or 
ancestry.”254 
Korematsu was a clearer break from the official 
constitutional law of the Plessy regime than from the racist 
constitutional practices of that time.  A strong case can be made 
that constitutional authorities at the turn of the twentieth century 
would have held constitutional federal or state laws that imposed 
a wartime curfew on persons of color or excluded such persons 
from certain jurisdictions during wartime had such measures been 
promulgated and subjected to constitutional scrutiny during the 
Strauder and Plessy regimes.  Equally as strong a case can be 
made that those constitutional authorities would have reworked 
the Strauder/Plessy ban on race discriminations to encompass 
situations when “pressing public necessity” was thought to 
require imposing unique burdens on members of one race.255  
Faced with a Korematsu-like fact situation, the racist Fuller Court 
would have almost certainly adjusted the line between race 
discriminations and race distinctions, and not have applied 
mechanically the existing ban on all race discriminations.256  
Rather than maintain, as Stephenson did, that a race 
discrimination “necessarily implies partiality and 
favoritism[,]”257 constitutional authorities might have tweaked 
that claim so that only policies that “implie[d] partiality and 
favoritism[]”258 were race discriminations.  The point is that such 
a move was not explicitly made before World War II.  Korematsu, 
from the perspective of 1944, weakened the Plessy regime’s 
commitment to racial equality, even if that weakening was more 
likely in theory than in actual practice. 
Korematsu improved upon standards the Plessy regime 
employed when considering race classifications, but that 
improvement was limited and may have been more theoretical 
than real.  Black’s opinion suggests that only race discriminations 
 
254. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
255. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
256. See generally OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 
1888-1910 at 352 (2006) (discussing the racism of the Fuller Court). 
257. STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 4. 
258. Id. 
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that advance vital social purposes pass constitutional muster.259  
Preventing racial mixing on street cars might not meet that 
standard.  Still, Korematsu did not overrule Plessy or comment 
adversely on any past decision sustaining an alleged race 
classification.  A racist southern constitutional decisionmaker 
during the first half of the twentieth century would have little 
difficulty finding that preventing racial amalgamation or fights 
between the races was a “[p]ressing public necessity . . . .”260  The 
Supreme Court of Virginia, when justifying bans on interracial 
marriage, declared: 
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution, or in any other provision of that great 
document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the 
State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity 
of its citizens, or which denies the power of the State to 
regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a 
mongrel breed of citizens.  We find there no requirement that 
the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of 
racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even 
though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship.  
Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races 
have better advanced in human progress when they 
cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture 
and developed their own peculiar genius.261 
A judge more attentive to strict scrutiny might have tweaked this 
opinion a bit but would not have changed the result. 
Korematsu retained the Plessy regime’s and, for that matter, 
the Costin/Manuel regime’s deference to elected officials when 
determining whether race conscious means advanced pressing 
social ends.  The strict scrutiny test in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi was limited to ends.  The federal government was 
entitled to impose a curfew on Japanese Americans and exclude 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast because such 
regulations were designed to prevent sabotage and a successful 
Japanese invasion of California.262  Preventing a Japanese 
invasion of California was a compelling government end.  
 
259. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20. 
260. Id. at 216. 
261. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955). 
262. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20. 
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Korematsu was excluded from the West Coast, Korematsu 
asserted, “because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, 
because the properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast . . . .”263  The Supreme Court did not 
heighten the degree to which justices had previously scrutinized 
race conscious means to purported government ends.  
Government officials had to establish only some relationship 
between the race conscious measure and the end to be achieved.  
Stone in Hirabayashi stated, “it is enough that circumstances 
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for 
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the 
decision which they made.”264  Justice William O’Douglas’s 
concurring opinion in that case stated, “[w]here the orders under 
the present Act have some relation to ‘protection against 
espionage and against sabotage,’ our task is at an end.”265  The 
Justices were as deferential to governing officials when 
determining whether the exclusion orders satisfied the 
requirement that race conscious measures be based on real 
differences between the races.  If the military had some basis for 
determining that real differences existed between Japanese 
Americans and other citizens, that was good enough during World 
War II to sustain a race conscious measure discriminating against 
some persons of color.  Black stated, “[t]here was evidence of 
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered 
that the need for action was great, and time was short.”266  “The 
fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather 
than another enemy power,” Stone declared in Hirabayashi, “set 
those citizens apart from others who have no particular 
associations with Japan.”267  
Three developments occurred after World War II that made 
the Korematsu regime more racially egalitarian than the Plessy 
 
263. Id. at 223; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94-95 (1943) (“The 
challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed purpose of safeguarding the 
military area in question, at a time of threatened air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces, 
from the danger of sabotage and espionage”). 
264. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102. 
265. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
266. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. 
267. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101. 
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regime.268  First, the Supreme Court obliterated the Plessy 
regime’s distinction between race distinctions and race 
discriminations.  Second, the Supreme Court required that 
government officials adopting race conscious measures meet a 
higher standard for means as well as for ends.  Third, 
constitutional decision makers became far more suspicious than 
the Korematsu majority that race conscious measures were 
actually based on real differences between the races.   
The Korematsu regime clearly broke from the Plessy regime 
only when the justices abandoned the distinction between 
constitutional race distinctions and unconstitutional race 
discriminations.  This process began during the 1950s when the 
Supreme Court indicated that government actions that made race 
relevant to a person’s legal standing were subject to strict 
scrutiny, even if in a formal sense those measures did not treat 
persons of color worse than white persons.269  Bolling v. Sharpe 
held that statutes mandating race segregation had to meet the 
same standard Korematsu demanded for race discriminations.270  
Citing both Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren’s majority opinion declared, “[c]lassifications based 
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since 
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally 
suspect.”271  Race consciousness by the 1960s was the touchstone 
for strict scrutiny rather than discrimination between white 
persons and persons of color who had engaged in the same 
behavior.  Justice Byron White’s majority opinion in McLaughlin 
v. Florida, when striking down a state law that punished 
interracial premarital sex more severely than premarital sex 
between persons of the same race, declared, “[j]udicial inquiry 
under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end with a 
showing of equal application among the members of the class 
defined by the legislation.”272   
 
268. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 8, at 1273-74 (discussing the development of strict 
scrutiny). 
269. Id. at 1277. 
270. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
271. Id. at 499. 
272. 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).   
2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:47 PM 
472 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
The mature Korematsu regime insisted on scrutinizing race 
conscious means as strictly as Korematsu purportedly scrutinized 
government ends.  By the mid-1960s, government officials could 
no longer point to a rational basis or the equivalent of “evidence 
of disloyalty on the part of some” when defending race 
classifications or discriminations.273  The constitutional law of 
racial equality required race conscious measures to be necessary 
or narrowly tailored means to their purported government ends.  
“[N]ecessity,” Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in 
McLaughlin declared, “not mere reasonable relationship, is the 
proper test.”274  Government officials at the turn of the twenty-
first century could no longer blithely expect judicial deference 
when they insisted a race conscious measure was based on real 
differences between the affected races.  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor insisted that “skepticism” rather than deference was the 
attitude courts should take when determining whether a race 
conscious measure was a narrowly tailored means to a compelling 
government end.275  “Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria,” she declared in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
“must necessarily receive a most searching examination.”276 
Korematsu did not specify the textual hook for the 
constitutional law of racial equality when the federal government 
adopted race conscious policies.  Black placed more emphasis on 
constitutional powers than constitutional rights.  His opinion 
noted that the military orders at issue in Korematsu were attacked 
“as an unconstitutional delegation of power . . . beyond the war 
powers of the Congress, the military authorities and of the 
President,” and “a constitutionally prohibited discrimination 
. . . .”277  The express holding of Korematsu focused entirely on 
the Article I powers of Congress and the Article II powers of the 
President.  Black declared, “we are unable to conclude that it was 
beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude 
 
273. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).  
274. Bolling, 379 U.S. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. at 194 (“Such 
classifications bear a far heavier burden of justification.”); see also id. at 196 (“Such a law 
. . . bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and 
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”). 
275. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24, 227 (1995).  
276. Id. at 223 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 273 (1986)).  
277. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217. 
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those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the 
time they did.”278  When discussing what constituted “a 
constitutionally prohibited discrimination,”279 Black did not 
mention much less discuss the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause, another provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Thirteenth Amendment or any provision in the Bill of Rights.   
Hirabayashi was more forthcoming.  Justice Stone 
announced that the Fifth Amendment provided the textual hook 
for the constitutional law of racial equality when the federal 
government adopted race conscious policies.  “The questions for 
our decision,” he stated, “are whether the particular restriction . . . 
was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an 
unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power, 
and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated 
between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other 
ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”280  At the onset 
of the Korematsu regime, a gap existed between the rights 
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution and 
the rights enumerated by the post-Civil War Amendments.  The 
Supreme Court during World War II was no more willing to 
interpret the Fifth Amendment as holding the federal government 
to standards mandated by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than the justices had been willing to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as holding the states to the 
standards mandated by the Fifth Amendment.281  Stone in 
Hirabayashi declared, “[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal 
protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory 
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due 
process.”282  While “[i]t is true,” Murphy agreed: 
 
278. Id. at 217-18. 
279. Id. at 217. 
280. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943); see also id. at 89 
(Appellant’s “contentions are only that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative 
power to the military commander by authorizing him to impose the challenged regulation, 
and that, even if the regulation were in other respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and 
those of other ancestry.”). 
281. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
282. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
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[T]hat the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains 
no guarantee of equal protection of the laws . . ., [i]t by no 
means follows, however, that there may not be 
discrimination of such an injurious character in the 
application of laws as to amount to a denial of due process 
of laws as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment.283 
As both the Stone and Murphy opinions indicated, the 
Korematsu regime regarded the Equal Protection Clause as the 
appropriate textual hook for determining whether state race 
conscious policies were constitutional.284  The Equal Protection 
Clause provided the constitutional foundations for the judicial 
decisions declaring state mandated segregation unconstitutional.  
The Supreme Court in Brown framed the question before the 
Justices as whether “segregation . . . deprive[d] the plaintiffs of 
the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”285  Loving v. Virginia held that “restricting the 
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates 
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”286  Justices 
in the Korematsu regime determined whether race conscious 
measures that benefited persons of color passed constitutional 
muster by analyzing the constitutional meaning of “equal 
protection.”  Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke understood affirmative action 
as raising the question whether under the “Equal Protection 
Clause . . . discrimination against members of the white 
‘majority’ cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 
‘benign.’”287  Justice William Brennan’s separate opinion in 
Bakke was similarly grounded on an “analysis of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”288 
The gap between the due process law of racial equality that 
governed federal race conscious measures and the equal 
protection law of racial equality that governed state race 
conscious measures vanished as the Korematsu regime matured.  
The Brown line of decisions began the process of obliterating the 
 
283. Id. at 112 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
284. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234-35, 242; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.  
285. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
286. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
287. 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978). 
288. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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differences between the federal and state law of equal protection.  
Schools segregated by federal law met the same fate as schools 
segregated by state law.  “In view of our decision that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially 
segregated public schools,” Chief Justice Earl Warren stated in 
Bolling, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution 
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”289  By 
the turn of the twenty-first century, the Justices were insisting that 
race conscious federal policies had to meet the same strict 
scrutiny standards as race conscious state policies.290  O’Connor 
in Adarand declared “congruence” to be a fundamental principle 
underlying the constitutional law of racial equality.291  Her 
opinion eviscerating any remaining space between federal and 
state obligations declared, “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .”292 
The Thirteenth Amendment remained largely moribund as 
an alternate textual hook for the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., was the exception that proved the rule.293  The Justices 
in that case held that Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment 
could prohibit race discrimination in private housing markets.294  
Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opinion declared that “the 
freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the 
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a 
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can 
live.”295  Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court made any 
further effort to integrate this element of the Turner regime into 
the Korematsu regime.  The path-breaking federal 
antidiscrimination laws passed during the Great Society did not 
 
289. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
290. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
291. Id. at 224. 
292. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)). 
293. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
294. Id. at 439. 
295. Id. at 443. 
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mention the constitutional ban on slavery.296  No Supreme Court 
opinions sustaining these measures discussed whether these 
measures might have Thirteenth Amendment foundations.297  The 
Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence paid no heed to 
the Thirteenth Amendment but focused entirely on the 
constitutional law of equal protection.298 
The resulting Fourteenth Amendment law of racial equality 
was not as friendly to affirmative action programs as Thirteenth 
Amendment law had been during Reconstruction.  In sharp 
contrast to the Turner regime, which maintained race conscious 
programs were a legitimate means for implementing the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s commitment to ending both slavery and 
the slave system, the Korematsu regime insisted on a race neutral 
interpretation of the  phrase “equal protection.”299  Justice Lewis 
Powell’s crucial opinion in Bakke stated, “[t]he guarantee of equal 
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual 
and something else when applied to a person of another color.”300  
“The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause,” 
O’Connor’s opinion in Adarand agreed, “is not dependent on the 
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification.”301  Strict scrutiny was not quite as strict when race 
 
296. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241.   
297. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  Remarkably, the petitioners in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel raised a Thirteenth Amendment claim when they insisted that the prohibition 
of race discrimination was an “involuntary servitude.”  Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 
243-44. 
298. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  A cottage 
industry has developed, however, on the Thirteenth Amendment as an alternative source for 
fundamental rights, including constitutional rights to racial equality.  See Douglas L. Colbert, 
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (1995); 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 
BOS. U. L. REV. 255 (2010); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459 (2012); Alexander Tsesis, Into the Light of Day: 
Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 
(2012); James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426 (2018); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989). 
299. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
300. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. 
301. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). 
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conscious measures benefited persons of color.  O’Connor in 
Adarand “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict 
in theory, but fatal in fact[]’” when government attempted to deal 
with “the lingering effects of racial discrimination.”302  Still, 
Congress and state legislatures at the turn of the twenty-first 
century did not enjoy the same leeway under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the Reconstruction Congress had under the 
Thirteenth Amendment to promote racial equality by employing 
race conscious measures.303 
All the Judges on the Korematsu court took for granted that 
federal courts were responsible for determining the constitutional 
law of racial equality.  The majority opinions and dissents 
quarreled over whether justices should defer to the military 
judgment that excluding Japanese from the West Coast was 
necessary to prevent a possible Japanese invasion.304  None 
suggested that implementing the constitutional law of racial 
equality was primarily a legislative task.  As was the case with 
Plessy, all the Justices on the Korematsu court assumed that they 
had the final say in determining whether a measure 
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race.305  Justice 
Frank Murphy’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi stated:  “We 
give great deference to the judgment of the Congress and of the 
military authorities as to what is necessary in the effective 
prosecution of the war, but we can never forget that there are 
constitutional boundaries which it is our duty to uphold.”306  
“While this Court sits,” he asserted, “it has the inescapable duty 
of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed.”307  
Justice Wiley Rutledge’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi 
rejected claims that “the courts have no power to review any 
action a military officer may ‘in his discretion’ find it necessary 
 
302. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)). 
303. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
304. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
305. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
306. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
307. Id. at 113. 
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to take with respect to civilian citizens in military areas or zones 
. . . .”308 
Ironically, the Plessy regime’s abandonment of legislative 
primacy made possible the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown.309  Under the Turner and Strauder regimes, Congress had 
to be the first mover when the constitutional law of racial equality 
was established.  Courts could not consider whether race 
conscious measures were unconstitutional race discriminations or 
constitutional race distinctions unless Congress had passed a law 
prohibiting the race conscious measure under constitutional 
attack.310  Senator Charles Sumner insisted during the early 1870s 
that Congress prohibit segregated schools311 because he assumed 
that courts were unlikely to declare segregated schools 
unconstitutional in the absence of federal law banning such 
institutions.  When introducing what became the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, he spoke of “the absolute necessity of congressional 
legislation for the protection of equal rights . . . .”312  Sumner’s  
last speech in Congress maintained with respect to segregated 
schools, “I most solemnly believ[e] that the only true remedy is 
in a national statute, uniform and complete in its operation 
everywhere throughout the land . . . .”313  No such congressional 
legislation was on the books when Brown was decided.  Justice 
Robert Jackson’s comment in oral argument, “I suppose that 
realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn’t 
be obtained from Congress[,]”314 reflected the Plessy and 
 
308. Id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
309. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554-55; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
310. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879). 
311. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
312. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner); see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 432 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner) (“[T]hose axiomatic and self-evident truths . . . shall be maintained by the 
legislation of Congress carrying out the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
313. 2 CONG. REC. 949 (1874) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner). 
314. Schmidt, supra note 238, at 65 (quoting LEON FRIEDMAN, ARGUMENT: THE 
ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TOPEKA, 1952-55 244 (1969)).  Jackson repeated this claim in his unpublished draft 
concurrence in Brown.  Id.  He declared, “We are urged . . . to supply means to supervise 
transition of the country from segregated to nonsegregated schools upon the basis that 
Congress may or probably will refuse to act.  That assumes nothing less than that we must 
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Korematsu regimes’ commitment to permitting federal courts to 
be the first mover in determining the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  Just as no judge on the Plessy Court considered federal 
statutory law relevant to determining whether states could 
mandate segregated street cars, so no judge on the Brown Court, 
following the practice entrenched only during the Plessy regime, 
considered federal statutory law relevant to determining whether 
states could mandate segregated public education. 
The Korematsu regime replaced legislative primacy with 
judicial supremacy.  The Justices when implementing Brown not 
only did not bother looking for guidance from the elected 
branches of the national government but insisted that all 
government officials were to be guided by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the constitutional commitment to racial equality.  
In an opinion signed by all nine Justices on the Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren in Cooper v. Aaron declared, “the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution, and that principle . . . [is] a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”315  Justice 
Felix Frankfurter’s concurring opinion piled on.  He wrote, “[o]ur 
kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the 
Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal 
specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what 
is ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’”316 
While the Supreme Court remained the managing partner 
throughout the Korematsu regime, the role of Congress in 
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality 
was sometimes analogous to senior partner, sometimes analogous 
to junior partner, and sometimes closer to summer associate.  
Katzenbach v. Morgan indicated that remedying race 
discrimination might be a joint enterprise, with federal courts and 
the federal legislature equally empowered to make the 
constitutional law of racial equality.317  Justice William Douglas’s 
 
act because our representative system has failed.”  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE ROBERT H. 
JACKSON’S UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN BROWN V. BOARD 129 (2017). 
315. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
316. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); JAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: ANDREW JACKSON (2004). 
317. 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966). 
2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:47 PM 
480 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
majority opinion held that Congress could forbid states from 
denying the ballot to Spanish speakers educated in Puerto Rico, 
even though the Supreme Court had previously ruled that literacy 
tests were constitutional.318  “Congress might . . . have 
questioned,” Douglas wrote, “whether denial of a right deemed so 
precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or 
appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English, or of 
furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise.”319  
City of Boerne v. Flores withdrew any suggestion in Morgan that 
Congress might be authorized to interpret independently the post-
Civil War Amendments.320  Congress was authorized to remedy, 
identify, and prevent constitutional violations, but not determine 
what actions constituted a violation of the equal protection or any 
other clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.321  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion condemned the elected branches of 
the national government for trying to overturn a judicial decision 
narrowing the free exercise rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.322  He asserted, “[w]hen the political 
branches of the Government act against the background of a 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must 
be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will 
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled 
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations 
must be disappointed.”323  Shelby County v. Holder further 
reduced congressional power to implement the post-Civil War 
Amendments.324  Chief Justice John Roberts brazenly challenged 
whether thousands of pages of congressional factfinding justified 
legislation extending the preclearance provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.325  Congress, he insisted, had to demonstrate 
 
318. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941). 
319. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 342 
(1966). 
320. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654. 
321. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-29. 
322. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
323. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
324. See generally 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
325. Id. at 554. 
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“‘exceptional’ and ‘unique’ conditions” when legislation 
implementing the constitutional commitment made during 
Reconstruction to racial equality trenched on an early 
constitutional commitment to state sovereignty.326 
A. Compared to What 
Whether Korematsu or the Korematsu regime should be 
celebrated depends on what the Korematsu regime is being 
compared to.  Korematsu fares well when compared to the Costin 
regime, which permitted states to make race discriminations on 
the ground that persons of color were racially inferior to white 
people.327  The comparison between the Korematsu regime and 
the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes is more complicated.  
Each of the latter three regimes has at least one element that 
arguably better promotes racial equality than the Korematsu 
regime.  The Plessy and Strauder regimes treat race as a banned 
category.328  The Strauder and Turner regimes require Congress 
to be the first mover in implementing the post-Civil War 
Amendments.329  The Turner regime treats the Thirteenth 
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial 
equality.330  These differences make a difference, particularly 
with respect to the law of affirmative action and the state action 
doctrine.  Whether the Korematsu regime improved upon these 
past regimes depends on whether one thinks affirmative action 
promotes racial equality, whether some version of the state action 
doctrine is an appropriate limit on the constitutional commitment 
to race equality, and what institution in general at present is most 
likely to best implement the constitutional commitment to race 
equality. 
 
326. Id. at 555; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966). 
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944); Costin v. Corp. of 
Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266). 
328. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 306-07 (1879). 
329. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310; In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) 
(No. 14,247). 
330. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
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1. Banned Categories 
A contemporary Strauder or Plessy regime by taking a 
banned categories rather than a strict scrutiny approach to race 
conscious discriminations would reverse the result in Korematsu, 
at least in theory,331 and the result in Grutter.332  Both the 
Japanese exclusion order and affirmative action admissions 
programs are race discriminations as race discriminations were 
understood at the turn of the twentieth century.  Each burdens or 
benefits members of one race without providing the same or 
equivalent burden or benefit for members of another race.333  As 
such, both are per se unconstitutional under the Strauder and 
Plessy regimes, but may be constitutional under the Korematsu 
regime, which permits government officials to adopt race 
conscious measures when doing so is a narrowly tailored means 
of achieving a compelling governmental end.334  Whether 
returning to this banned categories doctrine of the Strauder and 
Plessy regimes improves upon the strict scrutiny doctrine of the 
Korematsu regime depends on the most likely forms of race 
conscious legislation, whether governing officials can be trusted 
to use race conscious measures to promote racial equality, and 
whether race conscious measures inherently violate constitutional 
commitments to race equality.   
For most of American history, Plessy’s banned categories 
approach, even restricted to race discriminations as opposed to 
race distinctions, would have better promoted race equality than 
Korematsu’s strict scrutiny test.  A few Reconstruction measures 
aside,335 race conscious federal and state laws from the 
ratification of the Constitution to the Great Society were means 
of maintaining white supremacy and almost always provided 
 
331. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
224. 
332. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
333. Although, a good lawyer would claim all persons, even white persons rejected on 
racial grounds, enjoy the benefits of diversity.  See NATASHA K. WARIKOO, THE DIVERSITY 
BARGAIN AND OTHER DILEMMAS OF RACE, ADMISSIONS, AND MERITOCRACY AT ELITE 
UNIVERSITIES (Univ. of Chicago Press 2016). 
334. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
224. 
335. Lundin, supra note 46, at 9. 
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benefits only to white people or imposed burdens only on persons 
of color.  A banned category standard would have outlawed the 
common race discriminations that dotted the antebellum 
American legal landscape and prohibited the Black Codes that 
former confederate states adopted in the immediate aftermath of 
the Civil War.336  A banned category standard applied to all race 
classifications would have prevented Jim Crow segregation.   
Many contemporary progressives have come to prefer strict 
scrutiny to banned categories because only during the last thirty 
or forty years have most explicit race conscious measures 
purported to provide benefits only to persons of color or burden 
only white persons.  A fair case can be made that from a 
progressive point of view, the benefits of a strict scrutiny review 
that allows some affirmative action admissions policies in higher 
education and some minority set-asides in government 
contracting to pass constitutional muster337 outweigh the 
occasional explicit racial profiling by law enforcement officers 
that might meet that constitutional smell test.338  Justice Stephen 
Breyer believes that the contemporary constitutional law of race 
equality must give educators at the turn of the twenty-first century 
some leeway to make race conscious decisions.  His dissenting 
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1 asserted: 
The wide variety of different integration plans that school 
districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem 
of racial segregation in schools, including de 
facto segregation, is difficult to solve.  The fact that many 
such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests that 
such criteria have an important, sometimes necessary, role to 
play.339  
 
336. For the Black Codes, see THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF 
THE SOUTH (Univ. of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa eds., 1965). 
337. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 
1147, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a minority set-aside program satisfied strict 
scrutiny). 
338. The issue in most racial profiling cases is providing race consciousness, not 
determining whether an explicit race conscious profiling policy satisfies the strict scrutiny 
test.  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
339. 551 U.S. 701, 861 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Strict scrutiny, or even a lesser form of scrutiny, is superior to 
banned categories from a progressive perspective because race 
conscious measures may promote as well as frustrate the 
constitutional commitment to race equality as antisubordination 
or anticaste.340  Justice John Paul Stevens articulated the 
antisubordination conception of equal protection in his Adarand 
dissent.  Condemning the judicial tendency to lump all race 
conscious programs, Stevens asserted: 
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the 
difference between a “No Trespassing” sign and a welcome 
mat.  It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote 
against Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in order to keep 
African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with 
President Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s race as a 
positive factor.  It would equate a law that made black 
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed 
at recruiting black soldiers.  An attempt by the majority to 
exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market 
is fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a 
relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market.341  
Some higher degree of scrutiny is necessary to distinguish the 
“No Trespassing” sign from the welcome mat, but a banned 
categories approach throws out the equality promoting baby with 
the racist bathwater, so to speak. 
Conservatives prefer the Strauder regime to the Korematsu 
regime.  Justice Clarence Thomas sees no differences between the 
race conscious measures of the late Korematsu regime and those 
of the Plessy regime.  Giving contemporary “school boards a free 
hand to make decisions on the basis of race,” he maintains, is “an 
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in 
Brown.”342  Contemporary government officials have no more 
capacity to make race conscious policies than the white 
supremacists of the past.  Thomas asks, “[c]an we really be sure 
that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a 
 
340. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471, 1493, 1540 
(2004). 
341. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
342. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but 
beneficent and progressive?”343  More to the point, conservatives 
insist that a banned categories approach recognizes how race 
classifications are inherently injurious and by their very nature are 
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to race equality.  
Thomas articulates the central understanding of the 
anticlassification understanding of equal protection when he 
insists, “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race 
because every time the government places citizens on racial 
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or 
benefits, it demeans all of us.”344 
Strict scrutiny, these brief observations highlight, suffers 
from a Goldilocks problem.  Progressives find the test too hot.  A 
lower level of scrutiny in the twenty-first century is more than 
sufficient to root out the racist race conscious measures of the 
past,345 while permitting contemporary race conscious measures 
that promote racial equality.  Conservatives find the test too cold.  
Too often, in their view, strict scrutiny permits university 
administrators and others to mask old fashioned race 
discrimination under the guise of diversity.346  The standard that 
is “just right” awaits a less racially polarized United States. 
2. Congress or Courts 
A contemporary Turner or Strauder regime, by adopting an 
institutional commitment to legislative primacy, would maintain 
Grutter but reverse Brown.347  Courts in a regime committed to 
legislative primacy are limited to implementing federal 
legislation and determining whether federal legislation 
implementing the post-Civil War Amendments is constitutional.  
A Supreme Court committed to legislative primacy would sustain 
 
343. Id. at 781-82. 
344. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016). 
345. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (claiming that Japanese exclusion order was not “reasonably related to a public 
danger”). 
346. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 380-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the admissions at the University of Michigan Law School are more 
consistent with commitments to quotas than commitments to diversity). 
347. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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the University of Michigan’s race conscious admissions program 
as long as the Justices determined that affirmative action violated 
no federal law.348  Courts would sustain segregated schools in 
Topeka, Kansas, for the same reason.  Congress as of 1954 had 
passed no laws prohibiting race segregation in public schools.  
The result in Korematsu depends on the version of 
legislative primacy employed by government officials.  Both the 
Turner and Strauder regimes required Congress to be the first 
mover.  Courts had no independent authority to secure racial 
equality in the absence of a federal law mandating racial equality.  
Legislative primacy in the Turner regime, at least as understood 
by congressional radicals, bordered on legislative supremacy.  
Congress was empowered to determine the constitutional 
meaning of racial equality as well as the legislation that best 
implemented the constitutional commitment to racial equality.  
Courts had no business interfering when federal officials 
determined that Japanese Americans had to be excluded from the 
West Coast.  Legislative primacy in the Strauder regime was 
weaker.  Federal courts had no independent power to enforce the 
constitutional commitment to racial equality, but they were 
empowered to determine whether federal legislation was 
implementing that constitutional commitment.  The justices could 
not interfere with a state exclusion policy that Congress had not 
prohibited, but federal courts could independently determine 
whether a congressional exclusion policy met constitutional 
standards. 
Comparing the virtues and vices of the Turner/Strauder 
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy to those of the 
Korematsu regime’s commitment to independent judicial review 
is difficult.  A cottage industry exists comparing judges and 
elected officials as rights protectors.349  Much of that literature 
highlights the relative contributions the national judiciary and 
 
348. Bakke’s holding that crucial provisions of federal antidiscrimination law were 
coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause complicates this analysis.  See Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 406 (1978). 
349. See, e.g., REBECCA ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (NYU Press: New York eds., 2006); JOHN J. DINAN, 
KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS 
OF RIGHTS (Univ. Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS eds., 1998). 
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national legislature have made to racial equality in the United 
States.350  On the one hand, independent judicial review was once 
the only means by which persons of color could obtain relief from 
a white supremacist regime.  A court committed to legislative 
primacy would not have reached any of the Supreme Court 
decisions that declared unconstitutional state race conscious 
measures handed down before the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.351  On the other hand, independent judicial review at 
present is at least as much a boon to white persons challenging 
race conscious laws promoting racial equality as to persons of 
color challenging race conscious laws preserving white 
supremacy.  Federal law now protects numerous rights of race 
equality and almost certainly would protect against all 
manifestations of twentieth century Jim Crow if constitutional 
doctrine required Congress to pass additional laws prohibiting 
traditional forms of race segregation.  State affirmative action 
policies and state minority set-aside programs are the two most 
prominent race conscious measures that contemporary courts 
committed to legislative primacy would not adjudicate.  
Disaggregating judicial decisions and federal laws for the 
purpose of determining the merits of legislative primacy 
compounds these difficulties.  Some scholars think Supreme 
Court decisions independently implementing the post-Civil War 
Amendments inspired federal laws prohibiting garden-variety 
race discriminations.352  Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis 
proposes that massive resistance to Brown stirred northerners to 
support such measures as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.353  Legislative primacy, in this view, 
ignores how judicial decisions often spur vital congressional 
actions promoting race equality.  Gerald Rosenberg insists that 
 
350. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 11; LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES: TWO CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TRIAL 
(Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK eds., 2017). 
351. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
352. See ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL 
CHANGE 241-42 (Wesleyan Univ. Press: Middleton, CT eds., 1982). 
353. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 
80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85 (1994). 
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independent judicial review is a distraction.354  Brown and related 
judicial decisions neither directly achieved much desegregation 
nor inspired federal legislation prohibiting segregation.355  
Legislative primacy, in this view, is institutional 
acknowledgement that federal legislation and executive 
enforcement are the necessary ingredients of a regime committed 
to racial equality.   
Matters are further complicated when the distinction 
between strong Turner legislative primacy and weak Strauder 
legislative primacy are thrown into the comparative mix.  
Turner’s combination of legislative primacy and legislative 
supremacy keeps judicial hands off federal affirmative action 
programs and voting rights laws, as well as off all state race 
conscious measures that are not forbidden by federal law.  
Strauder’s legislative primacy and judicial supremacy empowers 
courts to determine the constitutionality of federal laws 
mandating affirmative action programs and implementing the 
Fifteenth Amendment, but not race conscious state laws, unless 
those state laws are prohibited by federal law.  The Korematsu 
and Strauder regime’s commitment to judicial supremacy 
permitted the Supreme Court to strike down the preclearance 
formula Congress mandated when reauthorizing the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, but the result in Shelby County could not have 
been reached by judges who adopted the legislative supremacy 
commitments of radical Republicans during the Turner regime. 
Legislative primacy is most attractive when the dominant 
national party has the commitment and power necessary to enact 
comprehensive measures promoting race equality.  This 
combination of commitment and power has occurred only twice 
in American history and for relatively short periods of time.356  A 
burst of civil rights legislation occurred during Reconstruction 
and during the Great Society.357  During these periods, elected 
 
354. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE 420-29 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing 
“The Fly-Paper Court”). 
355. See id. at 39-169. 
356. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 79-81 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 1999). 
357. Id. 
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officials could be trusted to implement the constitutional 
commitment to racial equality at least as extensively (weak 
legislative primacy) and probably more extensively (strong 
legislative primacy) as federal courts.  At all other times in 
American history, justices have been more committed to racial 
equality than elected officials, even when that judicial 
commitment is quite weak.358 
Americans may be entering a third period in which some 
version of legislative primacy is an attractive means for securing 
racial equality, at least as racial equality is understood by 
contemporary progressives.359  Democrats in the 2020 national 
election gained control of all three branches of the national 
government.  Persons of color make up a substantial part of the 
Democrat electorate and compose an increasing percentage of the 
Democrats in the legislative and executive branches of 
government.360  By comparison, the judicial branch of the 
national government for the foreseeable future, the Supreme 
Court in particular, will be controlled by very conservative 
Republicans.  Five of these Justices are older white men who are 
not old enough that one could safely predict they will leave the 
bench in the foreseeable future.  Given the dramatically different 
understandings of racial equality likely to animate the elected 
branches of the national government and the national judiciary, 
progressives might be better off returning to the weak legislative 
primacy of the Strauder regime, which did not permit the 
Supreme Court to strike down state laws in the absence of a 
federal law prohibiting such measures, and even better off 
returning to the strong legislative primacy championed by 
Republican radicals during the Turner regime, which vested 
Congress with the power to determine the constitutional meaning 
of racial equality. 
 
358. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 350, at 372, 375. 
359. This paragraph relies heavily on Jack M. Balkin, Race and The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time, MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), [https://perma.cc/28PQ-GZT3]. 
360. In Changing U.S. Electorate, Race, and Education Remain Stark Dividing Lines, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5B94-T2LH]; Anna Brown & Sara Atske, 
Black Americans Have Made Gains in U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps Remain, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5NW5-QGTT]. 
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3. Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment 
The Turner regime that regarded the Thirteenth Amendment 
as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality 
might reverse Korematsu, but not Grutter.  The point of the 
constitutional law of racial equality, from the perspective of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, is to ensure that former slaves and other 
victims of racial prejudice are treated as equal members of the 
American polity.  Race neutrality is a means to that end and not 
the end sought.  Korematsu was wrongly decided because the 
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was rooted 
in historical prejudices against immigrants from Japan and other 
Asian countries.  Grutter was rightly decided because affirmative 
action programs are designed to help persons of color become 
equal citizens, do not reflect historic prejudice against white 
persons, and are not designed to reduce white persons to second-
class citizenship. 
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race 
equality are partly yoked to the merits of affirmative action.  
Progressives are likely to celebrate a Thirteenth Amendment law 
of race equality because the constitutional ban on slavery 
provides stronger foundations for affirmative action programs 
than does the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment is about caste.  Congress is empowered to eradicate 
slavery and the slave system.  The persons who have rights under 
the Thirteenth Amendment are those who have experienced 
slavery, the slave system, the badges and incidents of slavery, or 
the aftereffects of slavery.  White persons have no rights under 
the Thirteenth Amendment because members of that class have 
never experienced slavery, the slave system, the badges and 
incidents of slavery, or the aftereffects of slavery.  Conservatives 
are more likely to celebrate a Fourteenth Amendment law of 
racial equality that is more open to being interpreted as 
articulating a constitutional commitment to race neutrality or 
colorblindness.  The text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
no special treatment for former slaves or their descendants.  All 
persons, whatever their race, must be treated equally.  White 
persons complaining about affirmative action programs have 
some history as well as text on their side.  The evidence suggests 
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that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction abandoned a version 
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment limited to race 
discrimination in favor of the race neutral Equal Protection 
Clause precisely because the latter was thought to better protect 
persons of all races.361 
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race 
equality are even more firmly yoked to the state action doctrine.  
Justices in the Strauder, Plessy, and Korematsu regimes insisted 
that the state action requirement was a necessary element of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s law of race equality.362  The Turner 
regime, which regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as the source 
of the constitutional law of race equality, had no state action 
requirement.363  This state action requirement clearly inhibits 
efforts to achieve race equality in the United States.  Justices have 
wielded state action when striking down federal bans on 
discrimination against persons of color in places of public 
accommodation,364 when permitting racially restrictive covenants 
in American housing markets,365 and when allowing private clubs 
with state liquor licenses to refuse to admit black members or 
guests.366  A Thirteenth Amendment law of race equality might 
permit the Justices to reach a more racially egalitarian result in 
each of these circumstances on the ground that private 
discrimination is a feature of a slave system or a badge and 
incident of slavery.367  The Korematsu regime’s commitment to a 
state action doctrine that imposes limits on efforts to secure race 
equality can be justified, if justified at all, only if state action has 
other constitutional benefits that outweigh the costs that doctrine 
imposes on efforts to remove the substantial race prejudice 
vestiges of the American slave system.   
 
361. See Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction 
and the Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 287, 297, 315 
(2015).  
362. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 
323 (1926); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
363. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1968). 
364. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 
365. See, e.g., Corrigan, 271 U.S. 323. 
366. See, e.g., Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163. 
367. See supra notes 362-66 and accompanying text. 
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4. Packages 
Doctrines, institutional authority, and textual hooks come in 
packages. Legislative primacy complements the Thirteenth 
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of race 
conscious measures.  Congress is better positioned than the 
Supreme Court to determine what practices maintain the status 
hierarchies first established by the antebellum slave system and 
how those status hierarchies are best dismantled without harming 
other social interests.  The number of employees that should 
trigger antidiscrimination obligations raise questions of 
constitutional policy best resolved by a legislature rather than 
questions of constitutional law best adjudicated by a court.  The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is more 
conducive to the rule-bound analysis typically performed by 
justices.  The closer to “sameness” the rules for implementing the 
constitutional commitment to race equality, the better courts are 
at constitutional decision making.  The Justices who adjudicated 
the cases challenging school segregation could have easily 
determined that school districts were employing race conscious 
measures,368 that the schools for students of color were inferior to 
the schools for white students,369 and that in the United States 
students of color could have never enjoyed equal education in 
racially segregated schools.370   
The Korematsu regime may be the best package Americans 
can achieve.  That regime offers a Goldilocks solution to the 
problem of legislative discretion.  The Costin and Turner regimes 
give elected officials too much power over race conscious 
measures.  The banned categories approach of the Strauder and 
Plessy regimes gives elected officials too little discretion.  Strict 
scrutiny with judicial review is “just right.”  Affirmative action 
policies pass constitutional muster, as long as they do not use 
racial quotas explicitly and give individualized consideration to 
all applicants.371  The state action doctrine remains a limit on 
efforts to achieve race equality.  Nevertheless, as Terri Peretti has 
 
368. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948). 
369. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950). 
370. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
371. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
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detailed, the justices tend to apply that requirement only when 
race is not on the table.372  Goldilocks strikes again, achieving a 
balance between prohibiting private race discrimination and 
maintaining individual freedom that is close to “just right.” 
Comparing the Korematsu regime only to the Costin regime 
or the worst features (of which there were many) of the Plessy 
regime forecloses discussion of the contributions the Thirteenth 
Amendment, legislative primacy, and banned categories might 
make to the constitutional law of race equality.  The Turner, 
Strauder, and Plessy regimes all promote racial equality in some 
instances when the Korematsu regime tolerates race conscious 
measures that discriminate against persons of color.  The Turner 
regime’s commitment to the Thirteenth Amendment facilitates 
bans on private discrimination.  The Turner and Strauder 
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy gives Congress the 
leeway to determine how best to dismantle racial hierarchies.  The 
Strauder and Plessy regime’s commitment to banned categories 
forecloses legislative excuses for race discrimination.  Korematsu 
is not the only way, these alternatives demonstrate, even if that 
way is better than much of what preceded that understanding of 
the constitutional law of race equality. 
 
 
372. See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275 (2010). 
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.  That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed, That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness.1  
In 1786, a group composed of ex-military and farmers 
sought to take over the seat of government in Massachusetts in a 
coup later known as Shays’s Rebellion.2  This distressing event 
occurred because the people in rural areas of Massachusetts felt 
that they were not properly represented by the “elites” in more 
densely populated areas.3  Before that group, small, radical groups 
of Colonists led a rebellion against Britain’s vast empire for 
mainly the same reasons.4  The phrase “no taxation without 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Articles Editor of the 
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author extends thanks to the faculty and staff of the 
University of Arkansas, specifically Professor Mark Killenbeck, as well as to the Arkansas 
Law Review.  Additionally, the author extends thanks to God for making this Comment 
possible, and to all those who vehemently disagree with each other - sharpening arguments 
and propagating the sport of critical debate. 
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S 
FINAL BATTLE 4, 6, 18 (2003). 
3. Id. at 6.  
4. See RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HOW 
COMMON PEOPLE SHAPED THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE 5, 14-17 (Howard Zinn ed., The 
New Press rev. ed. 2016).  See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 
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representation” is undoubtedly an idiomatic motif of the 
Colonists’ purpose.5  This quaint but markedly gruesome 
rebellion later became known as the American Revolution.6  After 
both events had come and gone, the victors took measures to 
ensure appropriate representation for their constituents.7  
Likewise, both incidents required radical changes to their 
respective structures of government.  Given that Americans have 
always gone to great lengths to seek adequate representation, it is 
unsurprising that the national popular vote movement exists.  
That being said, this Comment aims to prove why the 
national popular vote—and in particular the iteration referred to 
as the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is 
unconstitutional, ineffective, and potentially disastrous.  While 
there has been much scholarly debate about the validity of a 
national popular vote interstate compact, many works have 
focused only on the Compact Clause requirements.  The articles 
that have shifted focus away from the compact aspect of the 
popular vote system either fail to incorporate the Compact Clause 
materials at all or do not have the benefit of new Supreme Court 
decisions outlining the States’ near plenary power to control their 
electors.   
This Comment aims to provide a holistic picture of the 
NPVIC and any closely related compacts through updated 
precedent.  This Comment will first look at what a national 
popular vote might entail and explicitly lays out the most 
prominent popular vote movement, the NPVIC.  This Comment 
will then focus on the NPVIC’s Compact Clause element to 
determine whether congressional approval is required before this 
compact can go into effect.  Next, this Comment will address the 
 
1776) (saying one justification for the revolution was the deterioration of “the right of 
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants 
only”).  
5. See, e.g., RAPHAEL, supra note 4, at 16-17 (saying the American Revolution did not 
spawn from mere class warfare and was in fact instigated in part by “[m]any merchants, 
lawyers, and other colonists of comfortable means object[ing] only to the abuse of power by 
the British Parliament”). 
6. See id. at 24 (saying the lead up to the American Revolution was carried out by 
small, unorganized movements, not a heroic call to arms by any founding father). 
7. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2; see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 1. 
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potential legal challenges to the NPVIC that would exist despite 
congressional approval.  In discussing that post-approval claim, 
the potential procedural bars to a case against the NPVIC will be 
addressed, then the substantive challenges of any potential case.8  
Finally, this Comment will close on the national popular vote 
movement’s purpose and some healthy alternatives to safely and 
practically reach that same goal.  In conclusion, this Comment 
will advocate one alternative above the rest for its constitutional 
consistency, compliance with social reformation demands, and 
structural integrity.  
I.  DEFINING A NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 
In determining a national popular vote’s constitutionality, it 
is necessary to first define, in a concise manner, what a national 
popular vote is.  Luckily, since 2006, many States have proposed 
and adopted a uniform interstate compact, the NPVIC, to achieve 
that very thing.9  While none of the NPVIC statutes have gone 
into effect as of this Comment’s writing, their activation has been 
looming year after year and will do so in perpetuity.10  This 
perpetual possibility stems from the fact that, once adopted, there 
is no action necessary except to wait for the triggering event—the 
addition of more member States.11  As a result, States that have 
already adopted the NPVIC can renew this measure without end 
and with an unlimited time to garner support.12  This Comment 
will focus on the NPVIC alone because it appears to have the most 
wind beneath its wings, compared to other national popular vote 
proposals.13  After the 2016 presidential election, the NPVIC 
 
8. The substantive challenges will be predicated on the plain text of the Constitution, 
the thoughts and opinions of the founding fathers during the convention, and the current 
social and political arguments against a national popular vote and the NPVIC specifically. 
9. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NPV—THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 
INITIATIVE: PROPOSING DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH AN INTERSTATE 
COMPACT 2 (2019). 
10. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
[https://perma.cc/MM4U-PDEQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
11. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1. 
12. See id. 
13. Eric T. Tollar & Spencer H. Kimball, A More Perfect Electoral College: 
Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions Under the Twelfth Amendment, 9 LEGIS. & POL’Y 
BRIEF 4, 28 (2020). 
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found renewed support, which generated the most positive 
movement towards a national popular vote since the idea’s 
inception.14  That being said, this Comment’s analysis and 
conclusions can be extended to any similar proposal so long as no 
material changes have occurred.  After reviewing other proposals, 
it appears the general principles of a national popular vote system 
remain more or less unchanged in any iteration of the proposal.15  
So, what system does the NPVIC set out?  First and most 
critically, it will, as the name implies, nationalize the election 
processes of member States.16  In other words, it will eradicate 
any distinction between State lines when determining which 
candidate the State electors should vote for.  Upon the first 
presidential election’s occurrence after the compact goes into 
effect, the NPVIC would instead instruct member States to 
conduct their statewide popular votes as they would absent the 
compact.17  The States would then add up each of the statewide 
popular votes, and the “chief election official” of each State 
would determine the nationwide popular vote’s outcome.18  At 
this point, the chief election official would submit the outcome of 
the national popular vote to the members of that State’s Electoral 
College.19  The electors would then cast their ballots, conforming 
to the national popular vote’s results, regardless of what results 
their State yielded.20  The “election official” designation belongs 
to either the State’s governor or the mayor in the District of 
Columbia.21  Coupled with the wording of some State statutes that 
bind electors to their party’s primary candidate, the NPVIC’s 
process would effectively restrict the electors to vote only for the 
candidate who won the nationwide popular vote.22 
 
14. Id.  
15. See, e.g., Ralph M. Goldman, Hubert Humphrey’s S. J. 152: A New Proposal for 
Electoral College Reform, 2 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 89, 90 (1958); H.R.J. Res. 109, 108th 
Cong. (2004).  
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019). 
17. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009). 
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
19. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
20. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01. 
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009). 
22. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying states have 
absolute control of their electors); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979) (voiding faithless 
votes); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 18002 (1994) (imposing a penalty for a faithless vote). 
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The NPVIC will take effect when a sufficient number of 
States join the compact.23  The number of federally delegated 
electoral votes each State has determines the number of necessary 
States.24  Before the compact can take effect, the total number of 
electoral votes collectively possessed by member States must 
equal 270 or more, so that this compact and its members alone 
can secure the presidential seat.25  As of this Comment’s writing, 
the NPVIC member States’ combined electoral votes equal 195, 
only 75 shy of their 270 goal.26  Despite the NPVIC’s adoption 
by more than a dozen States, it does not appear that this compact 
has been proffered for congressional approval.27  The following 
section will discuss why congressional approval is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for the compact to be effective in a constitutional 
manner.   
II.  WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD 
NEED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL 
The Compact Clause of the Constitution is found in Article 
I, Section 10, Clause 3.  The pertinent language in that mandate 
is as follows:  “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress 
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State 
. . . .”28  While this seems straightforward, the Supreme Court has 
varied significantly in determining what is required by this 
clause.29  The irony with this clause’s inconsistent treatment is 
that both accepted definitions are allegedly based on textualist 
interpretations of the Constitution.30  The broader of the two 
definitions would place a bar on any interstate agreement made 
without congressional consent, regardless of the nature of such 
agreement.31  Under this interpretation, the Court defines the 
 
23. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
24. OR. REV. STAT. § 248.355 (2001). 
25. See 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013). 
26. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 10. 
27. NEALE, supra note 9, at 2. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. 
29. Compare U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978) 
(defining “agreements” and “compacts” narrowly), with Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 
503, 519 (1893) (defining “agreements” and “compacts” broadly).  
30. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519. 
31. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 459.  
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terms “compact” and “agreement” as used in Article I, Section 10 
broadly and synonymously.32  This encompasses any activity that 
possibly interferes with the supremacy of the United States, and 
any activity that “the United States can have no possible objection 
[to] or have any interest in interfering with[.]”33   
This plain text meaning of the Compact Clause, as laid out 
above, was previously said to be invalid when read in context by 
the proponents of the narrower definition.34  While the Court did 
acknowledge that the two contrasting definitions were both 
predicated on the plain text of the Constitution, the first 
interpretation was nevertheless abandoned as the Court was 
reluctant to bar interstate agreements that “do not enhance state 
power to the detriment of federal supremacy.”35  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that Congress can implicitly 
approve of an interstate compact before it is fully furnished for 
any formal approval.36  The Court also stressed that there are 
some instances where the States must act before Congress can 
determine whether its approval will be granted or not.37  In sum, 
not every agreement entered into between States requires 
congressional approval.38  The Court even went as far as to say 
that some agreements did not need congressional approval at all 
because the historical practice of seeking congressional approval 
for like compacts was merely out of caution and convenience for 
the associated states, rather than to prevent injury to the 
supremacy of the United States.39  However, the Court did 
acknowledge that any negative impact to the supremacy of the 
United States was to be considered for its potential of and not 
actual injury.40   
 
32. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 520. 
33. Id. at 518. 
34. See id. at 519.  
35. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460. 
36. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 521 (finding that congressional approval may 
be implied in a number of ways including subsequent ratification and enforcement of the 
terms of a compact).  
37. See id. at 521.  
38. See id.  
39. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471.  
40. Id. at 472.  
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While there has been some pushback over the years to this 
laissez-faire rule—allowing significant interstate dealings 
without congressional approval41—the most important pushback 
to this rule (regarding a national popular vote) was the 
acknowledgment that the interference with the supremacy of the 
United States was not the only matter for consideration.42  Instead, 
the Court recognized that an agreement would require 
congressional approval when such approval would guard against 
any potential adverse effect on any State not made a party to the 
agreement.43  If there is an agreement that has the potential to 
injure another State, it is the right and duty of Congress to provide 
approval before the agreement goes into effect.44  The Court 
eventually laid out four indicia that an agreement would be of the 
kind to require congressional approval due to its potential harm 
to another State.  These indicators are:  (1) the existence of a joint 
administrative body between the States, (2) the action of one 
member State being conditioned on the action of another member 
State, (3) the bar on any of the States to unilaterally and freely 
modify or repeal their acceptance of the agreement, and (4) the 
requirement of reciprocity in an agreement concerning limitations 
imposed on a member State’s inherent powers.45 
The general principles of the Compact Clause include 
possible interference with federal supremacy or a substantial 
impact on non-member States.46  As a result, congressional 
approval is required here regardless of the indicators’ existence, 
but that will be discussed later.47   
Assuming, arguendo, that further proof is needed to 
determine whether congressional approval is required, the above 
test, when applied to the compact at hand, is satisfied with three 
out of the four indicators being present.48  There does not appear 
 
41. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 372 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
42. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854). 
43. Id. 
44. Id.  
45. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 
(1985). 
46. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978); see also 
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 494. 
47. See infra Part II. 
48. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
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to be any indication that the NPVIC will adopt an administrative 
body; thus, the first indicator is likely not met.49  However, the 
rest of the indicators are blatantly present.  Getting the ball rolling, 
the NPVIC meets the second indicator, which essentially looks to 
“whether [the compact’s] effectiveness depends on the conduct of 
other members . . . .”50  This is met because the NPVIC will come 
into effect only after “states cumulatively possessing a majority 
of the electoral votes” have enacted this agreement.51  This means 
that every member State has only conditionally approved the 
compact, subject to action by other States.  
Additionally, how a State directs the panel of electors to cast 
their electoral votes would be predicated on conducting a popular 
vote in each of the other member States.52  Northeast Bancorp, 
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Bancorp) involved multiple States drafting a similar statute in 
each jurisdiction, and there was evidence suggesting that the State 
legislatures drafted the statutes together.53  Nevertheless, the 
Bancorp Court found that no compact had been formed, let alone 
one that needed congressional approval.54  This was largely 
because while an incentive structure was designed to entice more 
States to adopt the similarly-worded statute, the document was 
more akin to a model law than an agreement between States.55  
In addition, the incentive structure found in that case was not 
a result of the proposed law itself, but rather the incentive 
originated from a federal law barring the interstate exchange of 
bank titles, absent a contrary State law permitting the transfer.56  
In essence, the law there was not reciprocal because the States 
 
49.  But see JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE BASED PLAN FOR 
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 278 (National Popular Vote Press, 
4th ed. 2013) (“These tasks could be simplified by the establishment of an administrative 
clearinghouse for these functions.  The officials of the compacting states might themselves 
establish such a clearinghouse.  Alternatively, such a clearinghouse might be established by 
federal law.”).  
50. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015); see also COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4303A (2019); see also NEALE, supra note 9, at 1. 
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002; S.P. 252, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019).  
53. See 472 U.S. 159, 163-65, 173, 175 (1985). 
54. Id. at 175. 
55. See id. at 169.  
56. Id.  
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were merely working together to reap the full benefits of an 
enacted federal law.57  In that case, once one State adopted the 
statute it became valid and enforceable as to that State, 
independent from the actions of any other State.58  In short, the 
statute at issue in Bancorp is vastly different from the NPVIC.59   
To reiterate, the NPVIC requires other States to adopt the 
same law before it becomes effective.60  While there is no 
mandated adoption or forced incentive structure built into the 
NPVIC,61 there are other ramifications States may face if they do 
not play nice with the existing member States upon activation.62  
The States’ selection of electors is expressly conditioned on a 
popular vote in the other member States.63  In conclusion, the 
NPVIC’s conditional adoption clause and how the compact 
functions make its effectiveness conditioned on other member 
States’ actions.  
Next, when a compact cannot freely and unilaterally be 
repealed, that indicates the compact will likely need prior 
congressional approval.64  Customarily, a compact has the 
“distinguishing feature” of presumptively being interminable 
without the deliberate action of multiple member States and thus 
requires congressional approval.65  The presumption of this 
norm’s presence in compacts can only be overborne by “express 
provisions that permit withdrawal . . . .”66  In fact, express 
permission to leave a compact is so necessary that “[t]he absence 
of comparable language in the Compact is significant and weighs 
against” the ability of a State to freely and unilaterally repeal a 
compact.67  One State supreme court went as far as saying that not 
 
57. Id. at 164.  
58. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 472 U.S. at 175. 
59. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167A, § 2 (1996), with OR. REV. STAT. § 23.248 
(2019). 
60. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009).  
62. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 9882 (2003). 
63. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
64. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 
175 (1985).  
65. Waterfront Comm’n v. Murphy, 429 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.N.J. 2019), vacated, 961 
F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2020) (vacating order for lack of jurisdiction). 
66. Id. at 11.  
67. Id. (citing Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013)).  
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even the unequivocal ability to come and go as a State freely 
pleases (even when enumerated) is sufficiently dispositive of 
whether a compact would require congressional approval under 
this indicator.68  Instead, the court there looked to the statute’s 
history.69  
While the member States are free to repeal the NPVIC, they 
have a limited duration to repeal the statute.70  Otherwise, they 
will be bound by their initial pledge to appoint their electors based 
on the nationwide popular vote.71  If they intend their refutation 
to be effective, the member States must repeal the NPVIC before 
the last six months of a president’s term.72  This, while not an 
absolute bar on the repeal of the agreement, sufficiently impacts 
a State’s unilateral ability to withdraw.73  There is no language 
indicating that States can freely repeal or modify the statute at 
their discretion.74  Because the absence of express permission to 
freely and unilaterally repeal or modify a compact indicates the 
inability to do so,75 the NPVIC would presumptively not allow 
member States to leave or modify willingly.  In addition to the 
absence of such a provision, the express restriction on when a 
member State can effectively walk away76 sufficiently satisfies 
this indicator. 
Finally, and “[m]ost importantly,” when a compact requires 
reciprocal obligations or limits to inherent State powers, the 
compact will need congressional approval.77  This indicator 
essentially looks to whether the member State “ceded a portion of 
its own sovereignty in order to benefit from the collective action 
of multiple states . . . .”78  All member States to the NPVIC give 
up their ability to direct their electors to vote under that State’s 
 
68. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015). 
69. Id. (finding “the history of the Compact is replete with examples of unilateral state 
action”).  
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
71. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
72. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
73. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1.  
74. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01. 
75. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013). 
76. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1. 
77. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 
(1985). 
78. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. 2016).  
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mandates.79  This ability is undoubtedly a part of a State’s 
sovereign power.80  The restriction of such sovereign power so 
that all member States may expand their combined strength is 
precisely the kind of reciprocal obligation this indicator 
requires.81  In sum, the most important indicator that a compact is 
of the kind that would require congressional approval also 
appears to be the most straightforward.  It is undeniable that any 
State that enters into the NPVIC limits its ability to “appoint, in 
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of 
Electors . . . .”82  This is because member States will be relying 
on the chief election officials of other member States and the 
outcome of the national popular vote to allocate electoral votes—
rather than the independent discretion of their respective 
legislatures.83  
Admittedly, the Bancorp case has largely been cited for its 
commerce precedent and is rarely used to adjudicate challenges 
to the Compact Clause.84  That being said, a return to the general 
Compact Clause principles will necessitate congressional 
approval, regardless of the indicators’ presence.  This is because 
the NPVIC compact is, on its face and by its text, a political matter 
undoubtedly capable of affecting the rights and power of other 
States as well as the federal government.85  The compact states 
“[t]his article shall govern . . . in each member state,”86 “to 
produce a national popular vote . . . [unless] the electoral college 
is abolished.”87  Additionally, the supporters of the NPVIC even 
 
79. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009); see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 
S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (indicating each State has a right to independently control its 
electors).  
80. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2. 
81. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 849. 
82. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2. 
83. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
84. See, e.g., Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 838 
F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1988); Cont’l Ill. Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1521 n.5 (11th Cir. 
1987); Smith Setzer & Sons v. S.C. Procurement Rev. Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1322 (4th Cir. 
1994); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792, 793 n.16 
(4th Cir. 1991). 
85. See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 201 
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1920) [hereinafter MADISON, 
CONVENTION NOTES] (discussing the ramifications of various electoral schemes).  
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2753 (2011). 
87. Act of June 12, 2019, ch. 356, 2019 Or. Laws (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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admit, potentially obliviously so, that the compact would 
guarantee the presidency to the member States, that the compact’s 
design is to “remedy” the laws in 48 States, and that the NPVIC 
intends to reshape how federal elections are campaigned for.88   
Now turning a closer eye to these broad principles, it seems 
the NPVIC’s potential impact could have a disastrous toll on the 
supremacy of the United States, as well as the sovereignty of other 
States.  Regarding the impact on supremacy: 
the compact may not authorize member states to do anything 
collectively that they could not do individually.  Second, 
member states must not delegate their sovereignty, but rather 
they must retain their freedom to withdraw from the compact 
at any time.89 
Suppose member States engage in these practices—
collective power enhancement, delegation of sovereignty, and 
conceding the ability to withdrawal—through a compact.  In that 
case, that compact is said to be a potential threat to the supremacy 
of the United States and to non-member States, and that compact 
would require prior congressional approval.90  These concerns are 
very similar to the four indicators previously stated, and thus this 
analysis will be brief.  The NPVIC combines the member States’ 
power to secure for its members the sole ability to determine the 
presidency.91  Alone, no State could achieve this outcome.  Again, 
the States are not free to withdraw without significant restrictions, 
and their withdrawal will potentially be deemed invalid—replete 
with eerily looming enforcement mechanisms left for 
speculation.92  Finally, the sovereign powers of the member States 
have been partially subjugated to the NPVIC, exactly as 
 
88. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/HSN2-QCV3] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021). 
89. State v. Kurt, 802 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Mo. 1991) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978)).   
90. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854); Virginia v. Tennessee, 
148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).  
91. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013). 
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019); see also supra notes 65-77 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the member States to the NPVIC are not free to withdraw 
from the compact).   
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contemplated by the broad compact concerns when determining 
the necessity of congressional approval.93 
 Having determined that the NPVIC is an interstate compact 
of the kind that requires congressional approval (with or without 
the presence of the four indicia), the question that remains is what 
recourse a non-member State or the citizen of a member State 
could have if Congress did approve the NPVIC.   
III.  WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD 
STILL FAIL TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL, DESPITE 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL 
There are a couple of different issues that must be discussed 
before approaching the merits of any potential case against the 
NPVIC.  Both of these issues are theoretically dispositive of the 
case on procedural grounds.  To get to the case’s merits, the 
justiciability doctrine and jurisdiction must be satisfied.94  Briefly 
addressing each concern now, there are no justiciability grounds 
that would dismiss this cause of action because it would be based 
on a non-political question, and most likely, non-member States 
would be filing this suit against the federal government 
(dismissing standing concerns).95  Even if this were a suit against 
one State by another, it is likely to be valid.96  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court may or may not have original jurisdiction to hear 
the complaint, but it could nevertheless reach the Supreme Court 
through appeals.97  
 
93. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying States have 
near plenary power to dictate electors).  
94. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99, 204 (1962). 
95. See id. at 209; see also infra Section III.A. 
96. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405-06 (1821) (“[The Eleventh 
Amendment] does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a 
State and a foreign State.  The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases and in 
these a State may still be sued.”); see also Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934); 
see also infra Section III.A.  
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)-
(2) (1988); Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 393, 399 (“If a State be a party, the jurisdiction of 
this Court is original . . . .  The original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be enlarged, but its 
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under the third article of the 
constitution . . . .”).   
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Within the merits of the case, the Constitution plainly allots 
the power of elections to the individual States.98  However, 
questions remain regarding the exclusivity of such power.99  
Looking to the Supreme Court’s precedent, the States’ power 
appears to be definitively exclusive, at the cost of federal and 
State interference.100  This conclusion is further aided by the 
founding era’s thoughts and examples.101  Finally, if no legal 
argument is persuasive, the social and political reasons alone 
should be sufficient to halt the NPVIC.  
A. Justiciability Concerns 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to 
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no 
rule for his government?102 
 
 It is a fundamental principle that the legislature’s mere will 
cannot alter the Constitution absent amendment proceedings.103  
Likewise, the legislative branch cannot pass any laws or take any 
action repugnant to the Constitution.104  Suppose the legislature 
engages in any activity that is thought to be unconstitutional.  In 
that case, it is the Supreme Court’s prerogative to adjudicate 
whether or not there has been legitimate infringement.105  While 
these principles are no doubt ingrained in the hearts of every 
scholar of the law, these principles become increasingly murky 
when dealing with an interstate compact.  Of course, the usual 
justiciability concerns are present with an interstate compact, just 
as with any potential case and controversy brought before the 
 
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
99. See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2318 (2020); Ray v. Blair, 343 
U.S. 214, 225 (1952); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“The question before 
us is not one of policy but of power . . . .”); see also infra Section III.B.1.  
100. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also infra Section III.B.1.  
101. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 57, 509; see also infra 
Section III.B.2.  
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
103. Id. at 177.   
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 177-78.  
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Court.106  However, the Compact Clause’s mandates erect some 
peculiar obstacles to justiciability that need to be addressed.  
The first of these, and most likely to prevent a suit, is the 
political question doctrine.  The decision to approve or disprove 
an interstate compact is undoubtedly one of the legislature’s 
political judgment, rather than one of constitutional judgment 
akin to that of the Supreme Court’s.107  The political question 
doctrine then would seemingly bar the Supreme Court’s review 
of a claim alleging Congress improperly approved an interstate 
compact in violation of a constitutional principle.108  This doctrine 
requires federal courts to determine whether, based on six 
independent factors, a matter is committed to another branch such 
that separation of powers precludes judicial review.109  These 
factors are:  (1) constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
different political branch, (2) the lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards, (3) the need for an initial non-judicial 
policy decision, (4) the potential for any judicial decision to 
indicate a lack of respect to the coordinate branch, (5) the need to 
adhere to a political decision already made, or (6) the potential for 
embarrassment after multiple branches have resolved the issue 
differently.110 
This bar is especially present when the claim is based on a 
violation of the Guarantee Clause, which the Court has explicitly 
labeled a political question.111  The Guarantee Clause requires 
every State of the Union to be guaranteed a republican form of 
government.112  In other words, some fashion of a representative 
 
106. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (applying the justiciability standards 
to that case because it arose under the Federal Constitution); see also Virginia v. Tennessee, 
148 U.S. 503, 517 (1893) (Compact Clause cases arise under the Federal Constitution).  
107. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 485 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
108. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
109. Id. at 211, 217.  
110. Id. at 217.  
111. Id. at 224 (“[C]hallenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsistency 
with [the Guarantee Clause] present no justiciable question.”).  There is, however, some 
debate as to whether this bar still exists with the same force.  See Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 71-72 (1988) (citing circuit court decisions as well as Supreme Court decisions that 
indicate the Guarantee Clause may still be used to adjudicate cases). 
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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government must be present across the nation.113  Here, it is 
abundantly clear that any claim against establishing a national 
popular vote would incorporate that very clause;114 however, that 
may not be the only alleged constitutional violation possible.  If a 
claim touches on the Guarantee Clause but also relies on the 
violation of another constitutional principle, the claim may still 
be heard assuming the alternative violation does not likewise fall 
under the Court’s political question bar.115  
Thus, it is necessary to determine what other constitutional 
principles might be violated by congressional approval if any suit 
is maintained against an interstate compact establishing a national 
popular vote.  Although still potentially problematic, the 
requirement of a system of electors, also known as the 
Presidential Electors Clause, found in Article II, Section 1 and the 
Twelfth Amendment, would undoubtedly be violated with the 
establishment of a national popular vote.116   
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held (although stepped 
back in more recent cases)117 that the Constitution provides 
citizens an affirmative right to vote.118  While not considered a 
natural, unalienable right, it is still considered fundamental.119  
Because of the fundamental nature of the right to vote,120 the 
NPVIC could be subject to attack for equal protection and due 
process violations.121  This would likely stem from individuals 
who felt they were now disenfranchised from their vote due to 
their State’s sparse population.  As the Supreme Court has said, 
 
113. See THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 194 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1880) (defining 
republican government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”). 
114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
115. Baker, 369 U.S. at 227. 
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  The cause of such a 
violation will be discussed in more detail in Section III.B. 
117. E.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional 
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States . . . .”). 
118. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
119. Id.  
120. Id.  
121. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104, 110. 
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“[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because 
he lives in the city or on the farm.”122  
While it is important to note these additional means in which 
the NPVIC might be attacked, this Comment will only focus on 
the most ambiguous and challenging means of invalidating the 
NPVIC:  the idea that the compact is a violation of the Presidential 
Electors Clause, which establishes the Electoral College.123  This 
is partly because this Comment aims to avoid discussing 
individual rights and instead discusses the right of States as 
sovereign entities (which presumptively have no right to sue for 
due process/equal protection violations124). 
The distinction between reliance on the Guarantee Clause for 
a potential suit versus the Presidential Electors Clause is 
admittedly sparse.  Still, the distinction is nevertheless present in 
that the Guarantee Clause helps define a judicially enforceable 
requirement in the Constitution.  The use of the Guarantee Clause 
to define the meaning of the electoral requirement is different 
from the Supreme Court’s potential to “disrupt a State’s 
republican regime” by enforcing a government system the Court 
deems more akin to a republic, which would violate the political 
question doctrine.125  The Guarantee Clause will only be used 
here as a means of textual interpretation and not to determine what 
that clause alone requires of the States.  
A suit against the NPVIC, predicated on the violation of the 
Presidential Electors clause, is not a political question.  This is 
because the suit, although first requiring Congress to exercise its 
constitutionally committed judgment,126 would be against a 
potential violation of the Constitution.127  This case would only 
 
122. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)). 
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
124. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966).  But see Shelby 
Cnty. v. Alabama, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). 
125. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962). 
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23 
(1892).  The State of Michigan was sued for improperly appointing electoral members in 
violation of the Constitution.  McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23.  The Court found that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case saying:  
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be brought after Congress gave its consent to the interstate 
compact, and “once Congress gives its consent, a compact 
between States—like any other federal statute—becomes the law 
of the land.”128   
When the question presented to the Court is whether 
congressional activity has violated the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court can hear the case regardless of potential political 
concerns.129  The political question doctrine is not designed to 
prevent the Court from hearing legitimate constitutional 
questions.130  Instead, the political question doctrine, under the 
guise that the Court does not have that power under the 
Constitution, is designed to bar the Court from hearing truly 
political matters and, in so doing, questioning coordinate 
branches’ judgments or rationales.131  This is the difference 
between asking whether a coordinate branch can do something 
versus whether it should do something.  The former can be heard 
by the Court, whereas the latter is barred.132   
The validity of Congress approving the NPVIC falls under 
that first category.  Regardless of the NPVIC’s potential merits, a 
suit against congressional approval would simply be asking 
whether such approval was an appropriate use of Congress’s 
constitutional powers.  In this respect, no deference is deserved, 
nor any embarrassment incurred by asking whether the 
Constitution was violated.133  
 
it is said that all questions connected with the election of a presidential elector 
are political in their nature; that the court has no power finally to dispose of 
them; and that its decision would be subject to review by political officers and 
agencies, as the state board of canvassers, the legislature in joint convention, 
and the governor, or, finally, the Congress.  But the judicial power of the 
United States extends to all cases in law or equity arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and this is a case so arising . . . . 
Id.  
128. Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018).  
129. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968). 
130. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11, 217. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 217 (“The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to 
whether some action . . . exceeds constitutional authority.”).  
133. See id. at 218; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“It is most 
true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not.  [B]ut it is equally true, that it 
must take jurisdiction if it should.  The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a 
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution.  We cannot pass it by because 
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Assuming for a moment that the violation of the mandate for 
the Electoral College is sufficient to state a claim, it must be 
agreed that the case would meet the other justiciability 
requirements exclusively on that alleged violation for the suit to 
commence absent subsequent equal protection or due process 
claims. 
Given that any potential case brought to the Supreme Court 
after enacting the NPVIC likely cannot be directly contingent on 
the Guarantee Clause,134 the remaining causes of action must 
provide a sufficiently justiciable case regarding standing.  As 
discussed above, this Comment will only consider the 
Presidential Electors Clause.   
The recent case brought by the Attorney General in Texas 
regarding the 2020 election may initially seem dispositive of this 
question; however, the two causes of action are irreconcilably 
different.135  Standing generally requires injury, causation, and 
redressability.136  Causation is essentially a given when “the 
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at 
issue.”137  However, States have special standing, or relaxed 
standing, to bring suits to enforce their sovereign rights.138  This 
level of standing alleviates the need to show injury.139  More 
recent cases of State suits against the federal government fail to 
even contemplate State standing and tacitly accept the State’s 
standing to sue.140  Thus, the difference between a suit against the 
 
it is doubtful.  With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we 
must decide it if it be brought before us.  We have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the other would 
be treason to the constitution.”).  
134. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 227. 
135. Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020).  
136. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
137. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  
138. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (allowing Missouri to bring 
suit against the United States for entering into a treaty in violation of Missouri’s perceived 
regulatory rights, but ultimately rejecting the claim because no regulatory rights existed 
there).  
139. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (allowing a State suit against the 
federal government for violating the State’s sovereign rights); Tarah Leigh Grove, When Can 
a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 862 n.54 (2016) (discussing a 
State’s special sovereignty).  
140. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (immediately 
discussing the substantive rights of a State without first discussing any potential justiciability 
bars); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).  
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NPVIC and the suit launched by Texas, and what in turn makes 
the presented hypothetical suit sustainable, is that it is predicated 
on federal or state infringement of a State right, satisfying 
standing.141  
However, it is possible that a suit against the NPVIC could 
also be launched (either by a member State or a non-member 
State) against a member State or multiple member States.  If this 
were to be the case, it would initially seem that the standing 
concerns are the same as a suit against the federal government.142  
Despite those initial impressions, the Court has on occasion 
restricted the capacity of one State to sue another, requiring 
“absolute necessity” to exercise jurisdiction.143  They have gone 
as far as to require “serious magnitude and imminent” injury be 
“clearly shown . . . .”144  There is undoubtedly a more significant 
burden on a State to establish standing than that of a private 
individual in a suit against another State.  However, this increased 
burden appears to be inconsequential given the gravity of the 
topic.  
It is important to note that another underlying tenant of the 
justiciability doctrine is that the Court must have jurisdiction in 
the first place to hear the matter.145  The Constitution provides 
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases where a State 
would be made a party as well as those in which the United States 
is a named party.146  Congress cannot reduce this original 
jurisdiction.147  That being said, the Court has been reluctant to 
exercise its original jurisdiction in specific cases.148  If the Court’s 
 
141. See Grove, supra note 139, at 862 n.54.  This distinction may apply less fervently 
in the case of a member State given that it sought this legislation voluntarily and thus is not 
afforded the same protection of the rights it ceded.  See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); Merritt, supra note 111, at 17-18.  
142. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more 
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy.  Be 
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the 
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).  
143. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).  
144. Id. at 292. 
145. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962). 
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 
(1803).  
147. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138. 
148. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) (“[T]he pending state-court 
action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered here may be litigated.”). 
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exercise of jurisdiction remains consistent, a post-congressional-
approval case against the NPVIC likely will not be heard under 
original jurisdiction.  Regardless though, this hypothetical case 
could still be heard at the federal level.  It just may have to reach 
the Supreme Court as a course of appeals.149 
While there is some question as to whether a State could sue 
a member State, alleging that the NPVIC violates the complaining 
State’s rights, it is undoubtedly clear that there would be no 
question as to the possibility of a suit between a State and the 
United States.  Having sufficiently determined that the 
justiciability concerns would not preclude review of an interstate 
compact after congressional approval, when a suit is based on a 
violation of the Presidential Electors Clause, the merits of the case 
remain.  
B. Substantive Concerns 
Assuming that the Supreme Court has not yet dismissed the 
case for want of procedural requirements, the case’s merits must 
sufficiently justify a ruling against the NPVIC.  The merits of the 
case will be discussed below by first looking into the plain text of 
the Constitution as well as the Court’s interpretation of the same.  
Then this Comment will discuss both the founding era arguments 
against the NPVIC and the modern-day social and political 
arguments against the NPVIC.  
1. Plain Text of the Constitution and Judicial Interpretation 
The Constitution merely orders that each State must appoint 
electors equal to its number of representatives in Congress as 
directed by its State legislature.150  These electors must meet in 
their respective States and vote via ballot for the President and 
Vice President separately.151  Nowhere in the Constitution are 
electors of a State directed to vote based on specific criteria.152  
Despite the Founders’ suggestion that the only criterion was to be 
 
149. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257(a) (1988). 
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
152. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020). 
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the electors’ independent decision, and no vote was to be cast at 
the direction of any law,153 this is simply not present on the face 
of the Constitution.154  As a result of the lack of instruction in this 
matter, the requirement of an electoral body must first be defined 
by examining the totality of the document.  If ambiguity persists, 
the practices at the time of ratification should prevail.155 
Taking the entire Constitution into account, the States were 
intended to remain as several unionized sovereigns instead of 
forming a single sovereign entity.156  In addition, the Constitution 
promises to these several States a “Republican Form of 
Government[.]”157  This edict for a republican form of 
government modifies the establishment of an electorate system.  
However, there is no authoritative mandate in the text of the 
Constitution regarding federal interference with the States’ 
exclusive ability to generate presidential electors pursuant to their 
independent form of a republican government.  Therefore, a case 
predicated on such interference must rely on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of what little is enumerated. 
The Court has not always favored federalism.  It has often 
received the tail end of the Court’s generosity, if any attention at 
all.158  This inattention was somewhat alleviated when the Court 
decided National League of Cities v. Usery.159  In that case, the 
Supreme Court determined that there are, in fact, limitations to 
the federal government’s power to regulate commerce.160  These 
 
153. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 351 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
155. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-92 (2008) (applying 
a textualist/originalist approach in interpreting the Constitution).  
156. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 196-97 
(James Madison) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720 (1838) (recognizing the States are “sovereign 
within their respective boundaries”); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) 
(describing the States as “neighbors members of a single” or “quasi-sovereignties bound 
together in the Union”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (saying the 
Eleventh Amendment exists to “confirm[]” the presumption that “each State is a sovereign 
entity in our federal system”). 
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937) (saying 
the federal power to regulate commerce is plenary in nature).   
159. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).  
160. Id. at 842. 
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limitations are predicated on the belief that the several States 
retain some sovereignty.161  The Court determined that the federal 
government could not legislatively displace areas deemed to be 
the traditional government functions of the States—such as the 
wages set for government employees—even when the power 
invoked by Congress was outlined in the Constitution.162  It said 
this bar was found implicitly in the Tenth Amendment.163   
While it would be refreshing to reinvigorate the Tenth 
Amendment in this way, the text of that Amendment simply does 
not contain any language to support this protection.164  
Additionally, the Court later found that the National League of 
Cities rule, barring the infringement on “traditional governmental 
function[s],” was unworkable and did not protect the sovereignty 
of States.165  As a result of these two blunders, that case was 
summarily overturned.166  
The case that replaced National League of Cities provided 
an equally ambiguous test to determine whether a particular State 
right existed and, if so, whether the federal government could 
regulate in that area or if State sovereignty barred its control.167  
That case was Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, which also dealt with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s 
(FLSA) minimum wage requirements concerning government 
employees.168   
The Court there found that the Constitution provides both 
limits and avenues to impose federal control.169  In so doing, the 
Court rejected alternative theories that had previously protected 
the States’ rights, such as protection from federal infringement 
upon “‘uniquely’ governmental functions” or “‘necessary’ 
governmental services . . . .”170  Instead, the Court provided that 
the Constitution’s structure protects the States from federal 
 
161. Id. 
162. See id. 
163. Id. at 842-43.  
164. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 12.  
165. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).  
166. Id. 
167. See id. at 556; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 15. 
168. 469 U.S. at 530.  
169. Id. at 547. 
170. Id. at 545. 
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infringement on their sovereignty.171  It went on to say 
enumerated barriers in the Constitution must justify any restraint 
on federal power.172  These barriers can be a double-edged sword 
cutting both for and against the sovereignty of the States.173  The 
Court pointed out that the Constitution provides explicit areas that 
Congress may regulate in Article 1, Sections 8 and 10.174  Paired 
with the Supremacy Clause, the Court held that the States’ 
sovereignty was diminished upon ratification, but it is not gone.175  
Since Garcia, additional precedent has shed light on the 
notion of State power to control elections.  In Shelby County v. 
Holder, the Court not only upheld the premise of Garcia’s 
federalism construction, but also explicitly acknowledged Tenth 
Amendment protections for state-controlled elections.176  
Specifically, it said “the Framers of the Constitution intended the 
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth 
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.”177  The Court also 
assured that the several States retained equal sovereignty.178 
The rule presently regarding federalism is that the federal 
government may only regulate where it has been granted that 
express authority.179  It is also important to reiterate that the States 
are, in fact, independent sovereigns, although they have 
surrendered some power by their status as members of the 
Union.180  Much like a surgeon, the federal government may only 
operate in the areas in which it has previously been given 
informed consent.181 
 
171. Id. at 552. 
172. See id. at 554. 
173. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548.   
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013).  This differs from Nat’l League of Cities in that the 
Holder Court relied on enumerated State safeguards. 
177. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991)). 
178. Id. at 544. 
179. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543. 
180. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543. 
181. Jon F. Merz & Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational 
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 321, 322 (1990) 
(“[T]he law has placed upon physicians a duty to disclose information regarding diagnosis 
and treatment . . . .”); Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2333 (2020) (quoting U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
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Indeed, the Garcia Court quoted James Madison 
affirmatively when he said, “[i]f the power was not given, 
Congress could not exercise it . . . .”182  The Court reasoned this 
constitutional protection is granted to the States as evidenced in 
part by the voting rights that the States retained, namely, the 
ability to elect the federal executive and legislative branches.183  
Indeed, the Court went on to say that, at least regarding the 
Commerce Clause, substantive restraints on federal power should 
be “tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national 
political process . . . .”184  This has been interpreted broadly to 
apply to all potential federal interference with State 
sovereignty.185  Additionally, the Tenth Amendment’s 
protections for enumerated States’ rights has recently been 
enforced.186 
National League of Cities and Garcia provide an alternative 
mode of transportation for the Court to discuss federalism (an 
attempt at a pun).  Still, they are nonetheless demonstrative of the 
federal government’s ability to regulate the Electoral College.187  
Under this analytical regime, any interstate compact that creates 
a popular vote, as the NPVIC does, is an impermissible 
infringement on the States’ sovereignty after being adopted by 
Congress. 
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Garcia, the way the 
United States’ government is arranged explicitly recognizes the 
States’ rights as sovereigns.188  Phrased another way, the States’ 
 
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual 
State.”)). 
182. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549. 
183. Id. at 550-51.  
184. Id. at 554.  
185. Merritt, supra note 111, at 15; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 326 (1966) (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)) 
(establishing the “basic test to be applied” to determine the veracity of federal interference 
with State sovereignty).  The Court in Katzenbach applied this test to an alleged violation of 
State sovereignty authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment despite the fact that the test 
originated from a potential federal violation predicated by the Commerce Clause.  The use 
of this test shows the interchangeability of tests designed to determine federal overreaching 
despite the genesis of the federal government’s actions.   
186. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543, 556-57 (2013); Chiafalo, 140 
S. Ct.  at 2322-23, 2333. 
187. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.  
188. Id. at 549, 554.  
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sovereignty is found in the Constitution by the plain text of the 
Constitution (specifically that text which defines the structure of 
government).189  Here, the cause of action being raised is 
predicated on the same State sovereignty evidenced by 
constitutional decree.190  It could be argued that the Presidential 
Electors Clause is an explicit acknowledgment of State 
sovereignty in that area.191  Indeed, that was argued in Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board when the Court, per 
curiam, said:  
[I]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable 
not only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection 
of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely 
under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by 
virtue of a direct grant of authority made under [the 
Presidential Electors Clause].192 
However, assuming that the Presidential Electors Clause 
alone is insufficient to show that control of the Electoral College 
is the exclusive right of the State, the Garcia Court went on to 
recognize that a crucial element of State sovereignty, implied by 
the way the Constitution created the governmental system, is the 
ability of the States to solely elect the president and congress.193  
Thus, the Constitution ordains the right to elect the President as a 
sovereign power of all the States.194  
Additional evidence that the right to oversee the vote for 
President and the right to form the Electoral College is 
exclusively the right of the States can be found in Chiafalo v. 
Washington.195  In that case, three electors from the State of 
 
189. See id. at 554.  
190. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.  
191. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“Article II, § 1’s appointments power gives the 
States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, absent some other constitutional 
constraint.”). 
192. 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000). 
193. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (“The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection 
both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.”).  
194. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“[N]othing in the Constitution expressly prohibits 
States from [controlling] presidential electors’ voting discretion . . . .”). 
195. Id. at 2319-20.  For an even more recent acknowledgement of such State 
exclusivity, one need not look any further than the shambling mound of cases dismissed in 
favor of States’ rights during and after the 2020 presidential election.  See Joshua A. Douglas, 
Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
(forthcoming).  
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Washington voted against the candidate that won the statewide 
popular vote.196  The Court upheld Washington’s use of a civil 
sanction against these “faithless elector[s],” saying that, “[t]he 
Constitution’s text and the Nation’s history both support allowing 
a State to enforce . . . far-reaching authority over presidential 
electors . . . ‘conveying the broadest power of determination’ over 
. . . the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includ[ing] 
power to condition his appointment[.]”197  
Because the right of States to vote for President and control 
the Electoral College (the States’ election rights) are exclusive, 
they cannot be infringed by federal regulation,198 much like any 
other exclusive State power cannot be (the power to regulate the 
health and welfare of a State’s citizenry for example).199  While 
the Court has sometimes allowed federal infringement of States’ 
rights when there exists a legitimate end for the interference, 
those instances are predicated on infringement of an implicit right 
of the States after the federal government was granted express 
permission to regulate there by the Constitution or subsequent 
amendments.200  This case is the opposite of those.  The 
Constitution explicitly authorizes States to appoint presidential 
electors as the legislature of that State sees fit.201  
At best, there is only implicit power for the federal 
government to regulate the States’ election rights.  This implicit 
power could arguably spawn from the Civil War and other voting 
rights amendments’ broad grants of regulatory authority, 
especially regarding elections.202  However, this extension of 
authority is not infinite.  Notably, this power extends only to the 
enforcement of those amendments.203  No doubt some proponents 
 
196. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322.  
197. Id. at 2322, 2323-24.  
198. Id.; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551. 
199. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (limiting congressional 
regulation to only those constitutionally expressed areas and barring regulation that would 
infringe on a State’s law-making power for the health of its citizens). 
200. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing to United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)). See also M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
406 (1819) (discussing the inability of the State to tax instruments of the federal 
government).  
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
202. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
203. Id. 
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of the NPVIC claim a violation of those amendments is occurring 
under the existing electoral systems.204  However, it is hard to 
fathom that such a systemic issue has existed for as long as it has 
without any substantial prior acknowledgement of such a heinous 
defect.  If the Electoral College negatively impacts the individuals 
protected by those amendments, the Electoral College 
undoubtedly would be an ancient relic of the invidious past, just 
as literacy tests, poll taxes, white primaries, and abundant 
violence are.   
To say that the Electoral College is in the same category as 
the aforementioned practices, and is thus subject to regulation by 
the same amendments, is mere convenient political jiggery-
pokery.  The Electoral College, assuredly being different in kind 
than what the voting and Civil War Amendments were conceived 
to protect, cannot be regulated by such methods.  Even if 
regulation was permissible though, the NPVIC is a far cry from 
the rational basis of those noble causes, let alone the quasi-narrow 
tailoring required.205 
The NPVIC would eradicate some States’ abilities, and the 
values of others, to enforce their election rights.  Any federal 
regulation, including the interstate compact’s approval, 
interfering with these rights is not predicated on any express 
constitutional authorization of the federal government’s power.206  
There is no conceivable basis in the Constitution or its 
amendments authorizing such federal insight into this exclusive 
State power.  This would be an impermissible federal regulation 
of a State’s constitutional powers under the Presidential Electors 
Clause,207 and the Constitution generally. 
The member States may have a more difficult time finding 
friendly litigation, given they sought out the surrendering of their 
rights voluntarily, but they are potentially not without recourse.208  
While the more modern precedent does trend toward procedurally 
 
204. See Faith Karimi, Why the Electoral College Has Long Been Controversial, 
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/XV9F-6J6G] (Oct. 10, 2020, 6:59 AM). 
205. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542, 545 (2013). 
206. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I (laying out the powers of Congress).  
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
208. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798-99, 808 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 720, 723 (1997). 
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barring State suits against other States,209 a State is still capable 
of suing another for infringement on its sovereign powers.210  This 
is true even after that infringement occurs pursuant to joint 
action.211  If the merits of the case are heard, the just outcome in 
either instance (State v. State or State v. United States) favors the 
right of the State to freely exercise its sovereign powers without 
impediment from federal law or other State law.  
To be as straightforward as possible:  the right of the States 
to control their election procedures is exclusive, as defined under 
the Garcia framework.212  Any exclusive right may only be 
abridged by the federal government if there is informed consent 
to do so (evidenced by a clause in the Constitution or its 
amendments).213  While there are clauses granting such power to 
the federal government, these clauses are narrow and the powers 
implicit.214  Moreover, the Electoral College is not at all related 
to what these clauses are designed to remedy.  Additionally, there 
is no indication that the NPVIC can address these concerns; even 
if it is determined they are present with the Electoral College.  To 
continue the medical analogy, there is at best informed consent 
for the federal government to conduct as minimally intrusive a 
procedure as possible to remedy an exceedingly unique condition.  
The Electoral College is not an etiology of that unique condition 
and the NPVIC is not that minimally intrusive procedure.  If the 
plain language and interpretation thereof is not sufficient to bar 
the NPVIC, the legislative history of the Constitution and relevant 
clauses may be persuasive. 
 
 
209. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1900); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 
282 U.S. 660, 669, 674 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).   
210. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 
558 U.S. 256, 268 (2010) (“That the standard for intervention in original actions by nonstate 
entities is high, however, does not mean that it is insurmountable.”). 
211. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more 
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy.  Be 
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the 
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).  
212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985). 
213. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2334 (2020); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549. 
214. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
3 BARNES.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:49 PM 
524 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
2. Founding Era Thoughts and Examples 
How the citizens of each State would be represented in the 
federal government was discussed at length during the ratification 
of the Constitution.215  Still, only a sparse mandate made it into 
the final draft.216  Although it is the least desirable and most 
speculative course of action, the lack of definitive text may 
require a delving into the Founders’ minds and those who 
followed.  The framers defined the election powers of a 
republican system of government as not being comprised by the 
will of the people but rather the will of political bodies that 
represent the people.217  This definition appears to be consistent 
with the common understanding around the time of ratification.218  
Beyond dictionary definitions, the understanding of a republican 
government’s election can be demonstrated through the practical 
applications of such a system cited by the Founders, namely 
existing State constitutions at the time of ratification.219 
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 
established a method for choosing the president and vice-
president of the State where the several counties of the State 
would elect members of the general assembly and council 
members.220  Those elected officials would then choose the 
persons to fill the executive office of the State.221  Similar 
processes of indirectly elected executives existed in every State 
at this time.222  While these State examples of an executive 
 
215. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 284, 509. 
216. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.   
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 198 (James Madison). 
218. Republican Government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (defining 
Republican Government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”); JOHN 
BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2902 (8th ed. 
1914). 
219. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 584-86 (2008); 
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19; MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25 (stating the governor of the State 
is elected by vote of both houses of the legislature with the senate being elected by county 
representatives and the general assembly being elected directly by the people); DEL. CONST. 
of 1776 art. 7 (“A president or chief magistrate shall be chosen by joint ballot of both houses 
. . . .”). 
220. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19. 
221. Id. 
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 195 (James Madison); see, e.g., MD. 
CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7.  
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election process are engaged in by the legislative bodies,223 the 
Founders of the Constitution felt that the selection of a President 
would be better assigned to an independent, single-purpose, 
electoral body (as opposed to an executive elected by the 
legislatures or the people directly).224  This conclusion was 
reached after a full and frank discussion of the several election 
processes available, including the potential use of a popular 
vote.225  The framers also indicated their decision was predicated 
on failed or failing foreign examples of direct democracies.226 
The Founders’ definition of the Presidential Electors Clause 
and the examples relied on to create the electoral system should 
be more than dispositive of what the Constitution requires.  
However, the philosophical ideas behind this portion of the 
Constitution may be necessary to convince the most ardent 
proponents of the NPVIC.  The framers’ arguments on behalf of 
the Electoral College generally entail three substantial areas.227  
These are the avoidance of cliques, the separation of coordinate 
branches, and electing the most competent executive officer.228  
While the separation of coordinate branches in electing a 
President is undoubtedly essential, in the context of a popular 
vote, the first and the last concerns are the most relevant.  Under 
the first concern, the framers thought that a group or individual 
could elicit the support of many individuals and improperly seek 
out the presidency in a nationwide popular vote such that there 
 
223. See MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7; PA. CONST. of 
1776, § 19. 
224. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 509 (saying that an 
independent electoral system would avoid the “great evil of cabal” because each slate of 
electors would be states away from another).   
225. Id. at 320-21.  
226. See, e.g., id. at 268 (looking to the election of an executive in Poland); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 23-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan 
eds., 2001) (discussing Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage—saying “[t]here have been, if 
I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars”).  
227. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 452-53 
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON, 
CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268-69, 284.   
228. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
268-69, 284.   
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could be no counter to a powerful individual playing on the 
excitement of society.229  Specifically, it was said that: 
      The additional securities to republican government, to 
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of 
the plan, consist chiefly in the restraints which the 
preservation of the union will impose upon local factions and 
insurrections, and upon the ambition of powerful individuals 
in single states, who might acquire credit and influence 
enough, from leaders and favourites, to become the despots 
of the people . . . .230 
Or that the people “will be led by a few active and designing 
men.”231  This would be aided by the fact that the larger States 
would likely support a candidate from their State to the detriment 
of any small State who opposed them.232  In essence, the fear of 
cliques was the fear that someone could seize control through 
force and fear, as individuals are more susceptible to 
radicalization than separate and detached institutions.233  There 
are cliques that the framers discussed composed not of the people, 
but of the other coordinate branches.234  Again, this is not in direct 
relation to the NPVIC.   
The framers also feared that the people en masse would not 
be capable of selecting the most competent candidate.235  This 
was in part due to the lack of reliable and easily obtainable 
information regarding national events.236  Indeed, the framers 
 
229. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, 
supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton). 
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton). 
231. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.  
232. Id. at 268, 284.  
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Cary & James 
McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 257 (James Madison) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander 
Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.  
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 353 (Alexander Hamilton); 
MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (describing Governor Morris’s 
advocacy for a national popular vote to avoid an executive branch dependent on the will of 
the legislature).  
235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan 
eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (Mr. Sherman saying 
“[t]he [people] will never be sufficiently informed of characters”).  
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 235, at 447-48 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(saying the people at large have no means to acquire personal observation of presidential 
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talked repeatedly about the need for the electoral group to be 
diverse enough to reference national issues as opposed to local 
issues.237  The other half of this concern stemmed from the fact 
that even if the people as a whole had the opportunity to be 
informed, the information would not necessarily be accurate.238  
At best it is second-hand knowledge of a candidate and at worse 
it is akin to the game of telephone, even though a highly efficient 
game of telephone, with all the underlying inaccuracies.  To this 
end, the framers said, “[a] small number of persons, selected by 
their fellow citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to 
possess the information and discernment requisite to so 
complicated an investigation.”239  
The framers and indeed the generations that followed 
deemed, through implication of continued use despite significant 
criticism,240 this system of election superior to a direct 
democracy.241  However, the relevancy of their reasoning may 
differ in the modern world.  To answer the relevancy question, it 
is necessary to look at the changes that have occurred since then 
that might impact the historic rationales. 
3. Social and Political Arguments Against a Popular Vote 
You have to remember one thing about the will of the people:  




candidates and all information that is received is filtered through the lens of trusted 
individuals—albeit unelected—anyway); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
269 (Colonel Mason saying “it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character 
for [president] to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man”).   
237. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 172-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 269.   
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton). 
239. Id. 
240. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969) (saying that the Presidential Electors Clause “has probably been 
the subject of more proposed amendments than any other provision of the Constitution”).  
241. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII (changing the selection 
process of Vice President but retaining the Electoral College). 
242. Mark Dawidziak, Jon Stewart Blurs the Lines Between Jester and Journalist, THE 
PLAIN DEALER, [https://perma.cc/G22T-FJDA] (Mar. 28, 2019, 12:49 AM). 
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Some people in modern America may be taken aback by the 
previous section’s idea that the general public is incapable of 
discerning a proper presidential candidate.  To support this 
outrage, the speed at which news is provided could be noted.  
Likewise, the presidential candidates’ coverage could be cited.  
Regardless of either argument, however, political society as a 
whole has not drastically changed, despite our increased access to 
media.243  The presidential candidates do not visit or invest their 
campaigning into more than just a few States,244 nor does the 
available media generally provide one-on-one access to the 
presidential candidates.245  We may know more about the world 
around us now, but the accuracy of that information has remained 
essentially unchanged.246  Some even argue that this surplus of 
 
243. Compare Shawn Garvey, A Positive Look at Negative Campaigns, 8 LBJ J. PUB. 
AFFS. 13, 14 (1996) (“[W]hat his opposition claimed would result if Jefferson won the 
presidential election of 1800:  ‘Murder, robbery, rape, adultery and incest will be openly 
taught and practiced,’ warned the Federalist press[,]” and “[t]he 1884 presidential race . . .” 
where “Cleveland, widely rumored to have fathered an illegitimate son, was targeted by a 
Republican campaign attack song:  ‘Ma, ma, where’s my pa? Gone to Washington, ha, ha, 
ha’” and “[a] famous 1964 Lyndon Johnson campaign commercial began with a little girl 
plucking the petals from a daisy.  Within seconds, a nuclear explosion erupted in the 
background, and a mushroom cloud enveloped the little girl.”), with Gabriel Tate, The Mud-
Slingers: The Most Shocking Presidential Attack Ads Ever Aired, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 
2016), [https://perma.cc/NFR4-TPJS] (discussing a 1988 ad suggesting rapists and murders 
would be freed upon election of the ad’s opponent and a 2016 ad suggesting that the ad’s 
opponent lacked the fortitude to protect against “external threats to American security”). 
244. 94% of 2016 Presidential Campaign Was in Just 12 Closely Divided States, 
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/E6CS-UVBN] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); Tollar 
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 19-20 (discussing the history of presidential campaigning and 
how geographically limited said campaigning has been).  
245. Compare 1858 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
[https://perma.cc/AHC7-HSPL] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (stating that only 7 debates 
occurred, all in one State, spanning only 3 months, with no crowd involvement in the 1858 
Lincoln-Douglas debates), with 2000 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
[https://perma.cc/JD3J-NXCJ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (explaining how only three 
presidential debates occurred in 2000, in one month’s time, with minimal crowd involvement 
in one of the three debates), and 2020 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
[https://perma.cc/754A-6RNW] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (describing how only two 
presidential debates occurred in 2020, with no crowd involvement).  
246. Janet A. Hall, When Political Campaigns Turn to Slime: Establishing a Virginia 
Fair Campaign Practices Committee, 7 J.L. & POL. 353, 366 (1991) (stating that 
“[c]ampaign falsity statutes . . . are generally unenforced”); Maximilian J. Mescall, Make 
Campaign Coverage Great Again: Presidential Campaigns, the Pres, and the Rights of 
Access, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1653, 1653, 1657 (2018) (stating “more Americans follow 
the news” despite the fact that “journalists continue to act as moderators” as they did “[i]n 
early American History . . . as ‘gatekeepers by adhering to a developed set of ethical 
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information makes discerning the quality information from the 
rubbish more difficult.247 
That being said, it seems readily apparent that the current 
system simply cannot continue without some modification.  
Regardless of the system’s merits, if the social outcry is 
substantial enough, the practical implementation becomes so 
frustrated as to exhaust all hope of success.  Recent events have 
yielded a plethora of research into the average American’s 
mindset and faith in the electoral process.248  Generally, the 
verdict against the process is not pleasant.249  The need for a 
trusted and reliable system of elections is arguably more 
important than the actual process that occurs.   
In that vein, any proposed system must be consistently 
applicable and transparent.  Likely, a successful system would not 
be subjected to potential manipulation by a single individual or 
small subset of society.  Other concerns that have prevailed, 
despite the erosion of time, include the possibility that cliques will 
form and, as discussed above, the potential that the most 
 
norms’”) (quoting Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 72 
(2016)).  
247. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should be Good 
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 437, 449 (2008); Joan Deppa, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance Symposium: 
International Terrorism: Prevention and Remedies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 25, 
28 (1996) (discussing how too much media coverage after terror events may violate the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, confuse the facts, and encourage further violence); 
Paul Carrington, Too Much Publicity, 27 TEX. BAR J. 75, 76 (1964) (explaining the “excess 
of publicity has been called a ‘discredit to the American system of justice’”).   
248. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect to Have 
Difficulties Voting, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/4WBF-GCA6] 
(researching the impact Covid-19 had on voter confidence) [hereinafter Election 2020: 
Voters are Highly Engaged]; Nick Laughlin & Peyton Shelburne, How Voters’ Trust in 
Elections Shifted in Response to Biden’s Victory, MORNING CONSULT (Jan. 19, 2021), 
[https://perma.cc/3V8H-VH4M] (polling the impacts of violence and voter fraud on voter 
confidence in the electoral system). 
249. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, supra note 248 (stating 49% of 
voters believed it would be difficult to vote in the 2020 elections); Laughlin & Shelburne, 
supra note 248 (stating only 27% of registered republicans “say they trust the United States’ 
election system either ‘a lot’ or ‘some’” as of January 10, 2021); Deep Divisions in Views of 
the Election Process—and Whether It Will Be Clear Who Won, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 14, 
2020), [https://perma.cc/G8AR-QCWZ] (stating that only 22% of registered voters, polled 
from Sept 30 to Oct 5, 2020, are very confident that “[a]fter all the votes are counted, it will 
be clear which candidate won the election”); Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in 
U.S., GALLUP (Feb. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZX7Z-AGRJ] (stating that only 30% of 
Americans said they had confidence in the honesty of elections in 2016).  
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competent candidate will not prevail.250  A foundation-era 
concern that was only slightly voiced then but is far more 
significant in modern times is voter suppression and the suffrage 
of all citizens.251  
The NPVIC does not, and cannot, protect against these 
concerns.  First, even if it practically does not achieve this 
outcome, the NPVIC will most likely be perceived by a 
significant portion of the Nation’s voters as a way of 
disenfranchising their vote.  This can be evidenced by the existing 
arguments launched against the NPVIC,252 which can be expected 
to intensify upon its potential adoption.  Likewise, the NPVIC 
cannot address the concerns for consistency and reliability 
required of any electoral system.  For example, a vast exodus from 
or to a highly populous member-state could potentially drastically 
alter the outcome of the NPVIC’s vote.  This change would be 
substantial and could occur rapidly without any limitation on how 
frequently it could occur.  This may seem far-fetched, but again, 
the primary concern with an election system is how trusted and 
reliable it is by the people, regardless of the actual capacity for it 
to be altered.  To its credit, the NPVIC could likely end the impact 
of gerrymandering.  It would do so by simply ignoring any sparse 
or minority populations—an ironic example of the idiom “the 
medicine is worse than the disease.”  Another of the major 
concerns that the founding fathers had was that cliques could be 
raised to change the results of an election forcibly.253  This 
 
250. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
268-69, 284. 
251. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 286 (“There was one 
difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people.  The 
right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the 
latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.”). 
252. Jonah Goldberg, Column: Scrapping the Electoral College Is a Bad Idea, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/D4HC-P2GR] (suggesting intentional polarization 
as the driving force behind the NPVIC and that it encourages populist control of a “handful 
of large, highly urbanized states”); see also Curtis Gans, Why National Popular Vote Is a 
Bad Idea, HUFFPOST (updated Mar. 7, 2012), [https://perma.cc/5QMK-HQS9] (suggesting 
the NPVIC will “diminish voter turnout” and warning of the legitimacy challenges to an 
NPVIC election); Chris Stirewalt, The Electoral College Dodges Another Bullet, FOX (Jul. 
6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R2VS-FJ5S] (warning “a national popular election in a nation so 
vast and diverse would be a demagogue’s dream”).  
253. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268. 
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concern was in part mitigated by the geographical distance that 
existed between the electors in each State.254  
The NPVIC brings all the relevant electors/election officials 
into a significantly smaller geographic area and subjects them to 
the “great evil of cabal” associated with direct political 
pressure.255  In addition, the creation of a new election official 
who seemingly has unfettered control to report the election 
results256 likewise may establish cliques among these newly 
founded chief election officials.   
Regarding the competency of presidential candidates, this 
concern has been launched with increasing frequency in modern 
times.257  The NPVIC does not allow any enhanced observation 
or determination of a presidential candidate’s competency other 
than what is presently in place.  Thus, this concern is not better 
addressed after the enactment of the NPVIC.   
Finally, the NPVIC does not address the disenfranchisement 
that is already being alleged under the present election system.258  
While this could be mitigated as an ancillary concern of any 
election system (to be addressed more directly outside of election 
law), at least one alternative to the NPVIC, proposed later, does 
in fact address this concern.   
As a result, the NPVIC, while no better nor much worse than 
the current system in many ways, is almost assuredly not the best 
overall solution.  In addition to these specific and identifiable 
concerns the NPVIC either fails to address or potentially brings 
about, there exist other, more ambiguous sovereignty concerns 
upon the NPVIC’s adoption.  One such concern is that the erosion 
of the distinction between the States reduces the ability to “try 
 
254. Id. at 57, 509.  
255. Id.  
256. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
257. Miles Parks & Mark Katkov, What the 25th Amendment Says about Removing a 
Sitting President, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5LSN-N6TY]; 
Marianna Sotomayor & Mike Memoli, Joe Biden Releases Medical Assessment, Described 
as ‘Healthy, Vigorous’, NBC NEWS, [https://perma.cc/7CY8-QSV2] (Sept. 16, 2021, 2:41 
PM); Jeannie Suk Gersen, We May Need the Twenty-fifth Amendment If Trump Loses, THE 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2020), [https://perma.cc/UT95-4XQ8]. 
258. Block the Vote: Voter Suppression in 2020, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 3, 
2020), [https://perma.cc/SRD4-Z845]; How to Put an End to Voter Disenfranchisement, 
RUTGERS TODAY (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5VP2-N4HR]. 
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novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”259 
Given the general disdain that many Founders held for a 
national popular vote and the potential pitfalls of such a system 
that still exist today,260 there must be a highly persuasive reason 
for the present idea that this system is necessary.  The NPVIC’s 
proponents suggest that something must be done.  Regardless of 
why, their reasons should be addressed thoroughly and 
respectfully.  The section below attempts to provide more 
appropriate alternatives than the NPVIC.  
IV.  WHY DOES THE POPULAR VOTE MOVEMENT 
EXIST AND WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVES? 
It appears that the popular vote is aimed at reconciling the 
disparity between the outcome of an election and the outcome of 
the people’s desire.261  After all, it is a cornerstone in our 
Constitutional Republic that the will of the people is 
controlling.262  Additionally, the motivation of the NPVIC’s 
proponents may also be to broaden the focus of presidential 
campaigning.263  In achieving these goals, it has been proposed 
that the NPVIC is not an attempt to abolish the Electoral College 
writ large.  Instead, it is primarily concerned with eradicating the 
winner-take-all provisions that presently prevail across the 
Nation.264   
 
259. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-80 (1981); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
260. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
268-69, 284; see also supra Section III.B.2-3.  
261. See Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45 Presidents Came into Office Without Winning 
the National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/3E9R-JVW5] (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
262. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 405-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
263. How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE 
(Jun. 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZU27-GNXT]. 
264. Michael Gonchar & Nicole Daniels, Is the Electoral College a Problem? Does It 
Need to Be Fixed?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X8W3-HGTE]; see also 
Map of General-Election Campaign Events and TV Ad Spending by 2020 Presidential 
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An advocate of the NPVIC more immersed in the nuances 
might also suggest that it would eliminate the disparity in voting 
power between the citizens of States based on population 
differences (e.g., an occupant of California accounts for one vote 
out of tens of millions in a State that only controls roughly nine 
times the electoral votes of Arkansas, where a citizen accounts for 
one vote among a few million).265  This disparity is further 
exacerbated when comparing more disparate populations.  Under 
this argument the NPVIC would more accurately reflect the one 
person one vote standard. 
These motivations can be inferred from the direct words and 
publications of those that advocate for the NPVIC or similar 
national popular vote programs.266  Regarding the first concern, 
several articles have been published admonishing the Electoral 
College and discussing how the outcome of a particular election 
did not reflect the popular vote when another candidate “won the 
national popular vote by 2,868,518 votes.”267  Finally, regarding 
the broadening of presidential campaigns, the NPVIC’s 
proponents have said sullenly, “[t]he concentration of . . . 
campaign events in just a few battleground states is nothing new 
. . . .”268  It is advocated that the NPVIC will be the solution to all 
these problems and more.  
Now knowing the desires of those who advocate the NPVIC 
specifically, and more generally those that support some form of 
a popular vote, there must be a way to reconcile the Constitution’s 
commands while simultaneously reaching the desires of its 
 
Candidates, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/BE48-GN7Y] (last visited Jan. 4, 
2021) [hereinafter Map of General-Election Campaign Events] (blaming the winner-take-all 
laws for the lack of campaign diversity, among other qualms).  Interestingly enough, the very 
winner-take-all system the NPVIC allegedly loathes would likely be the inevitable outcome 
of the NPVIC, except at a nationwide, rather than a statewide, scale—just a few populous 
States would control the entire presidential outcome as opposed to a few densely populated 
counties. 
265. Distribution of Electoral Votes, THE U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., 
[https://perma.cc/6875-TQ37] (last updated Mar. 6, 2020). 
266. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 15, at 93-94 (“The Humphrey method, however, 
would have modified the exaggerated Electoral College majorities . . . [and] would heighten 
the need for [a] co-ordinated and widely distributed presidential campaign effort on a 
national basis.”); How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, supra note 263. 
267. Nate Silver Calculates that a 3-Million Lead Only Gives Biden a 46%, NAT’L 
POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/7NTG-AGKD] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 
268. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264. 
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opposition.  The systems proposed below also try to remedy the 
dangers of keeping the current system.   
A. Ranked Choice Voting 
Ranked-choice voting allows each present individual the 
opportunity to exercise his or her voting rights more than once.269  
This system is very similar to the way Iowa’s presidential DNC 
Caucuses are conducted.270  Because the Iowa caucus system is 
more developed, it will be the foundation for this section, and the 
Ranked Choice Voting System will be briefly discussed toward 
the end.  The political parties of Iowa determine the presidential 
caucus rules of that State.271  In the Iowa system, the voters will 
initially physically divide the room (or attempt to replicate this 
practice through technology) and locate themselves according to 
their desired candidate.272  Then, if that candidate does not receive 
a sufficient percentage of the total votes (ranging from 15-25%), 
that same voter can realign to his or her next most preferred 
candidate.273  This process is then used to select the political 
delegate to elect a primary candidate.274  
Transferring this system to a general presidential election 
would essentially entail the same process.  This process, however, 
is incompatible with the current electoral scheme, which only 
allots one vote per person.275  This is undoubtedly a significant 
obstacle for this proposed election method.  The only potential 
saving grace for this idea is that there is no explicit Constitutional 
mandate requiring one person one vote.276  Instead, the Supreme 
Court has simply interpreted the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments to require this.277  The Court also said 
that this interpretation’s main objective was to ensure “every 
 
269. See IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IOWA DELEGATION SELECTION PLAN 3 (2020).  
270. Compare id., with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 801 (2020).  
271. IOWA CODE § 43.1 (1973). 
272. IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, supra note 269. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 6. 
275. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
276. See generally U.S. CONST.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal 
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity).  
277. Gary, 372 U.S. at 381. 
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voter is equal to every other voter in his State[.]”278  Thus, if this 
method was universally available to all eligible voters and 
carefully crafted to avoid disparate voting power, there appears to 
be no violation.  This could also be likened to the runoff election 
procedures, which have been deemed to comply with the one 
person one vote mandate.279   
However, it is for this complication alone that this proposed 
system does not present a viable alternative to the Electoral 
College as it stands now.  Nevertheless, it is still a possible and 
popular280 contender to the NPVIC, and thus, States could 
potentially impose new laws in compliance with and recognition 
of this system.  Indeed, many States have already shown a desire 
to radically change the electoral system in their respective 
jurisdictions, as evidenced by the acceptance of the NPVIC and 
its originating legislation.281  
As previously stated, one State has adopted a general 
presidential election model that mirrors the Iowa caucus 
system.282  In Maine, as of November 2020, the candidates for 
president go through several rounds in the selection process.283  
After each round, the candidate with the smallest percentage of 
votes is removed from the running, and the next round begins.284  
This goes on until only two candidates remain, at which point the 
candidate with the most votes wins.285  Each eligible voter 
receives at least five ranks to place the candidates on the ballot 
 
278. Id. at 380. 
279. Minn. Voters All. v. Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn. 2009); Dudum v. 
Arntz 640 F.3d 1098, 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing runoffs, even when participation 
was restricted to only a few eligible voters, to prevail in the face of unequal voting power 
claims).  
280. See, e.g., Ranked Choice Voting, YANG2020, [https://perma.cc/866P-9ZLL] (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
281. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 
(2019); D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
282. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801 (2020). 
283. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-
A(2); Timeline of Ranked choice Voting in Maine, FAIR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/9TAV-
L65G] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (Maine’s ranked choice statutory scheme was adopted for 
State general elections in November 2016.  Upon expansion to federal elections in 2018, it 
faced a veto referendum petition, which suspended its implementation until it passed again 
on the November 2020 ballot).  
284.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2). 
285. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2). 
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(this can be expanded, but the minimum is five).286  Despite Rank 
Choice Voting already being unanimously ruled in violation of 
the Maine Constitution—because it violates the one person one 
vote rule expressly mandated within—it has, like a phoenix, or a 
cockroach, remained un-killable.287   
Additional complaints have been launched against Ranked 
Choice Voting Systems, aside from any constitutional complaints 
that could be made.288  These generally attack this system’s 
practical implementation.289  Many point to its implementation in 
the 2020 Iowa Democrat Primary as evidence that this system 
would be doomed from the beginning.290  Indeed, there is strong 
credibility in the argument that the infrastructure necessary for 
this system is far from available, and what we do have seems less 
than capable.  There is also the concern that an election system of 
this nature would all but disenfranchise a voter who did not have 
several hours to devote to an election.291  
Given the aforementioned constitutional attacks a Rank 
Choice Voting System would be subject to, as well as the practical 
drawbacks of such a system, it is difficult to imagine this system 
being able to reach the fundamental goals of any election system.  
It provides no greater access to presidential candidates than the 
current system, with the exception that in the distant future there 
may be more candidates to choose from.  As such, the people’s 
opportunity to meet a candidate may be slightly increased.  Again, 
this interaction would almost assuredly be brief and as 
 
286. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(4). 
287. See Op. of the Justs., 162 A.3d 188, 210-212 (Me. 2017). 
288. See, e.g., Maura Barrett & Ben Popken, How the Iowa Caucus Fell Apart and 
Tarnished the Vote, NBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NL8L-ZDKL]. 
289. See id.; Hollie Russon Gilman, The Democratic Party in Iowa Changes the 
Caucus Rules. There Could be Controversy, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/456E-FTRR] (“For instance, as my research finds, the wealthier, more 
educated and more able-bodied and -minded residents of Iowa are more likely to persuade 
their fellow caucus-goers.  Furthermore, participating in caucuses requires time and 
resources.  Even getting to the caucus—especially on a cold, snowy February night—can be 
challenging, skewing who shows up.  Particularly excluded are those with disabilities, non-
traditional work schedules and child-care responsibilities.  Moreover, the Iowa caucuses 
have not always appeared to be transparent.”). 
290. Sara Morrison, The Iowa Caucus Smartphone App Disaster, Explained, VOX 
(Feb. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9H76-MATC] (stating that “many precinct chairs didn’t use 
the app at all, citing difficulty downloading or using it”). 
291. Gilman, supra note 289. 
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analytically meaningless as the shaking of hands (or bumping of 
elbows) that occurs presently.  This system is also subject to 
manipulation simply by the inherent complexity.  In that same 
vein, this system’s trust and reliability have already been called 
into question,292 and there has yet to even be a substantial 
implementation of a Rank Choice Voting System. 
 Because of the uniqueness of a Rank Choice Voting System 
and similar election processes, it is difficult to determine how this 
would specifically reach the goals sought by the NPVIC.  That 
being said, thinking in the abstract, it would allow for a varied 
vote, with potentially lesser-known candidates having a larger 
constituency and greater potential to actually secure the 
presidency.  This system would also almost certainly broaden the 
scope of campaigns given its ability to divert attention from the 
two major political parties in the United States.  While there does 
not appear to be any numerical benefit to the voters’ desire 
compared to the election’s outcome, increased representation may 
nonetheless occur.  It would be procured by giving the voters 
more opportunities to elect nuanced candidates and, in turn, 
would require candidates to give more attention to secure States 
if they stand a chance at winning.  The electoral systems in place 
presently would largely remain unchanged (the Electoral College 
slate would still vote for the candidate who won the State’s 
popular vote).293  
As has been previously stated, this hypothetical alternative 
to the NPVIC is highly speculative at best.  The practical impact 
of using an Iowa caucus/Ranked Choice model in the general 
presidential election would be just as unpredictable and possibly 
illegal as the NPVIC.  However, this system has the distinct 
advantage of only requiring States to change their laws 
independently, which can be done according to the State’s powers 
highlighted in Chiafalo.294  Notably this means that no interstate 
compact is required.   
Because of this model’s ambiguity, it may best be retained 
only as a last resort.  The proceeding systems are far more 
 
292. See Barrett & Popken, supra note 288; Morrison, supra note 290; Gilman, supra 
note 289. 
293. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021). 
294. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020). 
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concrete and seemingly reach the same goals as the NPVIC, but 
through legal means. 
B. Proportional Electorate Systems 
There have been several proposals over time that could 
potentially reduce the discrepancy between the outcome of a 
State’s popular vote and the State’s allocation of electoral votes.  
Most of these systems incorporate some kind of proportional 
distribution of a State’s electoral votes based on each district’s 
popular vote.295  This section will specifically discuss the method 
employed by Nebraska as well as a new system coined by Eric T. 
Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball in their article, A More Perfect 
Electoral College: Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions 
Under the Twelfth Amendment.296   
Both of these propositions are defined by their rejection of 
the Winner Takes All (WTA) provision existing across most 
States.297  The WTA system requires all of a State’s Electoral 
College votes to go to the candidate who won a majority of the 
State’s popular vote.298  Instead, the Nebraska system allocates 
each congressional district’s electoral votes to the candidate that 
won the majority of the popular votes in that district.299  Then the 
electoral votes that extend from that State’s senate seats as 
opposed to their district/house of representative seats go to the 
State’s overall winner.300  
This electoral system has been criticized in large part for its 
susceptibility to gerrymandering.301  It is proposed that another 
electoral system, while similar in function, gets around many of 
the deficiencies in the Nebraska system.  This is the system 
developed by Eric T. Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball, called the 
Proportional Election Manner (PEM), where the State’s electoral 
votes are divided based on the percentage each candidate received 
 
295. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
296. Id. at 29. 
297. Id. at 25, 29. 
298. Id. at 20; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021). 
299. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2) (2015). 
300. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2). 
301. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 26. 
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in the State’s popular vote.302  When this results in a fraction of 
the electors, the number of electoral votes is rounded down to the 
nearest whole number, and the winner of the State’s popular 
election overall is awarded the remainder.303   
Both of these systems seek to meet the demands of the 
NPVIC in roughly the same way.  In each process, the WTA 
system is replaced with a proportional vote,304 and thus the 
people’s vote theoretically becomes more influential in 
determining who their electoral representative votes for. 
There is potential in both systems to alter the scope of 
presidential campaigning; however, the scope will not necessarily 
be broadened.  Instead, the focus will simply change from swing 
States to the States that employ these methods.  This can be 
evidenced by Nebraska’s present attention (and Maine’s 
historically, until the recent repulsion of this electoral system).305  
If every State of the Union were to adopt these same methods, the 
outcome would be similar to the NPVIC’s adoption in this regard.  
In other words, a candidate would likely invest campaign 
resources into swing districts or other highly populated areas 
instead of a variety of States.  The States adopting these solutions 
may see an increase in political importance or campaign coverage 
akin to swing States (assuming only a few States adopt these 
methods), but these proposed alternatives do not solve the 
problem of isolated campaign focus.  In addition to meeting the 
concerns the NPVIC seeks to address, these proportional systems 
account for some, but not all, of the underlying goals of any 
election system.  
For starters, they have no mechanism for providing the 
citizens increased interaction with presidential candidates aside 
from potentially broadening the campaign locations.  However, 
 
302. Id. at 29. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 25; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2). 
305. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264 (“The single visit 
to Nebraska and the 2 events to Maine were motivated by the fact that those states award 
electoral votes by congressional district.  Although the statewide result is not in doubt in 
either state, the 2nd congressional district of Nebraska (the Omaha area) and the 2nd 
congressional of Maine (the northern half of the state) were closely divided.  These campaign 
events were held in those particular districts, and the remainder of both states received no 
attention.”).  
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these systems adequately address the trust, reliability, and 
transparency issues to the same extent the present electoral 
system does.  Finally, they seemingly do not increase the risk of 
manipulating the electors or the risk of cliques forming.  It should 
also be noted there is likely a practical bar to the implementation 
of these systems.  That is, the dominant political party in each 
State has no incentive to relieve its State of its control, even 
partially, without the rest of the nation reciprocating the sacrifice.  
For this reason, it is unlikely these systems will slowly be tested 
State to State.  Furthermore, if adopted all at once, the problems 
of overuse would quickly become apparent.   
The systems above more or less maintain the current 
system’s status quo.  The changes they propose are substantial 
and could potentially alter presidential elections to address the 
grievances put forth by the NPVIC’s proponents; however, many 
of these changes would likely lose all effectiveness shortly after 
implementation due to overuse.  In addition, these proportional 
methods fail to stand toe-to-toe with yet another proposed 
method, as seen below.  
C. A Second Look at the Source Material 
Historically, each State’s presidential electors were the only 
names on a presidential ballot, if the people’s input was 
considered at all.306  The elected individuals would then convene 
in their States to select the president on behalf of their 
constituents.307  There was no decree contemplating who they 
were to vote for, nor any other mandatory indication except their 
 
306. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020) (“In some States, 
legislatures chose the electors; in others, ordinary voters did.”); Joel K. Goldstein, Electoral 
College: Is it a Dinosaur that Should be Abolished or a Last Bastion of Democracy?, 20 
UPDATE ON L. RELATED EDUC. 34, 35 (1996); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, 
Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 
906 (2017) (“Early in the nation’s history, the political parties provided ballots to voters to 
cast in the election, and those early presidential ballots simply listed the names of the 
presidential electors pledged to vote for that party’s presidential nominee.”); Rosenthal, 
supra note 240, at 4. 
307. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4 
(“[T]he electors are still chosen on a state-by-state basis, and in turn, they elect the 
President.”). 
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perceptions and beliefs about the candidates.308  Since that time, 
States have continually and gradually reduced the discretion that 
these electors have to cast their ballots.309  This process largely 
began after the election of 1800 when the electors sought to 
disrupt the election of the president by spreading their votes 
between the president and vice president evenly such that the 
decision would be controlled by Congress, which at the time was 
composed of the electors’ favorable political party.310  The 
Twelfth Amendment wholly remedied this problem.311  
Nevertheless, many statutory schemes are presently in place 
to prevent the exercise of discretion by electors.312  This includes 
the WTA system, which directs all electors to vote for the 
candidate who won the statewide popular vote,313 and faithless 
elector statutes, which bar deviation from the result of the 
statewide popular vote.314  The NPVIC is yet another attempt to 
regulate electoral discretion but instead favors the national 
popular vote outcome.315  
While electoral discretion is certainly not perfect, if it were 
to be allowed, as it once was—with the duly elected individuals 
having complete discretion316—it would likely meet many of the 
problems contemplated by the NPVIC, as well as other problems 
the NPVIC fails to address.  For starters, the implementation of a 
 
308. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4 (stating that the 
lack of electoral discretion common today “would have been unrecognizable to the 
Framers”).  But see Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323 (suggesting that upon the advent of political 
parties, the electors of each State were under a strong expectation “to support the party 
nominees”) (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 (1952)); Whittington, supra note 306, 
at 911 (comparing the Electoral College and Presidential Electors Clause to “Chekov’s gun” 
in the sense that it falsely indicates that electors are free to choose when they are in reality 
“instruments for expressing the will of those who selected them”).  
309. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 14. 
310. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2327. 
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (resolving the issue by dictating that if no candidate for 
the presidency received a majority of the votes, “then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of 
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.”). 
312. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 22-23.  
313. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (1969). 
314. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 
18002 (1994). 
315. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013). 
316. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 17.  But see 
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323; Whittington, supra note 306, at 911.  
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direct election of electors rather than a direct election of the 
president would allow for the electors of a person’s State to hold 
a more intimate connection with their constituents and to 
zealously advocate for the issues important to their people on the 
national stage.  This would reduce the number of people vying for 
a candidate’s attention by increasing focus on the chief issues in 
various States.   
Paired with the newfound impossibility of the WTA system, 
electors could make independent and informed value judgments 
about candidates.  In the process, this would also level the 
disparity of power between the single voters in each State.  
Functionally, that power would become indirect.  Electors would 
be free to vote for the candidate they feel is the most 
representative of their constituency after having a personal 
connection with the people, as well as the candidate.  This system 
allows the will of the people of every State to be explicitly heard 
through their liaison.  
Additionally, the votes, occurring at a far more local level 
than state or nationwide scale, will almost certainly be more 
representative of the elector chosen to represent a specific district.  
This proportional representation is precisely what the Nebraska 
and PEM methods seek to accomplish.317  This is because the 
people are voting as a specific district, which gives less of an 
opportunity for a densely populated area to overrule the rest of the 
State or the Nation. 
This system also has the potential to alleviate even the most 
sinister gerrymandering by requiring the independent thought of 
an elector.  No, the elector likely would not sway from his or her 
partisan affiliation, but the elector is at least subject to moral 
accountability.  This system also reduces the incentive to 
gerrymander in the first place.  Even a partisan sweep (occurring 
when every elector is from the same political party) cannot ensure 
a statewide victory for a single candidate, and the majority is no 
longer dispositive of the entire State’s electors. 
Likewise, a presidential candidate’s campaigning will be 
broadened, albeit not geographically, but rather by the specific 
and targeted issues raised by the electors representing the entire 
 
317. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
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United States.  The presidential candidates would no longer have 
to campaign or rally to mass crowds of thousands of people, 
greeting only ten or so before being shuffled away.  Instead, a 
candidate could sit down with 538 people or less throughout a 
campaign, with each person chosen to be the best representative 
of their community’s interests.  Likely to be a televised event, this 
would almost assuredly be more representative of a candidate’s 
actual capacity compared to a candidate addressing a partisan 
crowd chanting their name or waving their flags.  While the 
electoral representative would undoubtedly be as partisan as the 
populations he or she represents, the decreased number of people 
would give the candidate time to address opposing views in an 
actual conversation instead of merely spouting the same rhetoric 
to a different crowd.  
The American people commonly appoint representatives to 
control substantial aspects of their lives, including but not limited 
to a person’s literal life and death.  To think that presidential 
electors should be treated any differently is to ignore the 
foundations of the United States and to laugh in the face of the 
men and women who already see to it that the rights of the people 
reign eternal.  
The potential adoption of this plan, it should also be noted, 
is more likely than any other proposal.  This is because the 
adopting State’s political party does not need to cede its control.  
The electors, now directly chosen by the people, will likely have 
similar, if not the same, partisan affiliations as they did before 
adoption.  The difference is that they are no longer bound in the 
same way they were before.  It is in no way realistic to expect 
members of a political party to uniformly abandon said party, 
except in the most abhorrent of circumstances.  They will likely 
vote along the same partisan lines, but now for the candidate most 
acutely after their own district’s heart.  As a result, there is not the 
same incentive to shy away from this legislation by the dominant 
political party as there is with the other potential electoral 
systems.  Likewise, to those States seeking to avoid the seemingly 
inevitable NPVIC, this system presents a viable alternative.  
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CONCLUSION 
The national popular vote movement and, more specifically, 
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been gaining 
attention.318  It likely will continue to gain attention and support 
in the years following this Comment.  The NPVIC requires 
congressional approval, which it has yet to receive, if it is 
constitutionally permissible.319  However, even if congressional 
approval is tendered, it is unlikely that the compact can be 
sustained.320  The States could challenge the federal government 
and the compact under the notion that the States have a right to 
participate in the federal election process.321  Under the precedent 
set by the Supreme Court in Garcia and other cases, this right is 
evidenced by the structure of the Constitution and the explicit 
federalism concerns stated within.322  This view is also compliant 
with the historical teachings recorded at the Nation’s inception.323  
Additionally, there are practical social and political reasons not to 
implement the NPVIC or a similar election method.324  
Despite the NPVIC’s many faults, the motivation behind it 
is presumptively virtuous.325  As a result, alternative methods to 
reach the same goals have been proposed.326  Two of the proposed 
methods are better suited, right off the bat, for use in the United 
States, given their possible compliance with the Constitution.327  
With a third likely to avoid Constitutional preclusion until it is in 
practice.  However, there are many other differences between the 
alternatives and the NPVIC.   
 
318. Id. at 28. 
319. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 201; see also supra Part II and 
accompanying text. 
320. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text. 
321. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Alabama v. Arizona, 291 
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934); see also supra Section III.A. and accompanying text. 
322. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text. 
323. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text. 
324. See supra Section III.B.2. and accompanying text. 
325. See supra Part IV and accompanying text; Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45 
Presidents Came into Office Without Winning the National Popular Vote, supra note 261. 
326. See supra Sections IV.A-C. and accompanying text. 
327. See generally U.S. CONST; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal 
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity); Tollar 
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
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Under the Rank Choice proposal, providing variety in 
campaigning and better representation would be achieved.  That 
being said, this method is undeniably speculative, despite the 
minimal changes to state law that would be required for 
implementation.  Proportional systems, of varying degree and 
kind, all adopt proportional representation of the Electoral 
College’s votes and seemingly meet many of the proposed goals.  
However, they are mainly effective only when used by a few 
States.  In other areas, they merely maintain the system, and all 
its faults, in place today.   
Finally, a return to the original method of presidential 
elections would provide the people the most representation, 
would not require a significant change in existing laws, could be 
implemented effectively throughout the nation, and would secure 
the propriety of elections and the will of the people for centuries 
to come.  If we are to truly accept that some truths are self-evident, 
we should strongly consider an election system that derives from 
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THE HIGH PRICE OF POVERTY IN 
ARKANSAS’S COURTS: RETHINKING THE 
UTILITY OF MUNICIPAL FINES AND FEES 
Madison Miller* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The opposite of poverty is not wealth.  It is justice.  
— Bryan Stevenson, Esq.1 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, a “trail of tax cuts” led to budget 
shortfalls and revenue gaps throughout the United States.2  These 
budgetary problems resulted in many cities and towns shifting 
their burden of funding courts and the justice system at large “to 
the ‘users’ of the courts, including those least equipped to pay.”3  
Although “jailing an indigent person for a fine-only, low-level 
offense is unconstitutional,” it is still an ongoing practice in many 
states, including Arkansas.4  In 1995, Arkansas passed new 
legislation to govern its circuit courts’ collection and enforcement 
of fines and fees.5  One subsection of this chapter explicitly 
provides that the “court shall inquire into the defendant’s ability 
to pay and shall make a determination of the defendant’s financial 
 
        * J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Arkansas Law 
Notes Editor for the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author thanks Associate Dean 
Tiffany Murphy of the University of Arkansas School of Law for her guidance and advice 
in writing this Comment.  The author also thanks David Sachar for his invaluable insight into 
Arkansas’s Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission.  The author thanks the Criminal 
Justice Project at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights for its unrelenting efforts to 
remedy this injustice and for igniting her passion for this cause.  The author would also like 
to thank her family for their lifelong support in her educational endeavors, and Tyler for his 
unwavering encouragement and support.   
        1. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 
IN AMERICA xix (2017) (emphasis added). 
2. Id. at xv.  
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 4. 
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-701 to 712 (1995). 
4 MILLER.MAN.FIN. COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:50 PM 
548 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
ability to pay the fine.”6  Although this procedural safety net is 
embedded in the statute, it has not served its intended purpose for 
several reasons.   
A large part of the problem stems from courts’ partial or, in 
many cases, complete neglect of this mandated analysis.7  One 
contributing factor is that “the statute does not enumerate types of 
information to be considered before making an ability to pay 
determination.”8  Therefore, many judges fail to conduct a truly 
meaningful analysis when determining an individual’s realistic 
ability to pay.  In Arkansas, the law mandates an inquiry into 
whether the person can show that his or her failure to pay was not 
“purposeful” or a result of a lack of “good-faith effort” before 
imposing jail time.9  However, in practice, “the entire inquiry 
[may] rest[] on a judge’s observations of whether defendants 
possess random items, such as cigarettes, smart phones, or brand 
name clothing.”10  There are endless examples of people whose 
struggles illuminate the real-world effects of these arbitrary 
determinations.   
Kimberly Snodgrass, a named plaintiff in Mahoney v. 
Derrick,11 was convicted for failure to pay ten separate times over 
four years because she could not afford the monthly payments the 
judge imposed.12  However, the presiding judge did not conduct 
the requisite evaluation of Kimberly’s ability to pay, as is required 
by Arkansas law,13 even though “[a]ll but one of her jail records 
indicate[d] she was unemployed at the time of arrest.”14  Upon 
each conviction, she endured up to thirty days in jail, as well as 
 
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (emphasis added).  
7. MYESHA BRADEN ET AL., LAWS.’ COMM. FOR CIV. RTS UNDER L., TOO POOR TO 
PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES POVERTY & MASS 
INCARCERATION 9 (2019), [https://perma.cc/AU7R-C2E9].  
8. Id. at 10. 
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-703. 
10. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 
11. See generally Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 12-13, 
Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 60CV-18-5616 (Aug. 9, 2018).  Mahoney v. Derrick is a class 
action lawsuit that was filed against a White County District Court Judge in an effort to put 
an end to his unlawful behavior in his assessment of fines and fees.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 82-89.  
12. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (1995).  
14. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 28. 
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additional charges between $450.00 and $670.00 tacked onto her 
existing outstanding debt.15  Aside from added charges, each 
payment made towards an outstanding debt’s principal balance 
has a portion deducted as an administrative interest fee.16  As a 
result of her repeated incarceration and mounting debt, Kimberly 
“lost two jobs, her driver’s license has been suspended multiple 
times, and she has lost housing four times; each time losing much 
of what she and her children owned.”17   
Tragically, Kimberly’s story is not unique.  Tina Phares, then 
a forty-seven-year-old mother and former accounts manager with 
an associate degree, had a similarly disastrous experience with the 
Arkansas courts.18  Tina’s story began when she turned to drugs 
after a series of personal tragedies, including the deaths of her 
father and toddler son, an accident that left her husband 
“hospitalized [and] in an induced coma for a year,” and a 
tumultuous divorce.19  Over the subsequent years, before entering 
a treatment program in 2017, she was “convicted of failure to pay 
nine times and sentenced to 30 days in jail seven times.”20  At one 
point, the judge issued an arrest warrant for failure to pay “less 
than [a] month after she was released on two consecutive 30-day[] 
sentences for convictions of failure to pay[,]”21 allowing her 
almost no time to get back on her feet and earn an income.   
While Tina has made personal strides, such as becoming 
drug-free and, in 2018, “bringing home her first paycheck since 
her son died[,]” her life and personal progress remain stagnated 
by the over $15,000 in debt she owes to the court.22  Like in 
Kimberly’s case, there was no inquiry conducted to determine 
Tina’s ability to pay the fines and fees levied against her.23  Had 
 
15. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that, on average, Kimberly has 
spent “one of every three days in the White County Detention Center” since the time of her 
first arrest in September 2014). 
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017). 
17. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 




21. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 20. 
22. Personal Narrative: Tina Marie, supra note 18.   
23. Id. 
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the proper examination been performed, the judge likely would 
have recognized the personal hardships, battle with addiction, and 
lack of employment and financial resources that impeded Tina’s 
ability to pay.  Moreover, Tina might have never spent time in 
jail, and she certainly would not have been burdened with 
thousands of dollars in debt (totaling approximately $15,000 in 
2018).24  
Because of the unlawful actions of one judge, both Kimberly 
and Tina were jailed on failure to pay warrants for more than 150 
days over a three-to-four-year period, and both have incurred 
additional debt of “between $4,000 and $5,000 in fines and costs 
for the same charges.”25  These two first-hand accounts are drops 
in the bucket of the endless stories of personal and financial ruin 
brought on by the courts.26  Thousands of Arkansans remain 
bogged down by outrageous mounting debt stemming from 
flagrant disregard for the law and Arkansas’s Constitution.27  
Many people have spent time in prison, lost jobs, missed 
opportunities for personal and financial growth, and some have 
even lost custody of their children because of their inability to 
afford the debt imposed on them by Arkansas courts.28   
While the initial response is oftentimes, “don’t do the crime 
if you can’t do the time,” the goal of this Comment is to illustrate 
how the issue is much more complex than a simple form of 
appropriate retribution or punishment.  Many people find 
themselves in this treacherous cycle due to low-level civil 
offenses, such as a single traffic ticket or a minor housing code 
violation.29  These are not felony convictions; many times, these 
are not even infractions that carry with them more than a fine, 
much less jail time.  The preamble to the United States 
Constitution expressly references the goals of “establish[ing] 
 
24. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 10. 
25. Id. at 28. 
26. See generally NEIL SEALY ET AL., ARK. CMTY. INST., CAN’T WIN FOR LOSING: 
HOW INSTITUTIONS & POLICIES KEEP ARKANSANS IN DEBT 11-12 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/PNA8-YUD7].  
27. See generally id. 
28. See, e.g., Personal Narrative: Nikita, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/NS9T-7MH7].  
29. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6; see also SEALY ET AL., supra note 26, at 11-12.   
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Justice, . . . promot[ing] the general Welfare, and secur[ing] the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”30  This 
Comment will argue that until we remedy these grave injustices, 
inflicted primarily upon low-income Arkansans, we are not living 
up to these ideals.   
While the issue is complex, the premise is simple.  It is 
wrong to jail poor people or add hundreds of dollars at a time to 
the principal of their debt solely because they cannot afford to 
pay, and it should not be happening in the State of Arkansas.  The 
Arkansas statutes and United States Supreme Court cases31 that 
address this issue have not served their intended purpose of 
safeguarding constitutional rights.  Therefore, Arkansas should 
make a concerted effort to end this unconstitutional practice that 
is a waste of taxpayer dollars, with the cost of incarceration 
typically exceeding the amount in dispute.32  The Arkansas 
Legislature should address this urgent problem by adding 
specificity to the existing statute in the form of factors a judge 
must consider when making an ability-to-pay determination.   
Additionally, community members and non-profit 
organizations should continue pushing for reform through 
litigation.  To enact real change, there must be accountability.  
Given the obstacle of judicial immunity in litigation, plaintiffs, 
lawyers, and concerned citizens alike should utilize Arkansas’s 
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (“JDDC”) to 
report repeat-offender judges and ensure that unethical or 
unlawful behavior does not go unpunished.  Arkansas should 
prioritize this effort and establish a uniform system to guarantee 
equal protection under the law for its citizens and promote 
confidence in its courts and the judiciary.  Furthermore, many 
individuals facing unlawful treatment do not have the time, 
connections, or resources to continue litigating a case for years 
through proceedings and appeals.  While courts can serve as an 
 
30. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
31. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that “[t]here can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”); see also 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).  
32. MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 5 (2019), [https://perma.cc/YE9N-AR3E]. 
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effective mechanism for plaintiffs, we should not accept the 
notion that the existence of courts as an avenue for recourse 
somehow negates the serious nature of judges flouting the law. 
This Comment will proceed with four main parts.  Part II 
will provide background on the subject matter to furnish a 
foundational understanding of the issue.  Part III will explain how 
the municipal fines and fees system functions in Arkansas.  Part 
IV will propose possible solutions and practical remedies that, if 
utilized, could generate more positive outcomes for Arkansas’s 
local and municipal governments and their citizens.  Finally, Part 
V concludes that making meaningful reforms in this area is both 
morally and economically imperative.  
II.  BACKGROUND: THE “FINES AND FEES” 
CONUNDRUM 
For at least two decades, the new criminalization of poverty 
crept into communities large and small, driven by misbegotten 
law enforcement politics and the search for revenue, but with 
little public attention.33 
 
“A debtors’ prison is any prison, jail, or other detention 
facility in which people are incarcerated for their inability, 
refusal, or failure to pay debt.”34  The federal government 
outlawed debtors’ prisons in 1833.35  However, it was not until a 
series of cases between 1970 and 1983 that the Supreme Court 
established the unconstitutionality of incarcerating people simply 
because they cannot afford to pay fines and fees that the State has 
levied upon them.36  The Court’s opinion in Bearden v. Georgia 
 
33. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xviii. 
34. Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 
24, 2015, 7:15 AM), [https://perma.cc/X7N3-3KMY].   
35. Id.   
36. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 235, 240-41 (establishing that the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated when a defendant is imprisoned for an amount of time exceeding the 
statutory maximum on the basis of an inability to pay a fine or court costs); Tate, 401 U.S. 
at 397 (opining that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when a crime is punishable only 
by fine for those who can afford to pay it, but by prison for those who cannot); Bearden, 461 
U.S. at 668 (holding that incarcerating an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine violates 
the Equal Protection Clause unless the defendant has the financial means to pay, and thus, 
nonpayment is willful).  
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was, and remains, arguably the most consequential case on this 
issue.37  Although Bearden established that courts must conduct 
an analysis into a defendant’s ability to pay and must not imprison 
him or her for failure to pay unless the failure was willful, the 
opinion did not give explicit instruction regarding what exactly 
the Court meant by “willfully refused to pay.”38   
Because of this lack of clarity, municipal judges frequently 
ignore state law and the standard set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Bearden.39  One consequence of this initial failure to conduct a 
meaningful analysis of an individual’s ability to pay is that, in 
many cases, the individual is then placed on a payment plan with 
the court that he or she may not be able to keep up with.  As a 
result, if an individual defaults on their payment plan and the 
judge issues a bench warrant for his or her arrest, “Bearden 
becomes irrelevant”40 because the individual’s failure to pay 
“constitutes criminal contempt, which allows incarceration as 
well as further fines and fees.”41  Once a person commits a “crime 
that allows jailing,” such as contempt, “there is no protection for 
indigence.”42  In turn, this creates a loophole that results in 
punishing people for their inability to pay.43  
The truth is, while they are not referred to as “debtors’ 
prisons” by name, local jails across the country are full of people 
incarcerated based upon their inability to pay fines and fees.44  
The American Action Forum estimates that roughly “10 million 
 
37. See generally EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
38. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
39. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
40. Id. at 6. 
41. Id. at 5. 
42. Id. at 6. 
43. Cf. Cortney E. Lollar, Eliminating the Criminal Debt Exception for Debtors’ 
Prisons, 98 N.C. L. REV. 427, 434 (2020) (stating that while “[a] person who is incarcerated 
because she does not have the ability to pay a [] legal [financial] obligation might well be 
deterred from engaging in any further criminal activity, but when the failure to pay in and of 
itself becomes criminal activity justifying further incarceration, the deterrence value is 
difficult to ascertain”).   
44. Tara O’Neill Hayes & Margaret Barnhorst, Incarceration and Poverty in the 
United States, AM. ACTION F. (June 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/97HP-MDYF]; see also 
Lollar, supra note 43, at 434-35 (arguing that “courts and legislators should eliminate 
incarceration for the nonpayment of” legal financial obligations because “[s]ufficient 
mechanisms are already in place for those who have assets but choose not to disgorge 
them[,]” such as property seizure and wage garnishment).  
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people owe $50 billion in legal fees, fines, and penalties” in the 
United States.45  Despite their legal obligation to do so, “many 
courts refuse to consider a person’s financial condition” when 
imposing fines and fees and “at times[,] reject attempts to explain 
dire financial circumstances such as homelessness, the needs of 
dependent children, and the like by explicitly stating that [court-
imposed] debt must take priority over such concerns.”46 
While fines, imposed at the time of conviction, are intended 
to serve the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence, fees, on 
the contrary, “are intended to raise revenue” and often “bear no 
relation to the offense committed.”47  Arkansas’s Constitution 
specifically states that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt 
in any civil action . . . unless in cases of fraud.”48  Additionally, if 
a “defendant claims an inability to pay [a] fine, the court shall 
inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay and shall make a 
determination of the defendant’s financial ability to pay the 
fine.”49  If an individual elects to pay a fine in installments, there 
is an added fee (essentially an interest charge) deducted from his 
or her payment each month.50  These additional fees prolong the 
amount of time it takes to pay off the debt, allowing the 
municipality to rake in extra revenue and profit at the expense of 
its community’s most vulnerable members. 
Further, a missed payment can wreak havoc on a person’s 
life in endless ways.  Some judges in Arkansas will revoke the 
person’s driver’s license and registration as punishment, despite 
not having the authority to do so.51  This unlawful yet pervasive 
 
45. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44 (adding that roughly 5,000 people in the United 
States are incarcerated because they are unable to afford release).   
46. Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ 
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 59 (2018) (detailing the account of one father of four who has 
had to prioritize paying court debt over paying his electricity bill, buying his child a winter 
coat, and providing food and shelter for his family, lamenting that “[i]t doesn’t matter what 
[his] family suffers, so long as the court gets paid”).  
47. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6. 
48. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 16. 
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(a)(5)(A) (1995) (emphasis added). 
50. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017).  
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-402 (2021) (granting the Department of Finance and 
Administration’s Office of Driver Services complete authority over administering laws 
pertaining to suspension and revocation of driver’s licenses); BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 2. 
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practice is counterproductive, as many people, particularly those 
in rural areas of Arkansas, do not have adequate access to public 
transportation.52  The lack of access to transportation coupled 
with a suspended license may cause a person to lose their job, 
further hindering their ability to pay off their debt.53 
While non-profits like the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law (“Lawyers’ Committee”) and the American 
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) have made litigating these “fines 
and fees” cases a priority, another available avenue of recourse is 
reporting repeat-offender judges to the Judicial Discipline and 
Disability Commission in Arkansas (“JDDC”).54  Arkansans 
adopted a constitutional amendment establishing this commission 
in November 1988,55 which “investigates and may take 
disciplinary action or, in the most serious cases, recommend to 
the Arkansas Supreme Court that it impose discipline upon a 
judge whose actions are found to be a violation of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.”56   
There are several possible disciplinary remedies that the 
Commission may recommend.  However, in the most serious 
cases, “the [Arkansas] Supreme Court has the power to suspend, 
remove or involuntarily retire or censure judges based on the 
Commission’s recommendation.”57  In less serious cases, the 
Commission acts independently to mandate professional 
counseling and issue public admonishments, reprimands, or 
censures to judges who have violated the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.58  This process is worthwhile because it puts the judge 
on notice of his or her misconduct.  Additionally, as public record, 
 
52. Rayla Bellis, More Than One Million Households Without a Car in Rural America 
Need Better Transit, T4AMERICA BLOG (May 15, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X33T-KNF3]; 
BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
53. See BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
54. See Press Release, Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, Letter of 
Admonishment (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/SX78-MJ3F] (publicly admonishing 
District Court Judge Keith Blackman of Craighead County for his practice of exacting illegal 
fees on certain defendants “for changing a plea from ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty[,]’” and formally 
putting Judge Blackman on notice that this practice was unlawful).  
55. See ARK. CONST. amend. 66.  
56. About the Commission, JUD. DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY COMM’N, 
[https://perma.cc/3G3Q-7WAH] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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it may deter other judges from similar actions, resulting in 
increased judicial accountability and incentivizing judges to 
adhere to Arkansas’s laws and Constitution.  
Making these reforms would most certainly benefit indigent 
Arkansans, but the State’s population as a whole would reap 
positive benefits as well.  A 2020 study conducted by the Center 
for American Progress found that 16.2% of Arkansans live in 
poverty, with African Americans accounting for the largest 
percentage of that group at 27.1%.59  This indicator ranks 
Arkansas at 47th out of the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
in overall poverty.60   
The criminal justice system greatly depletes Arkansans’ tax 
dollars.  Arkansas has seventy-five counties, each with a county 
jail.61  In 2018, Arkansas’s incarceration rate was 589 per 100,000 
residents, far surpassing 2018’s national average of 374 per 
100,000 residents.62  Over the last forty years, Arkansas’s prison 
population has continued to increase steadily, skyrocketing from 
2,911 in 1980, to 11,851 in 2000, to 17,713 in 2019.63  These 
numbers do not even include the jail population in Arkansas’s 
county jails, totaling 8,610 in 2013.64  Sebastian County, the 
fourth largest county in Arkansas, proposed a county budget for 
the year 2020 with the jail budget listed at $6,774,888, “a 5.8% 
increase from the total jail budget from 2019[,]” consuming a 
quarter of the proposed general fund budget, “making the jail the 
highest-funded department in the general fund.”65 
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “almost every 
state has increased criminal and civil court fees or added new 
 
59. Arkansas 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/C2UC-EX85] (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2021).  
60. Overall Poverty 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/Z57Z-9WJG] 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
61. Arkansas 2018, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/GXU2-J9P6] (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2021).  
62. Id.; 2018 National Averages, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/38QJ-
B6UF] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021). 
63. State-by-State Data: Prison Population Over Time, SENT’G PROJECT, 
[https://perma.cc/8D2J-YRV3] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).  
64. Id. 
65. Thomas Saccente, Proposed ‘20 budget for Arkansas Jail Grows, ARK. ONLINE 
(Oct. 20, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PJJ3-6JB9].  
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ones” since 2008 as a way to increase revenue.66  However, the 
Brennan Center’s report explains in detail just how inefficient this 
practice is.  For instance, the report points out that not only does 
jailing people who are unable to pay the fines and fees imposed 
on them fail to generate revenue, but it also comes at a high cost, 
“sometimes as much as 115 percent” more than the outstanding 
amount.67  The imposition of fines and court costs provides more 
than 20% of the revenue for “nearly half of local governments.”68  
Every state in the nation is squandering money it could invest in 
infrastructure, better public schools, and improved public 
health.69  Instead, it is invested in jailing individuals for low-level 
offenses, including failure to pay court fines and fees.70  Worse 
yet, jailing an individual only further handicaps their ability to 
pay their legal financial obligations, and therefore, is a lose-lose 
situation for all parties involved.  
III.  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN 
ARKANSAS 
There are a variety of scenarios around the country, but they 
all add up to the same thing:  prosecuting people for low-level 
offenses, squeezing them for money, and jailing them if they miss 
payments, in a cruel game of “pay or stay.”71 
 
Because the United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
jailing an indigent individual for failure to pay is 
 
66. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6. 
67. Id. at 5 (additionally, the report points out that the actual costs are even higher than 
the estimated amounts because many of the costs associated with the debt collection are 
unascertainable).  
68. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44. 
69. See MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5, 9; Christopher Ingram, The States That 
Spend More Money on Prisoners Than College Students, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/99CD-M7KX]. 
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9; see also 
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/KD5K-QB96]; see generally Terry-Ann 
Craigie et al., Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the 
Criminal Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/7N2R-NBT3]. 
71. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9. 
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unconstitutional,72 upholding this ruling should be relatively 
simple.  However, Bearden’s language that a failure to pay must 
be “willful” for incarceration to be an appropriate remedy73 has 
left lower courts with too much discretion in determining what 
exactly “willful” means.  In 2009, the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
clearly stated that when a defendant violates the terms of their 
sentence in the form of a failure to pay, “the State has the burden 
of proving that the failure to pay restitution was inexcusable.”74  
However, once the State presents that evidence, “the defendant 
has the burden of presenting some reasonable excuse for his 
failure to pay.”75   
In Jordan v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that 
“[a] defendant’s failure to make bona fide efforts to seek 
employment or to borrow money to pay restitution may justify 
imprisonment.”76  While seeking employment seems reasonable, 
the suggestion that someone may go to jail because they have not 
made “bona fide efforts” to borrow money from people in their 
life is not reasonable and is entirely too subjective.  Additionally, 
borrowing money would place the person in the same position of 
owing money to someone or something—keeping them indebted.  
Arkansas law mandates that in determining the method of 
payment of restitution, the court take into account:  
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden 
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to 
another obligation of the defendant;  
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the 
court; and  
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment 
of restitution and the method of payment.77   
While this may sound like “the bases are covered,” what is 
happening in practice is an entirely different story. 
 
72. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1983). 
73. Id. at 668. 
74. Beebe v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 113, at 2, 303 S.W.3d 89, 90.   
75. Id. 
76. 327 Ark. 117, 122, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1997).  
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015).  
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One would be hard-pressed to find a better example of this 
statute’s inefficacy than the courtroom of one White County 
District Judge.78  During his 2016 campaign, the judge was quoted 
in the Searcy Daily Citizen admitting, “I know my fines are a lot 
higher [than other judges] . . . I have a policy:  Stay out of trouble 
for four years . . . Make your monthly payments . . . If they can 
do that for four years, they can do it for the rest of their lives.”79  
Further, he proceeds by saying, “I try to hammer them at the front 
end and make them want to change, then I give them incentive.”80  
One of the many issues with this approach is that his self-
proclaimed “zero tolerance” policy81 is outside of his purview as 
a judge.   
Court filings in Mahoney v. Derrick—the class action 
lawsuit brought against the judge—further outline his behavior, 
asserting that the judge “routinely sentences individuals 
convicted of failure to pay to twice the length of jail time as those 
convicted of the most serious misdemeanors under State law.  He 
does not credit the jail time against their debt; instead, the jail time 
is in addition to new debt imposed.”82  The Complaint goes on to 
allege not only that “[t]housands of individuals currently owe 
debt in [the judge’s] courts[,]” but also that he has “jailed some 
[individuals] while they live[d] in tents or shelters.”83   
The judge confirmed in a deposition that he issues arrest 
warrants and jails individuals who miss a single payment with no 
pre-arrest determination of “whether that person failed to make 
their fine payments knowingly and willfully.”84  Further, he 
concedes to his failure to act in accordance with the Arkansas 
Fines Collection Law, stating that he does not consider an 
individual’s ability to pay at sentencing, and does not consider 
 
78. See Alan Pyke, A Judge in Arkansas Makes $147,000 a Year for Turning Poor 
People into Indentured Servants, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 9, 2018, 3:27 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/6BB6-ZJZN].  
79. Id. 
80. Id. (it is unclear what exactly this “incentive” is). 
81. Max Brantley, New Lawsuit on ‘Debtor Prison’ Practices in White County 
UPDATE, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4JBP-6TKZ].  
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
84. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Mahoney 
v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Aug. 3, 2020).  
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“whether the $100 per month payment plan he imposes causes a 
severe and undue hardship on that person or his or her 
dependents.”85 
Because of the position of trust and authority that judges 
occupy in our society, the very least the public should expect them 
to do is follow and uphold the law.  One might think that when 
such disregard for the law is exposed, the thousands of people 
who have faced financial ruin as a result of the injustice would 
have their debts forgiven, or at least receive some sort of 
compensation.  However, that is not the case.  The Circuit Court 
of White County granted summary judgment for the defendant 
judge in Mahoney based on his entitlement to “absolute judicial 
immunity.”86  The plaintiffs got nothing.87  However, even if the 
court had ruled in their favor, the tens of thousands of dollars in 
debt that they collectively owe to the judge’s courts would have 
remained unsettled, and they would not have received any 
compensation.88  Because the plaintiffs only sought declaratory 
relief, a court order would have simply mandated that the judge 
modify his actions to accord with Arkansas’s laws when imposing 
and enforcing the collection of fines and fees.89  
Such an outcome is a crushing blow to indigent people’s 
quest for justice in Arkansas and across the country.  When a 
judge acknowledges under oath that he engages in practices that 
violate state law, as well as numerous rulings set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court with impunity, that should be 
concerning.  The egregious and ongoing nature of the judge’s 
practices met with the outcome of this case leaves only one 
conclusion:  there must be a new route to recourse for indigent 
Arkansans.   
 
85. Id. 
86. Order and Judgment at 4, Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Dec. 30, 2020).  
87. Id.  
88. This is because the plaintiffs were seeking declaratory relief, which “refers to a 
court’s judgment stating the rights of parties without ordering any specific action or listing 
awards for damages.”  Declaratory Relief, CORNELL L. SCH. (June 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/Y9KQ-T8TV].  
89. See id. 
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In its 1998 opinion in Robinson v. Langdon,90 the Arkansas 
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test 
for judicial immunity articulated in Cleavinger v. Saxner.91  This 
test articulates six factors for consideration: 
(1) the need to assure that the individual can perform his 
functions without harassment or intimidation;  
(2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for 
private damages actions as a means of controlling 
unconstitutional conduct;  
(3) insulation from political influence;  
(4) the importance of precedent;  
(5) the adversary nature of the process; and  
(6) the correctability of error on appeal. 92   
The Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers further elaborates on 
this concept, noting that “[t]his immunity applies even when a 
judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[,]” and that 
“[t]he rationale . . . is not to protect or benefit malicious or corrupt 
judges, but to benefit the public, whose interest it is that judges 
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence 
and without fear of consequences.”93  
While some of these justifications sound sensible when 
assessed at face value, the rationale that failing to punish judicial 
wrongdoing is somehow to the community’s benefit is an 
argument that holds little weight when looking at an example like 
the Mahoney case.  First, a judge’s “errors” are not always errors 
which an appeal could remedy.94  Second, when a judge is not 
exactly “perform[ing] his functions”95 in an ethical way, instead 
of protecting him as the hypothetical target of harassment or 
intimidation, the courts should prioritize the public’s best interest.  
Courts should not ignore the ways in which the judge violated his 
 
90. 333 Ark. 662, 670, 970 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1998). 
91. 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985).  
92. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296. 
93. 3 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 9:21 
(2020-2021 ed.).   
94. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89; see also Declaratory Relief, supra note 
88. 
95. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296. 
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oath of office and ultimately ensured members of his community 
stayed intrenched in poverty for years.96   
What started as a “zero-tolerance” policy ultimately resulted 
in a pattern of unconstitutional failures to conduct inquiries into 
individuals’ ability to pay, incarcerating many of those 
individuals when they could not pay, and continuing to levy 
additional fines and fees upon them for years.97  Many Arkansans 
will never financially or emotionally recover from their 
entanglement in this system, and granting the judge absolute 
judicial immunity does not protect the interests of Arkansas’s 
citizens.   
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Mahoney were not seeking 
monetary damages.98  Therefore, allowing the doctrine of judicial 
immunity to bar the imposition of declaratory relief to stop 
unlawful behavior—with no monetary damages at stake as a 
possible remedy—seems rather ludicrous.  While the argument 
that the judicial immunity doctrine furthers the public interest 
because “judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences”99 certainly 
makes sense in some situations, this doctrine must be narrowed, 
clarified, and reformed for its stated policy objectives to function 
as intended.   
Judicial immunity should not serve as a complete barrier to 
justice for individuals treated in an antithetical way to that which 
most Arkansans would deem ethical, appropriate, or deserving of 
a position of power and respect.  Furthermore, a doctrine created 
to alleviate judges from “fear of consequences” might not serve 
the public’s best interest.100  Instead, establishing a doctrine that 
provides judges with reasonable protection from suit while still 
preserving a strong mechanism for accountability and the 
imposition of appropriate consequences would be more suitable.  
Judges swear an oath to uphold our state laws and constitution, 
 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.  
97. See Matthew Martinez, Arkansas judge throws defendants ‘too poor to pay’ in 
‘debtors’ prison,’ lawsuit says, Fort Worth Star Telegram (Aug. 10, 2018, 10:10 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/9UWC-673Y]. 
98. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 1. 
99. 3 HALL, JR., supra note 93, § 9:21.  
100. See id. 
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and it is in the best interest of the public to ensure judges uphold 
these oaths.   
However, in November 2017, the ACLU of Arkansas and 
the Lawyers’ Committee were successful in settling a lawsuit in 
which the city of Sherwood, Pulaski County, and the district court 
judge were the named defendants.101  This settlement mandated 
that “Sherwood’s ‘hot check’ court [would] no longer jail people 
who can’t afford to pay court fines and fees imposed for bouncing 
a check . . . [and] requires the court to evaluate each defendant’s 
ability to pay before determining the person’s sentence.”102  
Several factors could point to why this outcome was so different.  
The fact that the city and county were themselves named 
defendants, and thus, were not entitled to judicial immunity, may 
have provided a greater incentive to settle.  Maybe it was because 
this case was litigated in federal court as opposed to state court.103  
However, the fact that the settlement had to include a mandate to 
evaluate each individual’s ability to pay, which the law already 
requires, further demonstrates the shirking of the law that is 
occurring in some of Arkansas’s courtrooms. 
IV.  THE PATH TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE 
SYSTEM IN ARKANSAS 
Ferguson was a spark that turned isolated instances of 
activism into a national conversation and produced numerous 
 
101. Dade v. City of Sherwood, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF ARK., 
[https://perma.cc/Q9AN-JMQE] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).  
102. Id.; see also Linda Satter, Under Deal, 1 Arkansas Court to Back Off Jailing Over 
Hot Checks, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:30 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/8WBR-747M] (One plaintiff in the case “wrote a single bad check for 
$28.93 in 2011 that, by the time the suit was filed [in 2016], had resulted in her being arrested 
at least seven times, paying nearly $3,300 in fines, fees and court costs, and spending 25 
days in jail . . . . [T]he lead plaintiff, Charles Dade, spent more than 100 days in jail and was 
assessed about $4,000 in fines, fees and court costs because of six bounced checks totaling 
$360 that he wrote in 2009.”).  
103. See Complaint—Class Action at 6, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-CV-
00602-JM (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/68TN-WKLV] (bringing “civil 
rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution”). 
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examples of partnerships between advocates and decision-
makers.104 
 
In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released the 
findings from its investigation of the Police Department in 
Ferguson, Missouri, highlighting the fact that “Ferguson law 
enforcement efforts are focused on generating revenue.”105  As a 
result, many states and localities began to face pressure to 
reevaluate the use of fines and fees to generate revenue.106  While 
there are many meritorious ideas regarding the most effective 
ways to achieve reform, this section will focus on three practical 
suggestions to make strides towards a more just and equitable 
system in Arkansas.   
A. Utilizing the Arkansas JDDC to Punish Judicial 
Misconduct 
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a 
formal opinion regarding the “[e]thical obligations of judges in 
collecting legal financial obligations and other debts,”107 
following the DOJ’s groundbreaking report detailing law 
enforcement’s unlawful practices in Ferguson, Missouri.108  The 
nexus between the ABA’s opinion and the DOJ’s report is that 
they both address unlawful practices of government and law 
enforcement officials in their focus on generating revenue.   
The ABA opinion asserts that to comply with the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must “undertake a meaningful 
inquiry into a litigant’s ability to pay court fines, fees, restitution, 
 
104. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (2015) (quote in all capitals in the original). 
106. See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. 
(Mar. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/K9HM-PJ4Y] (asserting that “[t]he publication of the 
Ferguson report is widely viewed as the start of the movement to reform fines and fees in the 
U.S.”).  
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020) (quote in all capitals 
in the original) (discussing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s clear mandate for 
meaningful inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay before incarcerating a defendant for 
failing to pay).  
108. See id. at 2.  
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other charges, bail, or civil debt before using incarceration as 
punishment for failure to pay, as inducement to pay or appear, or 
as a method of purging a financial obligation whenever state or 
federal law so provides.”109  According to the ABA, Rules 1.1, 
1.2, 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct all 
require meaningful inquiry as “a fundamental element of 
procedural justice necessary to maintain the integrity, 
impartiality, and fairness of the administration of justice and the 
public’s faith in it.”110   
The opinion clearly states that “[a]s long as a defendant’s 
failure to pay is due to genuine financial incapacity, alternatives 
to incarceration must be explored.”111  Furthermore, it emphasizes 
the necessity for consistently followed and “carefully prescribed 
procedures” to promote uniformity—opining that failing to adopt 
and adhere to such policies in failure to pay proceedings that 
could result in incarceration “strikes at the very roots of the fair 
and impartial administration of justice and poses a direct threat to 
public faith in the legitimacy of the judicial process.”112   
While some judges have been able to evade legal 
accountability through the judicial immunity doctrine, this 
doctrine does not shield them from ethical consequences.  In 
McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and 
Disability Orders, the D.C. Circuit explained that “the 
constitutional measures meant to protect judicial independence 
were not intended to insulate individual judges from 
accountability to ‘the world as a whole (including the judicial 
branch itself),’ but ‘to safeguard the branch’s independence from 
its two competitors.’”113  There is a fine line between judicial 
misconduct and simple legal error.114  While the “mere legal 
 
109. Id. at 1. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. ABA Formal Op. 490, supra note 107 (quoting the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
opinion in a judicial disciplinary case in which it recognized that for many litigants, “trial 
judges ‘are the judicial system’”). 
113. Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing 
Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2004) (citing 
McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct & Disability Ords., 264 F.3d 52, 65 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001)).  
114. See generally id.  
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error” rule typically shields judges from disciplinary action based 
on one erroneous decision, “most cases in which judicial error [is] 
elevated to the level of judicial misconduct involve[] more than 
one example of legal error, and a pattern is one of the identified 
exceptions to the ‘mere legal error’ rule.”115  Additionally, “[a]n 
intentional failure to follow the law, even with a benign motive, 
constitutes bad faith and consequently judicial misconduct.”116  
While recognizing the importance of balancing the interest 
of judicial independence with the need for accountability in cases 
of judicial misconduct, New York’s highest court rationally 
articulated that “the judiciary, the Bar, and the public are better 
served when an established course of misconduct is appropriately 
redressed and an unfit incumbent is removed from the Bench.”117  
Judges need not concern themselves that a “mere oversight[] or 
misreading[] of the law” will result in sanction for legal error.118  
Instead, judges must simply “comply with clear due process 
requirements and avoid bullying and patently unfair conduct.”119  
The interests of judicial independence are sufficiently 
safeguarded by the “mere legal error” rule, while the rule’s 
exceptions make it possible “to hold judges accountable for 
decisions that are clearly contrary to law, that were reached 
without following the procedures that confer legitimacy and 
credence upon judicial actions, that represent an exercise of 
discretion motivated by bad faith, or that reflect repeated legal 
error that cannot be attributed to an honest mistake.”120 
 One under-utilized avenue for recourse is filing a complaint 
with Arkansas’s JDDC.  While the Commission can choose to 
open an investigation and issue punishment against any judge in 
Arkansas on its own,121 the Commission’s members typically 
have full-time jobs, and they cannot know what is going on in 
 
115. Id. at 1263. 
116. Id. at 1268. 
117. In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. 1998). 
118. Gray, supra note 113, at 1280 (adding that judicial independence is not threatened 
simply because “the possibility of discipline for legal error may induce . . . second thoughts 
before judicial decision-making”). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A) (2013).  
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every courtroom in Arkansas if they are not made aware.  Because 
a judge who has immunity has not been held liable in a court of 
law, the ethical complaint process is a way of putting a judge “on 
notice,” so to speak, for his or her bad behavior.122  
In 2014, the Commission admonished a district court judge 
in Craighead County for instituting an illegal fee of $35.00 that 
was levied “against certain defendants, for changing a plea from 
‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty.’”123  While the Letter of Admonishment 
put the judge on notice, the voters had the final word when he 
subsequently lost reelection in 2016.124  Complaints may be made 
to the Commission anonymously or with the complainant’s name 
attached,125 so attorneys, prosecutors, and public defenders who 
witness unlawful behavior in the courtroom can make a report 
without fear of retaliation.  While anyone can make a complaint, 
the average citizen is likely not aware of this avenue for recourse.  
Therefore, attorneys should more frequently utilize this remedial 
measure to put judges on notice, so if their behavior continues, 
the punishment will further escalate. 
B. Enumerating Specific Factors for Consideration in 
Arkansas’s Statute 
Arkansas’s applicable statute, as it stands, requires that a 
judge must consider: 
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden 
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to 
another obligation of the defendant;  
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the 
court; and  
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment 
of restitution and the method of payment.126   
 
122. See id. at 8(D).  
123. Press Release, supra note 54, at 1.  
124. Keith Blackman, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/RFQ6-GUYA] (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2021).  
125. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A). 
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015). 
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Currently, the statute—on its face—seems adequate.  However, 
as stated above, the statute’s lack of specificity leaves too much 
ambiguity and room for interpretation as to what exactly is 
required.127  Implementation is the issue. 
The statute should instead require specific inquiries.  These 
requirements need not even go beyond what questions a person 
would generally ask to determine someone’s net worth.  The court 
should first determine the individual’s anticipated monthly 
income.  Next, the court should establish whether the individual 
has any dependents relying on their monthly income.  On a similar 
note, the court should ascertain the individual’s monthly living 
expenses (i.e., monthly housing cost, the average cost of utilities 
per month, groceries, etc.).  An individual should not have to miss 
a rent payment or forego running water for themselves and their 
families to prioritize, for example, a speeding ticket.  
Additionally, the court may inquire into whether an individual 
possesses any liquid assets.   
If the statute were to enumerate specific factors for review, 
there would be significantly less grey area when analyzing a 
person’s realistic ability to pay and on what schedule.  Because 
there are so many small local courts across the state of Arkansas, 
it can be difficult to ensure each court is adhering to the same set 
of legal procedures and upholding society’s expectation of ethics 
in the judiciary.  In reducing statutory ambiguity, the legislature 
could positively effect change in a concrete and cognizable way.   
C. Improving Record-Keeping, Transparency, and 
Accountability 
Another obstacle for justice—particularly in rural 
communities—is the lack of adequate record-keeping.128  This is 
a problem because many times, defendants “have no way to track 
the total debt owed or ensure their payments are properly applied 
to their outstanding debt[s].”129  And while community service is 
 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10. 
128. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. 
129. Id. 
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typically a stated alternative to paying fines and fees,130 poor 
record-keeping creates a possible scenario in which a person 
completes their community service time, frequently taking time 
away from work or other obligations to do so, only to learn later 
that there is no such record of their completion of community 
service, forcing them to start over.   
Furthermore, community service is not a legitimate 
alternative in many cases.  For example, according to court filings 
in Mahoney:  
individuals must make arrangements with the local police or 
other authorities in the town where the conviction occurred 
. . . [and t]hey may be denied the opportunity to work at the 
discretion of other municipal officials for any reason, 
including that there is no work available that day, not enough 
work available, or that no one is available to administer it.131   
One plaintiff tried three times to no avail to complete community 
service, and because the judge suspended his license, he had to 
walk “to the police station in below-freezing weather only to be 
told that it was too cold to work that day.”132  Unfortunately, 
community service is not always a reliable alternative to payment.  
Additionally, the Mahoney plaintiffs alleged numerous 
instances in which they corresponded with the clerk of court to 
make a partial payment, obtain an extension, or explain their 
inability to pay, but were nonetheless arrested for failure to pay.133  
When a sloppy administrative error on the part of the State can 
result in jail time, an issue clearly exists.  For example, the “Beebe 
Department [in White County] serves a community of just 8,000 
people[,]” yet over a span of two years, the judge issued “more 
than 4,000 warrants for failure to pay fines . . . in the Beebe 
Department alone.”134  To promote uniformity and give people 
the confidence that record-keeping accurately reflects agreed-
upon extensions, community service, and any other relevant 
 
130. CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO FINES AND FEES? 
COMMUNITY SERVICE MANDATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/G8NE-A728]. 
131. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
132. Id. at 18.   
133. Id. at 19-20.  
134. Id. at 20. 
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information, there must be an updated system to promote 
accountability and transparency within the courts.  An online 
system in which individuals can check their outstanding balances, 
make required payments, confirm payment due dates, track their 
community service, and upload relevant financial information 
would be considerably more practical than record-keeping by 
hand at the courthouse.  
V.  HOW THE SYSTEM STAGNATES ARKANSAS’S 
ECONOMY 
The anti-tax lobby told voters they would get something for 
nothing—the state or municipality would tighten its belt a little, it 
would collect big money from low-level offenders, and everything 
would be fine.  This hurt not only the poor.  In state after state the 
dismantling of the tax base crippled public education and 
damaged the futures of children across lines of income, hurting 
many more children than just those who live in poverty.135 
 
A system in which people are cyclically jailed because of 
their inability to pay fines and fees is doomed to result in a net-
negative economic outcome.136  While government officials often 
perceive fines and fees as an attractive alternative to raising taxes, 
they are less profitable than they may initially appear.  
A. Cost of Arkansas’s County Jails 
Pulaski County, the most populous county in the state with 
nearly 400,000 residents,137 spent a staggering $27,123,125.68 on 
its county jail in 2017.138  Calhoun County, the least populated 
county in the state with 4,739 residents,139 spent $417,986.22 on 
 
135. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xvi. 
136. See Carl Takei, WTF? Our Tax Dollars Are Being Spent to Jail a Vet for Being 
Poor, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (May 28, 2014), [https://perma.cc/J9GN-8L9X].  
137. Arkansas Counties by Population, ARK. DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT, 
[https://perma.cc/GRT7-PB8F] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021). 
138. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INMATE COST REPORT (2017), 
[https://perma.cc/A98Z-EUTD].  
139. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.  
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a county jail that only holds twenty-two inmates.140  Washington 
County, the state’s third most populous county,141 spends over 
$19 million on its county jail,142 with smaller counties like 
Poinsett (population 22,965)143 spending almost $1.5 million on 
its county jail.144  Craighead County (population 111,231)145 
spent nearly $9 million on its county jail in 2017.146  According 
to the Association of Arkansas Counties’ report, the average 
verified cost-per-day across the state to house one inmate is 
$71.48.147 
The amount of money Arkansas’s counties are expending on 
jails has steadily risen over the last twenty years, with the 
Sebastian County jail budget increasing by 53%, over $3 million, 
from 2006 to 2019.148  When viewing these numbers, one should 
consider the context that, nationally, Arkansas ranks 48th in 
Public Health, 41st in Education, 43rd in Infrastructure, 48th in 
Crime and Corrections, and 47th in Public Safety.149  Clearly, the 
increased spending on jails is not leading to an increase in public 
safety.  In a 2020 report authored by Human Rights Watch, the 
recommendations of how to effectively improve public safety 
included investing in education to advance the quality of schools, 
“stop[ping] enforcing laws in ways that effectively criminalize 
people for their poverty[,]” investing in initiatives that provide 
training and employment, providing “sufficient and adequate 
health care,” and “[v]astly reduc[ing] pretrial incarceration so that 
only those accused of serious crimes and found to pose a specific 
danger to others can be held in custody.”150 
Arkansas’s ranking in these indicators should be a wake-up 
call that the State’s current investments are not productive.  From 
 
140. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.  
141. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137. 
142. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.  
143. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137. 
144. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.  
145. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137. 
146. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138. 
147. Id. 
148. Saccente, supra note 65.  
149. Arkansas: #44 in Overall Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
[https://perma.cc/5LZ6-LV2J] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).  
150. A Roadmap for Re-imagining Public Safety in the United States, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Aug. 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/WW2X-63CR]. 
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the personal narratives in this Comment, one can deduce that this 
cycle of never-ending, court-imposed fines and fees only 
contributes to the larger problem.  The Brennan Center for Justice 
has rightfully pointed out that because “the burden of fees and 
fines falls largely on the poor” it is “much like a regressive tax” 
with “mounting balances [that] underscore [their] finding that 
fees and fines are an unreliable source of government revenue.”151  
The report further notes that, “[j]ailing those unable to pay fees 
and fines is especially costly—sometimes as much as 115 percent 
of the amount collected—and generates no revenue[,]” pointing 
out that this “practice is not just unconstitutional but also 
irrational.”152 
B. Fines and Fees as a Revenue Generator 
Across the country, states and localities use fines and fees to 
generate revenue.153  While revenue generation might sound good 
in theory, an accurate cost-benefit analysis typically reveals that 
fines and fees are not so profitable in reality.  An in-depth study 
of “the costs for state and local governments to enforce and collect 
fees and fines” revealed massive waste, illustrating that “[t]he net 
gain might be far less than [states] have imagined, [and] the losses 
far more damaging.”154  New Mexico’s Bernalillo County is the 
perfect example as it is “operat[ing] at a loss in this regard, 
spending more than $1.17 per dollar it raises in revenue from fees 
and fines.”155  However, the actual loss is impossible to calculate 
as the study did not “take into account many of the counties’ 
investments in this work, like the time and staffing spent on 
 
151. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5. 
152. Id.  
153. RON DEUTSCH & CARA LONG CORRA, FISCAL POLICY INST., FINES AND FEES: 
RAISING REVENUE AT THE COMMUNITY’S EXPENSE 1 (2020), [https://perma.cc/K5Z8-
RX6W].  
154. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Matthew Menendez, Fees, Fines and Ability to Pay, HILL 
(Feb. 10, 2020, 1:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/9TU2-CURS] (explaining how “[t]he IRS 
spends one-third of a penny for every dollar that it collects in taxes[,]” while in the Texas 
and New Mexico counties studied, “the governments spend more than 41 cents of every 
dollar of revenue they raise to collect the fees and fines they impose in jail costs and in-court 
proceedings alone”).  
155. Id. 
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enforcing warrants and suspending driver’s licenses for 
nonpayment of debts.”156 
Although I could not account for all the costs associated with 
collecting fines and fees in Arkansas, I was able to determine 
what percentage of each county’s revenue came from fines and 
fees in 2019.  Using each county’s most recent financial audit,157 
I divided the county’s annual revenue generated from municipal 
fines and fees by the county’s total annual revenue to determine 
the percentage of total revenue generated by fines and fees for 
each county.  Below, Figure 1 serves as a visual illustration of my 
findings.158  The x-axis lists the counties in order from least to 
greatest in terms of percentage of total revenue generated through 








157. County audits for each fiscal year can be accessed on the Arkansas’s Legislative 
Audit website.  See Search Audits, ARK. LEGIS. AUDIT, [https://perma.cc/DLB3-GGDC] 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2021).  
158. In addition to being available by search of the 2019 audits on the Arkansas Audit 
website, the documents, as well as excel sheets supporting the findings depicted on Figure 1 
























Figure 1: Percentage of Arkansas Counties' 
Revenues Generated from Fines & Fees
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, the rate at which counties are 
depending on revenue from fines and fees varies.  In larger 
counties, the percentage is lower because of the high rate of 
property tax revenue.  However, when federal aid and state aid 
are not accounted for as “revenues,” the percentage grows 
significantly in some counties.  Additionally, a conflict of interest 
arises when counties project an anticipated amount of revenue in 
this category.  When an amount is projected in the county’s 
budget and is considered unearned revenue, law enforcement 
officers, prosecutors, and judges alike are put into situations 
where their interest in accruing that unearned revenue can conflict 
with an equal and impartial application of the law.159  
Anne Kim, Vice President of Domestic Policy at the 
Progressive Policy Institute,160 explains in her piece for 
Governing that “[b]ecause the burden of these penalties falls 
disproportionately on people who can’t afford to pay, 
jurisdictions collect far less than expected and waste resources 
chasing down payments that won’t materialize.”161  Further, “as 
many as one-fourth of local inmates were in jail for nonpayment 
of fines and fees” in some jurisdictions, and “[i]n addition to its 
direct expenses, incarceration—even short stints in jail—can lead 
to costly outcomes, including unemployment, dependence on 
public benefits and greater risk of crime.”162  Because these 
revenues come at such a high cost both financially and socially,163 
each county should work to decrease its reliance on this revenue 
 
159. See Fines, Fees, and Financial Burdens, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
[https://perma.cc/2E2F-RHHC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (explaining that many places use 
fines and fees to fund court systems and local governments creating an inherent conflict of 
interest); see, e.g., Matt Ford, The Problem With Funding Government Through Fines, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), [https://perma.cc/M2TK-UTQC] (discussing an issue that arose 
in Nevada when tickets and fines revenue fell short of what the state legislature projected in 
its two-year budget, resulting in shortfalls of $700,000 in year one and $1.4 million in year 
two).  
160. Anne Kim: Columnist, GOVERNING, [https://perma.cc/3MBZ-2NEW] (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2021). 
161. Anne Kim, When Cities Rely on Fines and Fees, Everybody Loses, GOVERNING 
(Aug. 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/K4SD-CCUE]. 
162. Id. 
163. See id. (referencing “[a] 2014 study of Alabama court costs” which found that 
“collection rates [were] under 10 percent on average—despite countless hours spent by staff 
pursuing payment”).  
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source.  In doing so, counties could stop wasting money on fine 
collection efforts and incarcerating people who cannot afford to 
pay, allowing the citizens of Arkansas to put their money back 
into our state’s economy instead of dragging around the ball and 
chain of legal financial obligations for weeks, months, or in many 
cases, years.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Lawsuits have forced debtors’ prisons out of business in 
increasing numbers, mostly in specific counties and 
municipalities, but there are more venues to be tackled.164 
 
Even though the United States Supreme Court, state 
legislatures, and the vast majority of legal scholars are in 
agreement that debtors’ prisons are both unethical and 
unconstitutional, people in Arkansas and across America are still 
jailed every day simply because they cannot pay the legal 
financial burdens that they face.  Regardless of statutes and case 
law that seemingly ban this practice, it is clear that these 
safeguards have fallen far short of ensuring poverty is not 
criminalized.  
Whether or not one may personally empathize with the 
victims of this system, it is in everyone’s best interest to reform 
it.  Not only does jailing poor people have no positive impact on 
their ability to pay their legal financial obligations, but it also 
almost always has the opposite effect—frequently leading to 
unemployment, additional debt, and less money circulating in our 
economy to support Arkansas’s businesses.  The State itself 
would benefit from reforming this system too.  As it stands now, 
the system of fines and fees collections is a drain on taxpayer 
dollars, does not effectively reduce or deter crime, and stagnates 
our state’s economy.  
 
 
164. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 28. 
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DEAD MEN TELL NO TALES: ARKANSAS’S 





[A] single death is a tragedy, a million deaths are a 
statistic.1 
I.  AT DEATH’S DOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 
It is doubtful that Hulon Rupert Austin woke up on the day 
of March 7, 1986 and expected it to be his last.2  March 7 was a 
typical day—a workday—that started with a simple drive to a job 
site with his co-worker.3  A day that began so unremarkably ended 
with his co-worker looking up from where he was working to see 
“Austin lying on the ground.”4   
Following Austin’s death, the local coroner from Cleveland 
County, Arkansas, arrived at the scene.5  According to the 
coroner’s notes on the death certificate, his death was attributable 
 
        *J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Managing Editor of the 
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author extends four thank yous to the people that 
made this comment possible.  First, the author thanks her faculty advisor, Professor Steve 
Clowney, University of Arkansas School of Law, her Note and Comment Editor, Brady 
Brown, J.D. 2021, her Articles Editor, Sarah Smith, J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas 
School of Law, 2022, and the entire 2021-2022 class of Staff Editors.  Without their patience, 
knowledge, and humor, this comment would still be nonsensical doodles on a page.  Second, 
the author thanks Josie Bates.  Her unwavering love and support made even the most difficult 
parts of the writing process feel like magic.  Third, and most importantly, the author thanks 
her parents, Mike Moore and Susan Moore, and her older brother, Derek Moore.  They have 
spent their entire lives cheering the author on; in turn, she dedicates this comment to them. 
1. JOHN TIRMAN, THE DEATHS OF OTHERS: THE FATE OF CIVILIANS IN AMERICA’S 
WARS 316 (Dave McBride ed., 2011) (quoting Joseph Stalin).  
2. See Austin v. Highway 15 Water Users Ass’n, 30 Ark. App. 60, 61, 782 S.W.2d 585, 
586 (1990). 
3. See id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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to myocardial infarction6—the medical terminology for a heart 
attack.7  Although the term used by the coroner seems indicative 
of medical training, that could not be further from the reality that 
unfolded for Austin’s family.8  In the wake of his death, Austin’s 
widow attempted to file a claim based on his death at work; 
however, the Workers’ Compensation Commission “concluded 
that there was insufficient credible evidence proving the decedent 
suffered a compensable injury.”9  While a legal battle regarding 
the compensability of the injury itself seems conventional, the 
real issue within this case has nothing to do with the type of injury 
at all—in fact, that argument is an impossible feat considering 
that the coroner “admitted that he merely guessed” as to how 
Austin died.10  In reality, the coroner had “no medical school 
training, and had [only taken] an emergency medical technician 
course.”11  Even worse, the coroner did not even attempt an 
educated guess—instead, he chose “not [to] examine [Austin]’s 
medical records, or talk with his treating physician or his wife 
prior to making his determination as to the cause of death.”12 
Left with no choice, the Arkansas Court of Appeals opined 
that, “[s]ince there [was] no clear evidence as to the cause of death 
. . . we would have to engage in speculation and conjecture which 
is not a substitute for credible evidence, no matter how 
plausible.”13  The lack of training and care that the coroner 
wielded severely wounded this case’s trajectory and the 
possibility of fairness for Austin’s surviving spouse.14  In the end, 
his widow received no compensation from his death on the job; 
 
6. Id. 
7. Heart Attack (Myocardial Infarction), HARVARD MED. SCH. (Feb. 14, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/2DD9-LFCY]. 
8. See generally Austin, 30 Ark. App. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 586.  
9. Id. (emphasis added). 
10. Id. at 61, 782 S.W.2d at 586 (emphasis added). 
11. Id.  It is paramount for a “medical examiner or coroner [to] use all information 
available to make a determination about the death.  This may include information from his 
or her own investigation, police reports, staff investigations, and discussions with the family 
and friends of the decedent.”  Medical Examiners’ and Coroners’ Handbook on Death 
Registration and Fetal Death Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 21 
(Apr. 2003), [https://perma.cc/8UBL-U494] (emphasis added). 
12. Austin, 30 Ark. App. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 586. 
13. Id. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 587. 
14. See id. 
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more importantly, however, the coroner’s lack of a proper 
investigation into Austin’s death failed her more than any court 
case could.15   
This case presents an obvious question.  How could a 
coroner—a job that has so much to do with medical 
comprehension—require so little training?16  However, the real 
question is—and should be—much broader:  how is it that 
Arkansas has allowed this severe miscarriage of justice for 
Arkansan families of the deceased?17  Because, while the lack of 
training required by coroners in Arkansas may appear like a 
minutia of an issue, the reality is far, far grimmer.18 
While it is a bleak reality, it is also an uncomplicated one—
uniquely rooted in essential quasi-property principles.19  
Although the details of what precisely a “quasi-property” right 
entails are discussed at length later, at its most basic level, two 
truths exist and must prevail for Arkansans to see any justice in 
future death investigations within the state.20  First, Arkansas 
must recognize and reconcile that it is severely underdeveloped 
and underregulated in its approach to death investigation—
specifically, Arkansas has yet to abandon the outdated coroner 
system in favor of a modern medical examiner system.21  
Secondly, Arkansas must be vigilant in treating each dead 
constituent with the utmost care and skill owed to them because 
of the quasi-property right in the dead body that “vests in the 
nearest relatives of the deceased.”22  Those two truths together 
equal one crucial takeaway:  it is a simple quasi-property right, 
vested in the decedent’s family, that requires a higher standard 
 
15. See id. 
16. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
17. The ability for a medical examiner or a coroner to provide a deceased’s family with 
a proper cause of death has an importance that should not be understated—”[t]his 
information has many uses related to the settlement of the estate and provides family 
members’ closure, peace of mind, and documentation . . . .”  Medical Examiners’ and 
Coroners’ Handbook on Death Registration and Fetal Death Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 11, at 2. 
18. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
19. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
20. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999). 
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out of the professionals who investigate and postulate about 
deaths in the Natural State.23 
Issues abound in this sphere of policy for Arkansas; 
however, the solution is quite simple.24  Arkansas must modernize 
its regulation of the issues that truly make a difference in the lives 
and deaths of its constituents.25  Namely, Arkansas should honor 
its constituents’ postmortem quasi-property right by requiring a 
higher level of educational and experiential standards—standards 
that are achieved through abandoning the outdated coroner 
system in favor of a modern medical examiner system.26  
Hulon Rupert Austin was likely one of many Arkansans that 
died that day in March of 1986.27  However, to his family and the 
people that knew him, he was likely anything but a number.28  
While numbers are salient, numbers are also easy to glaze over.29 
For instance, in 2017, 2,813,503 people died across the United 
States.30  Of those deaths, 32,606 were Arkansans.31  In simply 
reading those numbers, it is easy to feel that glassy-eyed 
expression fog over the face.  That is an entirely natural and 
human response in feeling unable to comprehend or internalize 
such high numbers.32  “[P]sychologists who have studied 
genocides and mass disasters” noticed that “[s]omething happens 
in the brain when fatalities reach such high numbers . . . [t]he 
causalities become like a mountain of corpses that has grown so 
large it becomes difficult to focus on the individual bodies.”33  
 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See generally Austin v. Highway 15 Water Users Ass’n, 30 Ark. App. 60, 61, 782 
S.W.2d 585, 586 (1990). 
28. Id. 
29. See generally Jiaquan Xu et al., Mortality in the United States, 2018, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 2020), [https://perma.cc/64DZ-3UWN]. 
30. Id. 
31. Resident Deaths Due to Leading Causes, By Sex: Arkansas, 2017, ARK. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH (March 4, 2019, 10:06 AM), [https://perma.cc/YST2-C7AA]. 
32. William Wan & Brittany Shammas, Why Americans Are Numb to the Staggering 
Coronavirus Death Toll, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2020, 12:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/748T-
8BXN]. 
33. Id. 
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Perhaps “[w]ithout [the] visual, physical manifestations of deaths, 
the alarm bells in our heads fail to ring . . . .”34 
However, legislators in Arkansas have a duty not to treat 
those deaths as just simple numbers.  Instead, each death 
represents a person, a family, a lifetime, and a loss.  Legislators 
must work for the families of the deceased and bring those 
families any ounce of peace that the legislative monolith can 
bestow.  Namely, surviving family and friends of the decedent 
deserve competent coroners as the first line of peace.   
The solution to this problem is easily implementable.35  
However, it requires a fundamental belief that each death is not a 
number; each death represents a mountain of pain and sorrow for 
the affected family, friends, and loved ones.  Death is not an 
experience that Arkansas—or any state for that matter—can 
afford to treat like a statistic.  A person’s death is worth far more 
than a number.  Arkansas legislators should act like it. 
II.  TALES FROM THE CRYPT: EXHUMING THE 
HISTORY OF THE CORONER AND THE QUASI-
PROPERTY RIGHT IN DEAD BODIES 
The collision of the coroner role and the quasi-property right 
vested in dead bodies is a phenomenon that only occurred after 
centuries upon centuries of history and transformation.36  
However, each part—the coroner role and the quasi-property 
right—independently went through a sort of macabre 
metamorphosis.37  Because of that historic independence and 
modern harmony, it is necessary to dissect and appreciate each 
concept for its own importance before understanding how they 
reconcile as one cause.38  Consequently, the following literary 
journey is organized into first, setting the stage for how a quasi-
property right in dead bodies came to exist,39 and second, 
untangling the history and dissolution of the coroner role.40  
 
34. Id. 
35. See infra Part III. 
36. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
37. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
38. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
39. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
40. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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However, before either of those can occur, an understanding of 
what precisely a “quasi-property” right even means is 
imperative.41 
A. Over My Dead Body: Unraveling the Meaning  
Behind “Quasi-Property” 
Before unraveling the history of the quasi-property right in 
dead bodies, a knowledge of what a “quasi-property” right 
provides for the individual that wields it is a necessity.  
Accordingly, it is essential to begin with the most paramount 
actuality about a quasi-property right:  it truly has little to do with 
property at all—at least, not “in the ordinary sense of that 
word.”42  Rather, “[t]he concept of quasi-property [was] an 
ingenious invention by the U.S. courts to help a deserving 
plaintiff.”43  As one court brazenly asserted, this right “is 
something [that] evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and 
that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are 
being protected under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a 
lawyer.”44 
The interests that fell under this magic “quasi-property” 
umbrella were ones that “resembled property rights in their 
functioning even when they weren’t property rights, or, strictly 
speaking, ownership interests.”45  This distinction is imperative 
when understanding what exactly a quasi-property right in a body 
really even provides for the decedent’s family—this is not some 
grotesque, real ownership over a dead body.46  Instead, the 
purpose behind this right—when it is related to human 
remains47—is intrinsically linked to a court’s motivation “to 
 
41. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
42. Remigius Nnamdi Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the Challenge of Property: 
Rethinking Property Rights in Dead Bodies, Body Parts, and Traditional Knowledge 60 
(Nov. 2004) (SJD thesis, University of Toronto) (ProQuest) (emphasis added). 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 60 n.151 (quoting State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986)). 
45. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 
PENN. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2012). 
46. See id. 
47. A quasi-property right is not a right limited to the disposition of human remains; 
another example of a field of law that utilizes this terminology would be in recent trademark 
law.  Specifically, the concept of trademark dilution uses quasi-property rights for reputation.  
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protect the ‘personal feelings’ or ‘sentiment and propriety’ of the 
next of kin . . . .”48   
While this right might seem quite fluffy and difficult to pin 
down, the reality is that a quasi-property right in dead bodies is 
still somewhat inextricably linked to the general idea of 
property.49  Looking broadly at the concept of property, “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual’s rights in property 
against deprivation by the state without due process.”50  An 
individual that alleges that he or she “has been deprived of a 
property right possesses a civil cause of action under section 1983 
of the Civil Rights Act.”51  Accordingly, “in order to assert a 
section 1983 claim, a party must establish two elements:  (1) that 
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law; and (2) that the deprivation was of a right, 
privilege or immunity guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.”52  However, “[t]he issue of whether an interest 
conforms to a ‘property’ right for purposes of a section 1983 suit 
is a matter of state law”—ultimately meaning that “state laws 
define the rights and obligations which guide a court’s analysis in 
determining the existence of a ‘property’ interest.”53   
While Arkansas’s adoption of the quasi-property right in 
dead bodies endures discussion later,54 the broad notion of 
statehood power in assessing property rights shines a light on the 
motivation of allotting this right in the first place—giving 
standing to deserving plaintiffs.55  Ultimately, the bottom line of 
 
Id. at 1897.  In which, “reputation is protected through a heavily circumscribed exclusionary 
framework that is tailored to the centrality of perception[.]”  Id. at 1898.  Thus, by utilizing 
a quasi-property right, this “allows trademark to retain its roots in the ideas of deceit and 
unfair competition without abandoning the idea of exclusionary protection altogether.”  Id.  
48. Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1895.  
49. See generally Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in 
the Human Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 434 
(1992). 
50. Id. at 432. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
54. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
55. REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PROPERTY; 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION 60 (Sheila 
McLean, ed. 2007) [hereinafter NWABUEZE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY 
PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION]. 
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property comes down to only a few things:  “the rights of 
possession, exclusion, use, [] disposition, the right to enjoy fruits 
or profits, and the right of destruction.”56  In property lingo, 
scholars often refer to this as some variation of having the 
“sufficient number of [] ‘twigs’ in the property bundle . . . .”57  
However, the principal twig in that bundle for human remains is 
exclusion, and without it, deserving plaintiffs have little room for 
recourse.58  By pairing human remains recourse to the body of 
property law through the quasi-property loophole, courts have 
effectively allowed the quasi-property right “to simulate 
property’s exclusionary framework within limited settings.”59  
Those limited settings include “the plaintiff’s status in relation to 
the deceased and the nature of the defendant’s actions.”60 
Whereas ordinary property interests frequently find their 
base in tangible assets, quasi-property interests find their base in 
the relationship between the parties involved; thus, courts react 
directly “to the relationship between the parties rather than just to 
their interaction through a tangible object.”61  Coined as 
“[r]elational [i]nterests,” there are three primary triggers that 
qualify a relationship as one worth invoking a quasi-property 
right:  “[1] the status of the parties vis-à-vis each other, [2] the 
unique environment or context within which they interact, [and 3] 
the nature—wrongful or otherwise—of one party’s actions.”62  As 
for the first trigger—the status of the parties—the importance lies 
in the “settings where the law emphasizes the parties’ status [and] 
the fact that the parties’ objective/relative positions mandate that 
they pay greater attention to the manner in which they obtain and 
 
56. Patrick J. Mulqueen, “Only Dust Remains[?]”: The 9/11 Memorial Litigation and 
the Reach of Quasi-Property Rights, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 253 (2012) (quoting Erik S. 
Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[‘s] Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of 
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 549 
(1990)). 
57. Id. (quoting Melissa A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous 
Organs: Changes to Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & 
HEALTH 37, 43 (2002)). 
58. See generally Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1892. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1900. 
61. Id. at 1902. 
62. See generally id. at 1901-02. 
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use certain resources.”63  Similarly, for the second trigger, “the 
environment within which the parties interact over the resource is 
one that is especially sensitive and deserving of protection.”64  For 
the final, main trigger, courts actively choose “to impose liability 
on the defendant by tailoring the law’s exclusionary framework 
to the conduct that they seek to censure.”65   
With all of these triggers considered, it is clear that quasi-
property may, at times, be difficult to pin down.66  However, it is 
also a vital avenue in providing recourse for plaintiffs who have 
endured a wrong in a uniquely terrible way—through some 
violation of a deceased loved one.67  Regarded by some as a sort 
of legal magic trick, quasi-property rights should not be 
considered some work of fiction—quasi-property rights provide 
real protection to real plaintiffs.68  Ultimately, many of the 
intricate quasi-property law questions are new and unsettled; 
however, the journey quasi-property took to fruition was 
centuries in the making.69 
B. Till Death Do Us Part: The Origins of the  
Quasi-Property Right Vested in Dead Bodies 
When discussing, understanding, or arguing about any law 
or regulation, the common-sense approach often includes looking 
at the modern regulation versus its bygone counterpart.70  
However, when attempting to have those same interactions with 
the body of law that pertains to death or human remains, 
relegating or sorting laws into the past versus the present becomes 
 
63. Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1903. 
64. Id. at 1904 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 1905. 
66. See id. at 1906. 
67. See generally NWABUEZE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS, 
AND GENETIC INFORMATION, supra note 55, at 60. 
68. See id. at 59. 
69. See Mulqueen, supra note 56, at 255. 
70. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L. J. 451, 460 (2019) 
(stating that “[a]n easy benchmark . . . is to compare the new law to the old law.”); Brenda 
R. Mayrack, Note, The Implications of State ex. rel. Thomas v. Schwarz for Wisconsin 
Sentencing Policy after Truth-In-Sentencing II, WIS. L. REV. 181, 222 (2008) (comparing 
old versus new sentencing guidelines); Samuel C. Ullman, An Overview of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, 61 FLA. B. J. 13, 15-16 (1987) (comparing old versus new tax code regulations). 
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relatively impossible; notably, the label of “modern law” for the 
law regarding human remains is a bit of an oxymoron.71  
Separating the traditional history of the law regarding human 
remains from its caricatured present would strip it of all the 
significance and substance that shaped it for centuries.72  
Consequently, an understanding of the law regarding human 
remains requires an appreciation of its journey to modernity—for 
disassembling it would leave it void of the soul, theology, and 
humanity that it has attempted to pass on from generation to 
generation.73  
The inception of the legal field regarding dead bodies has a 
unique opening chapter to its story compared to many other legal 
traditions.74  Namely, “it is not principally derived from English 
common law.”75  Instead of English common law dictating the 
laws or regulations, “[f]or nearly a millennium, English law 
recognized that the Church of England had theological and 
secular jurisdiction over human remains.”76  Therefore, “[w]hile 
the common law courts had jurisdiction over property, the 
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction concerning human remains 
. . . .”77  Consequently, those theological roots left remnants of 
tradition, value, and process that percolated through time 
throughout the United States.78 
Looking deeper and more specifically into why the English 
common law remained largely silent on human remains 
regulation, this phenomenon is likely attributable to the deafening 
voice the Bible carried into this realm of issues.79  For instance, 
the Old Testament included extensive language regarding the 
importance that the familial role played for the decedent.80  This 
 
71. See generally TANYA MARSH, THE LAW OF HUMAN REMAINS 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS].  
72. See id. 
73. See id.  
74. See id. at ix. 
75. Id. 
76. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at ix. 
77. Scarmon, supra note 49, at 437. 
78. See MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 4. 
79. See id. 
80. See id.  Specifically, “[i]n Genesis, this principal is reiterated through the story of 
Abraham’s family.  After his wife Sarah died, Abraham purchased a tomb in Canaan.  When 
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concept of familial importance in the vein of dead bodies is 
evident through the English common law practice of granting “the 
heirs of the decedent . . . the right to protect the monuments, 
tombstones, and burial shrouds of the decedent [while] the 
Church took possession of the body after it was buried in the 
church grounds.”81   
That the Church of England took possession over the body 
of the deceased is an important fact to note when understanding 
that the Church owned the burial grounds in fee-simple.82  Even 
though the Church did not technically own the body itself—
instead, owning the burial ground—“the Church took 
‘possession’ of the body after burial and protected it so long as it 
remained in consecrated ground.”83  This idea that the 
“ecclesiastical courts provided a remedy against disturbers of the 
dead” became a pervasive root system for the modern professions 
tasked with death care and investigation.84 
1. A Nail in the Coffin: Modernity’s Departure from the  
Law’s Theological Inception 
To get to modern-day America’s take on a quasi-property 
right vested in dead bodies, it is important to note that early 
American settlers struggled immensely to balance theology and 
the separation of church and state.85  This careful balancing act 
compelled early American courts to “sift through the doctrines, 
principles, and values of English ecclesiastical and common law 
and determine which could be adapted for use in a country with 
greater cultural and religious diversity than England . . . .”86   
To fix that jagged notion, “[c]ourts of general jurisdiction 
replaced the delineated system that governed burials in 
 
Abraham’s grandson Jacob approached the end of his life, he instructed his sons” to bury 
him with his family in his homeland.  Id. 
81. Khushbu Solanki, Buried, Cremated, Defleshed by Buzzards? Religiously 
Motivated Excarnatory Funeral Practices Are Not Abuse of Corpse, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & 
RELIGION 350, 363 (2017). 
82. Id. 
83. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 5 (emphasis added). 
84. Solanki, supra note 81, at 363. 
85. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 5. 
86. Id. at 6. 
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England.”87  This decision came after American courts, “[l]acking 
ecclesiastic influence and disliking the potential injustice that the 
[previous] system created,” decided to allow “a decedent’s 
relatives [to] have an interest in the body for burial and interment 
purposes.”88  However, it was not until the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Beatty v. Kurtz that the Court affirmed state 
courts’ power to create and maintain laws and regulations 
regarding human remains.89   
In the landmark decision of Beatty, the dispute itself was a 
simple land ownership disagreement.90  One party had formerly 
“platted an addition to Georgetown, indicating on the plat that a 
particular parcel was for the use of the German Lutheran 
Church.”91  However, after many years of use, the church became 
exceedingly dilapidated.92  Seeing this under-usage of the plat, the 
original owners of the land the church sat upon claimed that the 
original land grant was a “defeasible fee” and reentered the land 
“to prepare it for redevelopment.”93  In response, “[t]he Lutherans 
filed a quiet title action that ended up in the Supreme Court.”94  
This disagreement appears like a very straightforward land 
controversy.  However, there was one major issue:  the plat 
contained a cemetery, and—not only that—the original owners’ 
quest for “redevelopment” caused them to tear down 
tombstones.95  Justice Story wrote a passionate opinion against 
the original landowners and included the Court’s belief that the 
acts of the original landowners were not “mere private trespass” 
but were “a public nuisance, going to the irreparable injury of the 
 
87. Denay L. Wilding Knope, Over My Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions 
Complicate the Constitutional Dilemma of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 
176 (2009). 
88. Id. 
89. See generally Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566 (1829); MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, 
supra note 71, at 6. 
90. Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in 
Burial Places, 30 PROB. & PROP. 59, 61 (2016) [hereinafter Marsh, Dirt and Death]; see also 
Beatty, 27 U.S. at 579-80. 
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Georgetown congregation of Lutherans.”96  Although this case is  
landmark in its affirmation of a state’s rights in regulating human 
remains, it is also landmark in setting a distinct tone for human 
remains law going forward—the legal protection of the 
decedent’s surviving family because of “piety or love.”97 
Since that time, laws and regulations relating to death in the 
United States have primarily been a movement regulated by state 
courts; specifically, this movement grew from a duo of court 
cases out of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.98  From Rhode 
Island’s 1872 decision, the court held plainly “that while a dead 
body is not property in the strict sense of the common law, it is a 
quasi property, over which the relatives of the deceased have 
rights which the courts will protect.”99  Similarly, in 1904, the 
Pennsylvania decision opined that, while “there is a legally 
recognized right of custody, control, and disposition . . . it would 
be more accurate to say that the law recognizes property in a 
corpse, but property subject to a trust.”100  Thus, the age of quasi-
property law applying to corpses was born—shaping how the 
states view and handle dead bodies into the modern era.101  
Importantly, the quasi-property element inherent in a deceased 
individual’s body is a field of law that affects every single 
constituent in any state.102  However, the way that a constituent’s 
specific state dictates their laws gravely affects the quasi-property 
rights and guarantees that every individual should enjoy.103 
Importantly, the lenses of theology, history, and early 
national trends are some of the most zoomed out lenses of human 
remains law.104  Only looking through such broad lenses allows 
for the quirks and confusions that have settled amongst the fifty 
 
96. Marsh, Dirt and Death, supra note 90, at 61 (quoting Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566, 
584 (1829)). 
97. Id. (quoting Beatty, 27 U.S. at 585). 
98. Knope, supra note 87, at 176. 
99. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 227 (R.I. 1872); Knope, 
supra note 87, at 176. 
100. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904) (emphasis added); Knope, supra 
note 87, at 176. 
101. See generally Knope, supra note 87, at 176. 
102. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
103. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
104. See discussion supra Sections II.A., II.B. 
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states to evade the critical eye.105  While those quirks and 
confusions may seem merely like the footnote of a trend, they 
indicate much more than that.  In the laws regulating coroners, it 
is important to remember that each of those hiccups directly 
affects every single constituent in each state—regardless of 
gender, age, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, or economic class.  
Death affects every single person.   
Without zooming in, one can miss the real injustices and 
issues faced by actual constituents, instead, just viewing them as 
mere numbers as part of a more significant trend.  For such an 
important issue that affects every person at one of the most pivotal 
and emotional points in their lives—the death of a loved one—
the states need to get it right, and the actual interests of the people 
it affects need to be at the forefront of any decision.  Each state’s 
decisions in this area of law needs tuning with the constituents in 
mind.106  Accordingly, zooming in to look at how Arkansas 
approaches quasi-property and coroner law has the important 
effect of bringing real-life problems to the forefront—hopefully 
encouraging the solving of problems and the easing of mind for 
families of the deceased.107 
2. One Foot in the Grave: Arkansas’s Take on Postmortem 
Quasi-Property Rights 
In Arkansas, the regulations surrounding and addressing 
coroners contain an inherent duality:  the severe under regulation 
of coroners against the backdrop of a seemingly generous quasi-
property right in dead bodies.108  The 1999 decision by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Travelers Insurance Company v. 
Smith is a landmark decision for Arkansans’ quasi-property right 
in the bodies of their deceased loved ones.109  For the first time, 
Arkansas officially recognized that there exists “[a] quasi-
 
105. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
106. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
107. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
108. See infra notes 187-196 and accompanying text; Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 
81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999). 
109. 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595. 
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property right in dead bodies [that] vests in the nearest relatives 
of the deceased, arising out of their duty to bury their dead.”110   
This important property right becomes increasingly notable 
when considering professions that deal directly with the families 
of deceased individuals—namely because that very same case 
held that an insurance company acts as an agent for said family 
members.111  The court stated that “it should have been clear . . . 
that [the insurance company’s] action or inaction would impact 
the family.”112  Therefore, when a family trusts an insurance 
company with making major decisions in the care of a deceased 
individual, that insurance company has a particular duty to act in 
accordance with that family’s wishes.113  Specifically, because an 
agent of another party must “act on the principal’s behalf and be 
subject to the principal’s control,” they are bound by the 
principal’s wishes—here, that principal being the nearest relatives 
of the deceased.114   
Additionally, the Travelers Insurance Company decision 
reiterates that “one who intentionally, recklessly, or negligently 
withholds the body of a dead person or prevents its proper 
interment or cremation is subject to liability of the family of the 
deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”115  
Therefore, by these stated standards, Arkansas appears to hold 
insurance companies to a high degree of ethical requirements 
regarding the decision-making in the treatment and care of the 
deceased.116  Specifically, in Travelers Insurance Company, the 
family of the deceased endured a five-day delay in the embalming 
process of its family member.117  Due to this “delay in the 
embalming process and the deterioration of the body, the body 
was not deemed presentable for an open casket funeral.”118  If that 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 93-94, 991 S.W.2d at 598. 
112. Id. at 94, 991 S.W.2d at 598-99.  
113. See Holly v. State, 2017 Ark. 201, at 22, 520 S.W.3d 677, 691 (stating “that the 
two essential elements of an agency relationship are (1) that an agent have the authority to 
act for the principal and (2) that the agent act on the principal’s behalf and be subject to the 
principal’s control.”). 
114. Id. 
115. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 90, 991 S.W.2d at 596.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 87, 991 S.W.2d at 594. 
118. Id. 
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alone had not been enough of a slap in the face to the family, the 
funeral home also attempted to charge it for the refrigeration 
required in “keeping the body for five additional days prior to 
embalming.”119  In the end, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict 
of $60,000.00 in damages ($20,000.00 for each of the 
plaintiffs).120   
While the case of that family pertains specifically to 
insurance companies,121 coroners are not and should not be off the 
hook from these standards of duty in Arkansas.  Although the 
duties owed by a coroner are far more abstract,122 the recognition 
of their existence is imperative—in fact, “[t]he first attempt to 
bring a constitutional challenge regarding” the quasi-property 
right in a dead body versus a coroner was a case out of Arkansas:  
Fuller v. Marx.123  Although the plaintiff initially lost this case in 
the district court, the Eighth Circuit noted that the loss pertained 
to a previous belief in Arkansas that a quasi-property right in a 
dead body bestowed upon the family of the deceased did not 
exist.124  Clearly, fifteen years later, the tide has continued its shift 
with Travelers Insurance Company.125  Accordingly, a shift of the 
tide in a duty owed by coroners to the families of the deceased 
should follow suit.   
A notion of similar regard found consideration in Waeschle 
v. Dragovic—a 2008 case out of Michigan.126  In that case, the 
court found that the plaintiff had a “constitutional right to notice 
that she did not receive [decedent]’s brain” after the coroner never 
notified her of such alterations.127  The court came to this 
conclusion through the belief that “next-of-kin have a cognizable 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for violation of the right 
to a deceased relative’s body.”128  This chain of thinking is nearly 
 
119. Id. 
120. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 87, 991 S.W.2d at 594. 
121. Id. at 90, 991 S.W.2d at 596. 
122. See infra Section II.C. 
123. 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); Knope, supra note 87, at 190. 
124. Fuller, 724 F.2d at 719; Knope, supra note 87, at 190. 
125. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.  
126. Knope, supra note 87, at 199.  
127. Id. at 200 (quoting Waeschle v. Dragovic, No. 08-10393, 2008 WL 4372636, at 
*7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2008)). 
128. Id. 
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a mirror image of the decision of the court in Travelers Insurance 
Company—holding that—due to the insurance company’s poor 
choices—“it should have been clear . . . that [the insurance 
company’s] actions or inaction would impact the family” and 
violate the key duty between the parties.129   
Although there is currently no black and white obligation by 
coroners owed to families in Arkansas, a conclusion of such 
magnitude is not beyond the scope of feasibility for the existing 
case precedent.130  Instead, a conclusion that coroners do owe 
some duty of care and skill to the families would serve as a natural 
conclusion for the direction in which the court in Travelers 
Insurance Company already set its sights.131  While this likely 
might be a controversial claim to some, requiring a duty out of 
coroners can only serve Arkansans with more respect and 
dignity—which they deserve during a time already filled with 
intense grief.  
The Travelers Insurance Company case perfectly 
encapsulates a clear moral compass for the State of Arkansas in 
the area of coroner regulation.132  However, in referencing later 
discussion, the peculiarly low standards that the State then turns 
around and holds its coroners to are embarrassingly low and void 
of said moral compass.133  Because of that disconnect, the cases 
that deal with coroners appear as residual damage control for what 
could simply be commonly cured by higher standards and 
education.134  Due to those lax regulations on the actual people 
that carry out these human remains laws that the State purportedly 
holds in such high regard, it is easy to conclude that said lax 
regulations inherently violate the State’s moral compass.135  
However, those issues endure discussion at length later.136  For 
 
129. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 94, 991 S.W.2d at 598-99. 
130. See generally id. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595 (stating that “[a] quasi-property right 
in dead bodies vests in the nearest relatives of the deceased . . . .”); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 
717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff lost under old rule in which there was a 
lack of property rights vested in a dead body’s organs). 
131. See generally Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595. 
132. See generally id. at 92-93, 991 S.W.2d at 597-98. 
133. See infra Section II.C. 
134. See infra Section II.C. 
135. See infra Section II.C. 
136. See infra Section II.C. 
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now, it is essential to recognize the lack of clarity at which 
Arkansas’s laws—on a surface level—care for the rights and 
respect of the bodies of the deceased.137  This clarity is important 
because it will serve as a backdrop for the lack of care and respect 
lazily required from the coroners that actually investigate the 
deceased individuals.138 
C. As Long as We Both Shall Live: The Origin  
and Dissolution of the Coroner Role in  
Favor of the Medical Examiner 
The history behind the coroner’s role is an important 
consideration as part of this conversation.  In its humble 
beginnings, the position of coroner was one that the United States 
took from England’s tradition, “just as they took over the sheriff 
and the jury system.”139  Originally called “crowners,” these 
bygone coroners “were knights appointed by the king of England 
to investigate deaths in which the crown had a property 
interest.”140  Thus, from the very beginning of the coroner story, 
the idea of property and death investigation intermingled.141  
Using property as their motivation in investigating an 
unexplained death, “crowners used crude medical and legal 
knowledge to make fact based determinations regarding 
questioned deaths, [and] were, in a sense, death investigation 
experts.”142 
As this original “crowner” system began to dissipate, 
England replaced it with what modern America would recognize 
as a coroner.143  While death investigation remained the 
cornerstone of the coroner’s role in the post-”crowner” age, a 
significant difference existed between the two times:  how the 
 
137. See infra Section II.C. 
138. See infra Section II.C. 
139. Lawrence M. Friedman & Paul W. Davies, California Death Trip, 36 IND. L. REV. 
17, 18 (2003).  
140. Robert D. Felder, A Coroner System in Crisis: The Scandals and Struggles 
Plaguing Louisiana Death Investigation, 69 LA. L. REV. 627, 631-32 (2009) (emphasis 
added).  
141. See generally id. at 632. 
142. Id. (emphasis added). 
143. Id. 
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community chose the coroner.144  For crowners, a king appointed 
them; for the new coroner system, a community elected them.145  
By electing this new age of death investigators, novel problems 
presented themselves for the crown that the coroners served and 
the people that the coroners investigated.146 
One of these paramount, new problems occurred due to the 
shifting motivations that the new age of coroners wrought.147  
Namely, the appointment of crowners by a king, due to their skill 
and ability in performing investigations, was starkly different 
compared to the new election system of coroners—in which, “the 
knights who specialized in death investigation were replaced by 
powerful political figures with little to no expertise in the 
field.”148  Additionally, a similar problem unfolded regarding 
power imbalances.149  This problem occurred “[b]ecause 
[coroners] wielded the power to seize property from citizens, 
[and] many coroners began using their power for self-serving 
interests.”150  Ultimately, “[i]t was this [election] system, one 
based on political interests in property rather than science, which 
crossed the Atlantic Ocean and thereafter influenced death 
investigations in the American colonies.”151   
Through that original metamorphosis, the modern American 
coroner was born; however, to many Americans, the actual duties 
that belong to a coroner may be somewhat of a mystery.152  After 
all, “[i]n today’s world of highly glamorized forensic science 
 
144. Id. at 632-33. 
145. Felder, supra note 140, at 631-32. 




150. Felder, supra note 140, at 632. 
151. Id. 
152. Out of all the duties and responsibilities that fall under the coroner role, there is a 
glaring quirk that seems fitting for the likes of a Wild West film—in Arkansas, the coroner 
is responsible for the arrest of a sheriff.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-511 (1947).  While it 
seems like this should be an archaic and untouched protocol, this duty came to pass as 
recently as 2016.  Tom Sissom, Arkansas Law Gives Coroners Authority Over Jails, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 2016, 1:17 AM), [https://perma.cc/4UCS-3M2P].  In 
response to the 2016 arrest of Benton County Sheriff Kelly Cradduck, the Benton County 
coroner was summoned by local prosecutors to dust off this odd protocol.  Id.  This legislative 
oddity is further proof that the Arkansas legislature should revitalize this bygone system.  
See discussion infra Part III. 
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dramas . . . the public has developed grave misconceptions about 
what realistically can be accomplished and what is statutorily 
required in the performance of a forensic death investigation.”153  
Therefore, to sober any preconceived notions regarding what a 
coroner does, it is important to look directly at the source:  state 
law—specifically, under Arkansas state law, the powers and 
duties of a coroner include that, after a death is reported, “he or 
she shall conduct an investigation concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the death of an individual and gather and review 
background information, including, but not limited to, medical 
information and any other information which may be helpful in 
determining the cause and manner of death.”154  This job 
description might be shocking to some due to a key lacking 
attribute that is commonly—and incorrectly—attributed to 
coroners:  conducting autopsies.155  Without it, the Arkansas 
statute could simply be describing Nancy Drew in any of her 
famous adventures.156   
Although those in the coroner role do not conduct the actual 
autopsy itself, they have a crucial role in tipping off whether there 
is a need for an autopsy or death investigation at all.157  For 
instance, coroners are the first line of defense in noticing 
indicators of toxicology concerns for the deceased; therefore, 
“[w]hen the proper and uniform technique and procedure [is] 
invoked in the collection, testing, and custody of toxicologic 
specimens, the conclusions of a death investigator’s autopsy 
report can have great scientific weight in a court of law.”158  On 
the opposite side of the coin, “individuals without a medical 
background may be more likely to miss subtle signs and fail to 
order toxicological testing.”159  Consequently, once “signs are 
 
153. Felder, supra note 140, at 627. 
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-301 (1993). 
155. § 14-15-301. 
156. §  14-15-301; Nancy Drew Series, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, [https://perma.cc/EA32-
F887]. 
157. Andrea R. Tischler, Speaking for the Dead: A Call for Nationwide Coroner 
Reform, 33 SW.  U. L. REV. 553, 559 (2004). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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missed and tests are not done properly in the beginning” of an 
investigation, “the mistake will generally never be detected.”160   
The former chief medical examiner in Virginia, Marcella 
Fierro, opined that an “autopsy is the cornerstone of death 
investigation”; therefore, if a coroner believes “a death isn’t 
recognized as being suspicious . . . [then] it’s buried or cremated, 
whatever the family wishes, never to rise again.”161  Most 
ominously, she stated that “[m]ost errors are buried.”162  
Ultimately, the panel, in which Marcella Fierro herself sat, stated 
that “coroners [are] the weak[est] link.”163  Simply put, “on their 
best day, if [coroners] do not have the training, the skills, the 
infrastructure, the facility, [and] the access to forensic science, 
they can’t do a good job.”164 
Toxicology is just one example of these grave dangers that 
states face when deciding on the education and training required 
for their coroners.165  An even more sour reality unveils itself in 
the courtroom; in which, some courts have held that coroners’ 
testimony is completely inadmissible or only admissible if they 
“possess[] the necessary experiential qualifications.”166  The fact 
that some coroners would not even be able to have those 
experiential qualifications should be disheartening to the 
constituents for which those coroners serve.167  Because of the 
gravity of such an important role, it should not be a partisan or 
difficult choice to make when requiring more out of some of the 
state’s most important investigators.  However, the current 
landscape of what states require out of this class of individuals 
tells an increasingly different story.168  
While the coroner’s position is one of longstanding heritage, 
the coroner position has also stood the test of time in many states; 
 
160. Id. at 559–60. 
161. Sandra Bartlett, Coroners Don’t Need Degrees to Determine Death, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 2, 2011, 12:06 PM), [https://perma.cc/B8NJ-A5UB]. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. (emphasis added). 
164. Id. (emphasis added). 
165. Tischler, supra note 157, at 559. 
166. Id. at 561. 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 187–97.  
168. See infra notes 169-88 and accompanying text. 
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however, many states changed or eliminated the role entirely.169  
For instance, “Massachusetts abolished the position in 1877, and 
created the post of ‘medical examiner’”—a position requiring a 
medical degree.170  Importantly, in addition to having some sort 
of medical certification or degree, the term “medical examiner” 
also generally denotes that the position is appointed—not 
elected.171  
In 1915, New York and Rhode Island followed 
Massachusetts and took similar steps.172  Starting then and 
moving into the 1990s, the states unleashed a domino effect in 
which “most states had either gotten rid of the coroner altogether, 
and replaced this office with a medical examiner, or with a mixed 
system of some sort—both a medical examiner and a coroner; or 
a system in which some counties had coroners, and others had 
medical examiners.”173  Because of this hybrid system, the 
educational standards required for either coroners or medical 
examiners fell into a sort of disarray.174 
In response to this confusion, a “panel [was] created by the 
National Academy of Sciences” that worked to “point[] out the 
lack of mandatory standards for autopsies and the absence of 
oversight into the performance of coroners and medical 
examiners.”175  After this effort by the panel, it opined that “the 
goal of every state should be to move away from a coroner 
system, which is not based on medicine, and instead hire board 
certified forensic pathologists and put them to work as medical 
examiners.”176  With all of these varying answers to the future of 
the coroner tradition, it is natural that the degree of education 
required for these important officials is the key issue that is under 
fire on a national scale.177 
 
169. Friedman & Davies, supra note 139, at 18. 
170. Id. 
171. Carl Parrott, Comparing Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems: Advantages 
and Disadvantages of the Coroner System, INST. OF MED. (US) COMM. FOR THE WORKSHOP 
ON THE MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION (2003), [https://perma.cc/YUR8-PF79]. 
172. Friedman & Davies, supra note 139, at 18. 
173. Id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 161. 
174. See Bartlett, supra note 161. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (emphasis added).  
177. See id. 
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The hardest pill to swallow for this education conundrum is 
that, nationally, “most coroners are laypersons elected for 
specified terms, and few have had any formal medical or legal 
training.”178  For a profession tasked with such an integral part of 
the death investigation process, “[p]ersons who have held the 
position of coroner include sheriff’s deputies, school bus drivers, 
tow truck operators, gas station attendants, tavern owners, 
accountants, and even jewelry salesmen.”179  This is not to say 
that perhaps these individuals were not well-intentioned members 
of their local communities hoping to serve the best they could in 
that role; however, it needs mentioning that jobs with such a high 
degree of importance and opportunity to cause irreparable harm 
to a family or an investigation should require an equally pressing 
degree of specialized knowledge and training.   
While it is true that “[i]n most states, elected coroners are 
not required to be physicians or forensic pathologists,” there are 
many other states that provide extensive qualifications or 
trainings required to fill these posts.180  Naturally, some states, 
including Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Ohio, require that 
coroners be physicians.181  While that high requirement is a rarity 
in the national trend, the other conditions across many of the 
states are still quite weighty.182   
For instance, in West Virginia, “[a] county medical examiner 
shall be medically trained and licensed by the state of West 
Virginia as a physician, registered nurse, paramedic, emergency 
medical technician or a physician assistant, [and] be certified in 
the practice of medicolegal death investigation.”183  In Alabama, 
a person cannot qualify to serve as a coroner “[u]nless he or she 
[h]as at least 24 months of previous service as a county coroner 
or deputy coroner in the state.”184  Similarly, in Texas, “[t]o the 
greatest extent possible, the medical examiner shall be appointed 
from persons having training and experience in pathology, 
 
178. Tischler, supra note 157, at 559. 
179. Id. 
180. Coroner Training Requirements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Jan. 15, 2015), [https://perma.cc/4KJ9-ELEQ]. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. (emphasis added). 
184. Id. 
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toxicology, histology, and other medico-legal sciences.”185  West 
Virginia, Alabama, and Texas serve as examples of only sixteen 
states with laws on the books requiring any level of education for 
this crucial investigatory role186—a horrifying figure that needs 
substantial upheaval on a national scale.  
However, focusing in on Arkansas, each of its seventy-five 
counties have their own coroners, with seventy-three of those 
counties electing those positions.187  The qualifications for 
serving as coroner:  being eighteen years of age and not being a 
felon.188  If those factors were not jarring enough, the training 
after being elected to the job is even bleaker.189  While Arkansas 
“offered free death investigation training” for coroners starting in 
2015, only twenty counties completed it as of 2016.190  As one 
coroner from Van Buren County crassly put it, “[y]ou’re not 
going to get no cooperation to take off from your full-time job to 
go do something that’s kind of free and not required.”191   
The picture for coroners got slightly sweeter in 2019 when 
the Arkansas General Assembly passed a law that “requir[ed] the 
certification [of] deputy coroners.”192  The training in question:  a 
minuscule certification course.193  Specifically, under Arkansas 
law, coroners and deputy coroners have to complete a training 
“that consists of no less than sixteen (16) hours [and no] more 
than forty (40) hours of instruction.”194  For a quick reference, 
“[m]edical school takes 4 years to complete, but to become a 
doctor [students] also spend 3-7 years in residency.”195  In 
contrast, the course that Arkansas requires “includes basics about 
death investigation, state laws and statutes, crime scene 
 
185. Coroner Training Requirements, supra note 180. 
186. Id. 






192. Tracy Neal, Certification Mandatory for Deputy Coroners, ARK. DEMOCRAT 
GAZETTE (Feb. 17, 2020, 1:03 AM), [https://perma.cc/RM23-FVKW]. 
193. Id. 
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-308 (2021). 
195. What to Expect in Medical School, PRINCETON REV., [https://perma.cc/WHR5-
9WZV]. 
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investigations and how to make proper death notifications 
. . . .”196   
Due to the inherent and paramount importance of a death 
investigator like a coroner or a medical examiner, Arkansans 
clearly deserve more than hardly trained professionals.  The 
quasi-property right endowed to constituents who are close 
relatives of the deceased should provide a concrete duty for 
coroners to act with a certain level of respect and skill on behalf 
of those families.197  A decision that coroners owe some duty of 
care and skill to the families of the deceased should act as a 
natural conclusion for the direction that the court in Travelers 
Insurance Company already chose.198  It is time for Arkansas to 
protect its constituents from lazy legislation and regulation over 
some of the state’s most important investigators. 
III.  KICKING THE BUCKET: THE SOLUTION TO 
ARKANSAS’S GRAVE MISTAKE 
The solution to Arkansas’s broken system is not a difficult 
one, but it is a grave one.  In their current state, Arkansas’s 
coroner regulations fail their constituents at almost every step of 
the way.199  From the moment a person dies, the local coroner’s 
office likely lacks the breadth of training necessary to deliver a 
quality report on the cause of death.200  Even worse, the office 
may not have enough education to recognize the need for a further 
autopsy request.201  These each seem like significant issues, and 
they are.  However, their gravity does not require an equally grave 
realm of regulation.  Simple regulations can make a world of 
difference for future generations of constituents who pass away.  
Stated plainly, Arkansas’s current coroner system does not 
provide the necessary experiential or educational components 
imperative for death investigators to properly postulate about the 
causes of death within the state.202  Accordingly, under the current 
 
196. Neal, supra note 192.  
197. See Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999). 
198. Id. 
199. See supra Section II.C. 
200. See A Look into Becoming an Arkansas Coroner, supra note 187. 
201. See Neal, supra note 192. 
202. See supra Section II.C. 
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regime, Arkansas coroners inherently fail the duty of care and 
skill arguably owed to families of the deceased under the 
precedent set in Travelers Insurance Company.203  There is a clear 
solution to this failure:  switching to a medical examiner system 
that requires the appointment of a physician. 
The medical examiner system was recommended by the 
panel created by the National Academy of Sciences in 2009,204 
and there are currently “16 states and the District of Columbia” 
that abide by that system—of which “[m]edical examiners are 
appointed to their position and [are] almost always . . . 
physicians.”205  By eliminating the coroner system, requiring the 
appointment—not election—of medical examiners, and 
mandating that the position be for physicians only, the state would 
greatly benefit its constituents by providing adequate 
investigations into their deaths by specialized health 
professionals.206  
It may seem easy to dismiss this idea due to a possible 
misconception that Arkansas’s lower population density provides 
for a lower need for investigations into suspicious deaths.207  
However, that assumption could not be further from the truth for 
the Natural State.  In reality, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) ranked Arkansas ninth out of all the states in 
homicide mortality.208  Additionally, in 2017, Arkansas held 
almost double the national average rate for firearm deaths—
sitting at 20.3 while the national rate sits at 12.0.209  Finally, if 
those statistics were not jarring enough, in 2017, Arkansas ranked 
ninth in the United States for suicide deaths—deaths that often 
 
203. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595. 
204. Bartlett, supra note 161. 
205. Id. 
206. See supra Section II.C. 
207. See Homicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
[https://perma.cc/5M2E-4T6D] (last visited Feb. 16, 2021); Stats of the State of Arkansas, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/838B-ZF9S] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018); Samuel Stebbins, Dangerous States: Which States Have the Highest Rates 
of Violent Crime and Most Murders, USA TODAY, [https://perma.cc/5Z7U-KPDN] (Jan. 13, 
2020, 8:51 AM). 
208. Homicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
supra note 207. 
209. Stats of the State of Arkansas, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
supra note 207. 
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require investigation for cause or suspicion.210  Most recently, in 
2020, USA Today ranked Arkansas as the fourth most dangerous 
state in the country.211  These statistics prove one central point:  
Arkansas cannot consider itself a state exempt from requiring 
extensive medical knowledge and training for some of its most 
critical investigative workers due to any fantasy that it is 
somehow a state that experiences low rates of suspicious 
deaths.212   
In contrast, an apt critique in moving towards a medical-
examiner-only approach would come from the fact that Arkansas 
ranks thirty-third in active physicians within the state.213  
However, this is an exceedingly easy argument to overcome 
based on the reality that Arkansas—utterly separate from the 
medical examiner question—needs the generation of more 
physician interest in the state regarding regular healthcare for its 
constituents.214  Although the University of Arkansas Medical 
School (“UAMS”) “is among the top 10 programs in the country 
in graduating primary care specialists,” the issue is that “[b]y 
2030, [the state will] need almost 500 additional . . . physicians 
just to meet the needs of the state, and [the state is] just not 
graduating enough to meet that need . . . .”215  Therefore, having 
more doctors in the state is not a need for just a single issue; it is 
a crucial need for various issues that constituents will face in the 
near future.  It is in the legislature’s best interest for those it serves 
to generate more appeal in—not only being a doctor—but being 
a doctor in Arkansas.   
To solve this important issue regarding physicians—
specifically for medical examiner positions—funding will likely 
play an important role in generating that interest.216  While 
 
210. Id. 
211. Stebbins, supra note 207. 
212. See Homicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
supra note 207; Stats of the State of Arkansas, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, supra note 207; Stebbins, supra note 207. 
213. Professionally Active Physicians, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 2021), 
[https://perma.cc/ZUV7-455V]. 
214. Denise Middleton, Why is Arkansas Still Facing a Primary Care Physician 
Shortage?, THV 11, [https://perma.cc/FD6K-VQF7] (Feb. 28, 2019, 10:12 PM). 
215. Id. 
216. See Bartlett, supra note 161. 
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funding is a challenging and grid-locking question for every state 
legislature, it is time for Arkansas to put its money where its 
mouth is:  purportedly caring about deceased Arkansans and the 
families they leave behind.  Arkansas must ditch the coroner 
system in favor of a modernized medical examiner position—
therefore finally equipping this crucial role to fulfill an arguable 
duty of care and skill to the families of the deceased.217 
IV.  BITE THE DUST: A CONCLUSION 
Throughout all of this history, law, and transformation, one 
takeaway is blatantly apparent:  Arkansas fails to fulfill the quasi-
property right in dead bodies—affirmed and afforded to 
Arkansans in Travelers Insurance Company—and favors ill-
trained and ill-equipped individuals as the leaders of death 
investigations within the state.218  This failure has percolated 
throughout centuries of history and transformation that has left 
the current coroner role in the shell of a position that it is now:  
unable to fulfill a dire and important need in owing some duty of 
skill or care to families throughout the death investigation 
process.219   
There is no question that there is no clear duty by coroners 
owed to families in Arkansas; however, a conclusion that 
coroners do owe some duty is an obvious and natural conclusion 
for the direction that the court already laid out in Travelers 
Insurance Company.220  By continuing the bygone system of 
electing coroners who often fail to possess the skills or education 
that would be proper for a job of such scientific magnitude, 
Arkansas is allowing death investigations to take a backseat to 
political showmanship.221 
Arkansas can no longer hide behind laws that do little in 
protecting families who are inevitably in some of the worst days 
they will experience in life.222  The quasi-property right inherent 
 
217. See Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999). 
218. Id. 
219. See supra Section II.C. 
220. See supra Section II.C. 
221. See supra Section II.C. 
222. A Look into Becoming an Arkansas Coroner, supra note 187. 
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in a dead body vested in the nearest family of the deceased must 
be honored.223  Without it, families will continue to suffer at the 
hands of those that lack proper education—failing in the endeavor 
of properly serving constituents, properly investigating deaths, 
and properly providing peace of mind for families throughout that 
process.224  Accordingly, Arkansas must ditch the coroner system 
in favor of a modernized medical examiner role.225  The 
legislature cannot afford to treat each Arkansans’ death as a 
number—each number represents a lifetime.  Arkansas should not 
say “till death do us part” with its current regulations—Arkansans 
are more than a number.  The legislature should act like it.  
 
 
223. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595. 
224. See supra Section II.C. 
225. See supra Section II.C. 
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